Vol.XLVII · Issue 2 · 2023 ISSN 0722-3226 E 16,50 US $ 28,00 United with HOT SPOTS: NATO – Russian Army’s EW tactics – Raw Materials THEME: Light Fighters, Operational Requirements and Potential Markets HOT SPOTS: NATO – Russian Army’s EW tactics – Raw Materials THEME: Light Fighters, Operational Requirements and Potential Markets NATIONS IN FOCUS: Greece and Eastern Mediterranean EMERGING TECHNOLOGY: Cloud Computing for Defence Applications Defence Applications Exclusive Report from Enforce Tac
Ukraine resists, Russia does not withdraw. This is becoming a new normal as are editorials dedicated to the war at the gates of Europe. In January, the US approved a new $2.5 billion package of military aids to Ukraine, trying to meet the demand of the Ukrainian military for ammunitions, long-range weapons (artillery, missiles), night vision goggles, sights and optics, laser rangefinders, and much more. The following month, a further $500 million package was approved. According to the Kiel Institute’s figures, since January 2022, the US has pledged some €73 billion to Ukraine, of which €44,34 billion in military aid. In February, Ukrainian President Zelensky spoke to the European Parliament and to the European Council. He also had talks with French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz in a separate meeting. EU countries pledged €55 billion to Ukraine, of which €10 billion in military aid. To the US and to European countries, president Zelensky asks more weapons and equipment, training, and financial aid. He multiplies calls to deliver promised resources quickly. To give an idea of the orders of magnitude, Ukrainian Chief-of-Staff, Lt. General Serhiy Shaptala, stated that to reverse the situation on the ground and switch from a defensive to an offensive posture – thus giving Ukraine a chance to pursue complete victory – he would need 300 tanks, 6-700 armoured vehicles, and 500 artillery pieces. Naturally, the wishlist is provisional and not exhaustive. War does not wait for western beloved bureaucracy or, in the case of the EU, for its “normative power”. War takes lives daily, disrupts supply chains, destroys infrastructure and houses, and consumes weapons and equipment at fast pace. According to Norwegian army’s esteems, Russia would have lost more than 180,000 soldiers (killed and wounded) while Ukraine 100,000. Ukrainian forces are engaged in a race against time to get timely supplies, and deal with daily shortages of food, water, gears, and ammunitions. Yet, they make every metre of Ukrainian territory taken by Russians cost them the highest possible price. It is a nation- wide effort that goes beyond the crude performance of its armed forces. It includes large private initiatives such as Ukrainian TV presenter Serhiy Prytula’s crowdfundings as well as individual initiatives by private citizens that voluntarily reach out to the front bringing small quantities of food and warm clothes to support their soldiers. Russian forces resist, too, and they pursue their campaign. After the September 2022 mobilization, Russia can count on 300,000 more troops, and Ukraine is afraid that Russia Will is as important as technology edge Editorial anticipated that other big companies will be called to contribute to the war efforts in 2023. The flow of money allowed Putin to raise pensions and minimum salaries by 10% and to guarantee subsides to the most impacted economic sectors. Sanctions tend to act in the long run, and the Russian ailing economy cannot hold forever. But Moscow does have margins to manoeuvring, still. Worse still, blowbacks of a sudden collapse would be a disaster for the global economy. The take home message is that the technology edge guaranteed by US and European weapons is fundamental to give hope to Ukraine and to make Kyiv’s victory possible. But money and technology are not enough. Battles and wars are won only through strong will. The real challenge is defeating the Russian will to fight rather than his ability to fight. On paper, European forces would be more advanced and better trained than Russia’s, but should a war occur, what would make the difference would be popular support for the government and the army. So, in the democratic world, the battle for hearts and minds must be won domestically as a precondition to provide Ukraine and the other allies with a more solid, credible support that goes beyond showing the flag. Marco Giulio Barone Editor-in-Chief MT 2/2023 · 1 might organise a large offensive employing half a million soldiers at once. Sometimes, Russia organizes massive missile raids through Kh-101/555 subsonic cruise missiles launched by Tu-95 strategic bombers, Kh-22 supersonic cruise missiles launched from Tu-22 bombers, Kh-59 stand-off missiles launched by Su-24 bomber fighters, Iskander short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) launched from land batteries in the Kursk Oblast, and Kalibr subsonic cruise missiles launched from naval vessels in the Black Sea. In March, raids also included six Kinzhal hypersonic missiles launched by Mig-31K fighter bombers, the largest attack with this kind of weapons so far. In addition, a few dozen S-300s have been used in surface-to-surface mode. Meanwhile, the bitter surprise for western countries is that Russian GDP has shrunk by 2.2% only in 2022. One year ago, western analysts had esteemed that the combined consequences of war and western sanctions would have reduced Russian GDP by 8%. IMF eventually expects a slight 0.3% growth in 2023. This is in partly due to the raise in the price of oil, gas, and raw materials as well as to the expansion of Russian trade with China, India, and Turkey to compensate for lowering sales to Europe. With Ukrainian production of cereals going down, Russian sales flourished, helped – once again – by global shortage and raising prices. In the financial sector, Russian central bank raised interest rates while imposing to importers of raw materials to pay their bill in roubles, thus containing the inflation spiral. Lastly, Russian National Wealth Fund contributed to cover for the state deficit – and it could do so for three more years at least, according to esteems. Moscow also seized part of the benefits of Gazprom and
2 · MILITARY TECHNOLOGY 2/2023 Editorial Will is as Important as Technology Edge.................................................... 1 Marco Giulio Barone, Editor-in-Chief Observations from Europe Brussels Ukraine: EU’s challenge of challenges ...................................................... 4 Caterina Tani Berlin That is About to Change.............................................................................. 5 Stefan Nitschke Paris French footprint in Africa............................................................................. 6 Less boots on the ground, weaker economic ties Marco Giulio Barone Rome Parole, parole, parole – Raising awareness, unchanged budget..................................................... 7 Marco Giulio Barone London The First Casualty of War…. ...................................................................... 8 Tim Mahon Hot Spots NATO: the saga continues – The Alliance after one year of Ukrainian war............................................ 10 Caterina Tani What Happened Next................................................................................. 13 Thomas Withington Dependence of Strategic and Critical Raw Materials May Soon Replace Today’s Dependence on Oil, Says the European Commission – What Lessons are to be Learned?.............................................................16 Stefan Nitschke Theme: Light Fighters Requirements and Proposals for Light Fighters – Powerful Little Ones................................................................................... 21 Santiago Rivas Radar, Sensors, Pods, and Suites for light fighters – Does size matters?.................................................................................... 24 Anil Raj UCAVs and adjuncts/remote carriers: the light fighters of the future?.................................................................. 28 Babak Taghvaee Nations in Focus: Greece Geopolitics in East Mediterranean – Shaping military agendas.......................................................................... 32 Marco Giulio Barone The modernization efforts of the Hellenic Army...................................... 37 Robert Czulda The Hellenic defence industry’s international cooperation programmes............................................................................................... 40 Eugene Kogan Observers from Overseas India Looking Inward. ......................................................................................... 44 Atul Chandra Japan Breaking the Yoshida doctrine.................................................................. 45 Tim Fish Strategic pills from China Xi Jinping’s China: Dragon on the Move?................................................. 46 Tomáš Chlebecek Emerging Technologies Final Frontiers – Emerging Technologies Observatory Show Me the MANET…. – Persistent Systems IRONs Out USAF Security Issues............................ 47 Tim Mahon Final Frontiers – Emerging Technologies Observatory The Loneliness of the Long-Distance Neuroscientist – AI, Machine Learning and Deep Learning in Defence............................. 49 Tim Mahon Final Frontiers – Emerging Technologies Observatory Manufacturing in Space – Space logistics for civil and (maybe) military applications..................... 50 Marco Giulio Barone Cloud computing for defence applications – Perspectives and experiments................................................................. 51 Andrew White The 3-2-1 Interview Hybrid Intelligence – the Future of Defence?........................................... 54 Tim Mahon Contents ˇ
MT 2/2023 · 3 Mönch Verlagsgesellschaft mbH (Mönch Publishing Group) Editor-in-Chief, Military Technology: Marco Giulio Barone Editor-at-Large: Dr Ezio Bonsignore North American Bureau Chief (New Orleans): Marty Kauchak NATO & EU Affairs Correspondent (Brussels): Caterina Tani Publishers: Uta & Volker Schwichtenberg US Office: 1326 St Andrew Street, Unit B, New Orleans, LA 70130-5124 Correspondents: Massimo Annati (Italy); Marco Giulio Barone (France); Angus Batey (UK); Dr Theo Benien (Germany); Philip Butterworth-Hayes (UK); Atul Chandra (India); Tomás Chlebecek (Czech Republic); Dr Robert Czulda (Poland); Peter Donaldson (UK); Arie Egozi (Israel); Tim Fish (New Zealand); Kubilai Han (Turkey); Eugene Kogan (Georgia); Denys Kolesnyk (France); Edward Lundquist (USA); Georg Mader (Austria); Stephen W Miller (USA); Jörg Muth (Estonia); Trevor Nash (UK); Dr Stefan Nitschke (Germany); Santiago Rivas (Argentina); David Saw (France); Andrew White (UK); Dr Thomas Withington (France) Executive Associate and CEO: Volker Schwichtenberg Executive Associate, CEO and Lawyer: Uta Schwichtenberg Founder: Manfred Sadlowski Deputy Managing Director: Christa André Cover and Layout: Frank Stommel Mönch Verlagsgesellschaft mbH: Christine-Demmer-Straße 7 Tel.: +49-2641 / 3703-0 53474 Bad Neuenahr-Ahrweiler Fax: +49-2641 / 3703-199 Germany E-Mail: miltech@moench-group.com www.monch.com The views published are not necessarily those of the Publisher or Editor. Photos and Illustrations for which no specific credit is given are understood to be in the public domain. Copyright © 2023 by Mönch Verlagsgesellschaft mbH. All editorial content published in this magazine is protected by copyright. All rights, especially those concerning translations are reserved. No part of this magazine may be reproduced, or transmitted, or translated into another language, in any form or by any means, electronic, digital, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, or be stored in any retrieval system of any nature, without prior written permission of Mönch Verlagsgesellschaft mbH, except as when related to §§53, 54 German UrhG, under which certain circumstances entitles the Publisher to compensation. According to §54 (2) German UrhG, any copy made or used by commercial enterprises, serving commercial purposes, requires financial compensation to be paid to Mönch Verlagsgesellschaft. For permission requests, write to Mönch Verlagsgesellschaft mbH. (Contact data see above) Printed in Germany – DCM Druck Center Meckenheim GmbH Werner-von-Siemens-Straße 13,53340 Meckenheim Subscription MILITARY TECHNOLOGY is published 6 times a year. This periodical is available by subscription for E96,- inclusive of surface postal charges, per year. Orders must be accompanied by cheque, payable to Mönch Verlagsgesellschaft mbH. Change of address: Please send old mailing label and new address together with name of journal to Mönch Verlagsgesellschaft mbH, Christine-Demmer-Str. 7 in 53474 Bad NeuenahrAhrweiler (Germany) and allow two months for the change to become effective. Subscription USA and Canada MILITARY TECHNOLOGY is published 6 times a year by Mönch Verlagsgesellschaft mbH, Bad Neuenahr-Ahrweiler, Germany. The subscription price is US $150 per year. Postmaster: Send address changes to: Mönch Verlagsgesellschaft mbH, Christine-Demmer-Straße 7 in 53474 Bad Neuenahr-Ahrweiler (Germany) – Subscribers: Please use same address for orders and payments. Other journals of the Mönch Verlagsgesellschaft mbH are: - NAVAL FORCES (six times yearly in English), - WEHRTECHNIK (six times yearly, in German), - RIVISTA ITALIANA DIFESA (monthly, in Italian) - TECNOLOGIA MILITAR (twice a year, in Spanish) - AL DEFAIYA (bi-monthly, in Arabic) MILITARY TECHNOLOGY is available to qualified circles within governments, military related organisations and industries. Your MILITARY TECHNOLOGY Contact Asian Eastern Pacific (ASEP) Mr. Vishal Mehta PO Box 11328 Mobile: +91 99 999 85 425 IARI, New Delhi 110012 E-Mail: vishal.mehta@ India moench-group.com Belgium, France, Pakistan Mr. Georges France Mönch Verlagsgesellschaft mbH Tel.: +33 1 60 82 98 88 6, impasse de la Grande Fax: +33 1 60 82 98 89 F-91510 Janville-sur-Juine E-Mail: georges.france@ wanadoo.fr Italy Mr. Franco Lazzari RID Tel.: +39 01 85 30 15 98 Via Martiri della Liberazione, 79/3 Fax: +39 01 85 30 91 71 I-16043 Chiavari (GE) E-Mail: franco.lazzari@rid.it lazzari@moench-group.com Portugal, Spain, Latin America, Middle East Mr. Antonio Terol Garcia Tel.: +34 91 3 10 29 98 Fax: +34 91 3 10 24 54 E-Mail: antonio@terolgarcia. e.telefonica.net terol@moench-group.com Australia, Canada, Scandinavia, UK, USA Tel.: +44 7968 714280 Mrs. Sally Passey (Director) E-Mail: sally@bspmedia.com BSP Media Contents The effect of short-range seduction chaffs launched by a Chinese 726-4 decoy launchers. (Photo: Ministry of National Defense People‘s Republic of China) Open your eyes to ... Enforce Tac 2023 – Homeland security and beyond................................................................ 55 Marco Giulio Barone and Stefan Nitschke From the deck Naval Launchers for Chaff-Decoys – Naval units’ main protection from missile attacks .................................. 61 Massimo Annati Cover Steam generator exchangers of a French nuclear reactor for submarines. (Photo: Adrien Daste - Naval Group) Index of Advertisers ASELSAN Inc.................................................................................... 4th cover DEFEA.......................................................................................................... 20 General Dynamics European Land Systems.............................................. 39 IDET............................................................................................................. 23 I/ITSEC......................................................................................................... 63 MSPO.......................................................................................................... 43 NEXTER........................................................................................... 2nd cover UDT................................................................................................................ 9 Weibel Scientific A/S................................................................................... 27
Caterina Tani Ukraine: EU’s challenge of challenges As often happens, political speeches are steeped in rhetoric, especially when the stakes are high. This is what one could also think about Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s declarations when he addressed the European Parliament and EU leaders in February, stating that Ukraine is fighting Russian invasion to defend the “European way of life”. Indeed, Zelensky came to Brussels, via London and Paris, to call on Europeans to provide ‘weapons, weapons and weapons’, not to succumb to Moscow, and to speed up the country’s accession project. After all, he reminded EU top officials, “Ukraine is Europe.” The Ukrainian leader does what he must and can do, driven by a combination of iron determination and the desperation of someone seeing no possible goal other than the ‘victory at all costs’ of Churchillian memory. Rhetoric or not, when he mentions the war as a risk to the European way of life, Zelensky speaks the truth. The conflict risks jeopardising the Union itself. The EU has survived many crises, and many are yet to come. From the failure of the EU Constitution to sovereign debt crises, Brexit, the still ongoing migration challenge, Covid, populism, and so forth. But certainly, the attempted Russian ‘Blietzkrieg’, which has turned into an excruciating existential war - on both sides for different reasons - seems the most serious and, at the same time, potentially transformative or de-constructive event of the EU’s history. Shocked and dismayed following the invasion and driven by the emotional wave provoked by the valorous Ukrainian resistance, the EU has supported the country not only with words, as happened during other recent European conflicts, but also with actions. Perhaps the European objectives do not match those of the Ukrainians, unwilling to give up any portions of territory, but are ‘realpolitikly’ scaled down to Ukraine’s survival as a country with a territory as large as possible and to avoiding at all costs nuclear or conventional escalations involving the bloc. However, the EU’s top-level unity and determination to support the invaded country, unthinkable until some time ago, is noteworthy. Among other things €20 billion were already delivered, and additional €20 billion is planned for 2023, while more than 4 million refugees have been taken in. Also, the EU is providing arms to Ukraine for the first time through its €3.6 billion ‘European peace facility’, a 2021 off-budget tool to bypass the peaceful nature of the EU, and new sanctions are in the pipeline. Meanwhile, the EU - not without reservations – decided to deprive itself of Russian fossil fuel and accelerate the green transition, a bold but potentially suicidal political move. On top of all that, there are the single or multiple initiatives of the member states, resulting from various bilateral meetings, in coordination with the United States, to deliver military means of all kinds, which now also include the German-built Leopard MBTs as well as the increasingly likely combat fighters, such as F-16s, Eurofighters or Gripens. Even more surprising is Germany’s ‘Zeitenwende’ (‘change of era’) after decades of stubborn pacifism as well as the French paradigm shift and similar initiatives elsewhere. Many have announced that the era of European ‘naivety’ is over. More realistically, the Union has removed, sometimes recalcitrantly, the blinkers it has been wearing for several decades. Is the dove ‘hawking’, then? Indeed, the changes taking place are remarkable. However, history, geopolitics, interests, energy issues and, finally, the public opinions of that very democracy that we strenuously try to defend, raise serious doubts about the answer to the question. Even if the Union is united in public, positions among member states have been distant until not long ago. Suffice it to think about when Germany was building the North Stream 2, going against US’ advice’ and de facto intensifying ties and dependence on Russia, while in the far east of the Union, some countries were still experiencing a sort of post-traumatic stress disorder from the Soviet invasion. Back to present, beyond words and intentions, it is by no means certain that Germany - which represents the heavyweight of the Union from many perspectives - will be able to overcome its longstanding taboo about wars completely. It is becoming increasingly clear that it should be up to Berlin to take the reins of a future European defence, in which, along with France, others will have to be massively involved. Then there is the serious energy question: could people’s impoverishment and likely future crises jeopardise the work the Union is trying to put in place? And finally, the biggest challenge: public opinion. If the social situation deteriorates, the rise of populism is behind the corner. Zelensky, who pushes to join the Union before 2024, when elections will happen, understood well that the situation might change. Should the Union split over these issues, or should Ukraine fall, nothing would be the same as before. This is not sufficiently clear to public opinions generally focused on the here and now. But, now more than ever, it is essential to open our eyes and look at the big picture. To understand that it was thanks to this Union – the innovative and even crazy ‘top down’ idea of a few visionaries – that we could grow and prosper as never before. Based on invaluable values, such as justice, democracy, respect for human and civil rights, freedom, and the primacy of the individual over the state, the EU is a happy island in a world of continuous instability and turmoil. And the island must be defended - starting with continuing to help Ukraine. Based in Brussels, Caterina Tani is MilTech’s NATO and EU Affairs Correspondent. 4 · MT 2/2023 Observations from Brussels
Observations from Berlin MT 2/2023 · 5 Stefan Nitschke That is About to Change The German Bundeswehr is running out of reserves of spare parts and ammunition. That was so widely heard at the end of 2022. And it was not very well understood by political decision-makers and, of course, by large parts of the civil society. The following is not an anecdote. It is a real sketch of a situation that is worrying. Before picking apart the story, we should take a close look at what was behind the surprise announcement by Chancellor Olaf Scholz during a special Sunday plenary session on 27 February, reacting to Russia’s unlawful attack on the Ukraine a few days earlier. He proclaimed a “100 billion special fund” (Sondervermögen) for the German Armed Forces, promising billions of Euros for the acquisition of advanced military hardware. Thanks to this, the Bundeswehr should “develop into an efficient, ultra-modern and well-advanced military force,” in order to fulfill Germany’s obligations as “one of the most important” NATO member states. Other political announcements spoke of the Bundeswehr as the largest and, in the future, most powerful (conventional) armed force on the European continent. But this is another story. The proclaimed 100 billion special fund should be used for investments in “the best” of weapon systems and equipment: more (upgraded) Puma infantry fighting vehicles and successors of the Fuchs armoured personnel carrier and BV 206 tracked all-terrain carrier for the army (Landstreitkräfte); new ECR Eurofighter combat aircraft (for electronic warfare), a successor of the Tornado fighter bomber, precision weapons for Heron TP drones, heavy lift transport helicopters (Schwerer Transporthubschrauber; STH), light support helicopters and space-based early warning satellites (Twister) for the Luftwaffe; new missile corvettes, frigates, submarines, multi-role combat boats, surface-ship-launched guided missiles, anti-submarine precision-guided missiles, underwater warfare sensors and long-range maritime patrol aircraft (P-8 Poseidon) for the navy (Marine); and new communications systems, night vision equipment, personal protection suits and navigation systems based on artificial intelligence. The ‘wish list’ might be longer. However, the project got a slow start. Some programmes were “caught cold,” delivering strong arguments for defunct procurement processes and procedures. Now, more than a year since Chancellor Scholz’ announcement in Parliament, there has been little or no improvement in the art of defence procurement in Germany. It was said that the “100-Milliarden-Sondervermögen” was so badly planned, leaving a number of procurement initiatives with a question mark. The original idea of the 100 billion for defence spending was to use extra money to provide the Bundeswehr with the material it needs for the 2020s and beyond – and more quickly and in larger quantities than the slightly increased annual defence budget (of around 50 billion Euros) would allow. The approximately 50 billion would ensure that Germany is nearing its commitment to spend 2 % of GDP on defence from 2022 onwards. To be sure, based on current growth projections, 2 % of GDP would be some 75 billion Euros (US$91 billion) in 2022. This would make Germany the third largest defence spender in the world after the United States and China. Despite the fact that outgoing Defence Minister Christine Lambrecht made a quick decision (in mid-December 2022) to invest billions of Euros for the acquisition of the American-made F-35A stealth aircraft (in order to maintain Germany’s nuclear sharing role), contracts for other important military hardware were almost lacking. Industry representatives spoke of a slow – and failing – process that can have serious effects on the Bundeswehr’s defensive readiness in case of conflict. That was seen in the technical problems with Puma infantry fighting vehicles during a training exercise last December. Of the 18 vehicles used in the manoeuvre, not a single one was left operational. The situation is more serious than anticipated. Their operational problems were seen as a major setback, since all these combat vehicles were originally assigned to NATO’s spearhead VJTF 2023. So, it was feared that the Pumas may instead be replaced with the older but proven Marder infantry fighting vehicle. The German land forces were listing 350 Puma infantry fighting vehicles in their inventory, and an additional 229 vehicles were on the agenda after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. That said, the Bundeswehr needs functional equipment. The problems with the Puma had been known for a long time. Another serious point is the depletion of stockpiled ammunition and spare parts. After many years of austerity, the Bundeswehr now finds itself in an embarrassing position – lacking ammunition of many sorts, spare parts, main battle tanks, armoured personnel carriers, heavy artillery and air defence systems. Above all, there is a lack of rocket and tube artillery. “The army is not well equipped,” said the Chief of the Army, Lieutenant General Alfons Mais. Rather than an information meeting with the industry at the official level, a so-called “munitions summit” (on November 28) had come into play, which was intended to help clarify fundamental production issues. Participants came to the conclusion that the defence industry must (and will) be prepared for the Bundeswehr’s modernization. Production capacities must be ramped up and new ones created for ammunition, battle tanks and armoured personnel carriers, heavy artillery and air defence systems. This cannot be done at the “push of a button,” however. The national production capacities are necessary to cover the increased demand of the Bundeswehr as well as other EU and NATO partners. After all, contracts for 200 Leopard 2 A7 main battle tanks, 150-200 howitzers and 200-250 armoured personnel carriers (Lynx/Puma) are expected. That said, the process of creating military equipment – from early design to commissioning – takes some time, often years, sometimes decades. And the industry is not allowed to produce and stockpile ammunition without a contract. The dilemma is that wrong political decision-making and pure processes in the procurement authorities seem to be responsible for the current situation of the Bundeswehr – and for a lack of contracts. It is highly questionable whether an “ammunition summit” was really necessary to solve the problem, because any mere quantity analysis – in the Ministry of Defence and among the military command – would have been sufficient to identify the long-known shortcomings in equipment and ammunition. Editor-in-Chief of companion journals Naval Forces and Wehrtechnik, Dr Stefan Nitschke is a frequent and welcome contributor to MilTech.
Marco Giulio Barone French footprint in Africa Less boots on the ground, weaker economic ties In 1979, French diplomat Louis de Guiringaud stated that “Africa is the only continent that is still within France’s reach, within its means. The only one where it can still, with 500 men, change the course of history. “ Notwithstanding the apparent affordability of French power politics in Africa, any time Paris wanted to have an impact on African politics it had to engage considerable economic resources and military power, and to put at stake its reputation. The most recent decisions taken by France have a taste of a complete debacle, as military presence decreases, and economic ties are left to private initiative. As the US, China, Russia, India but also Singapore, Germany, Italy, and Turkey pledge political and financial capital to the continent, it seems that France has no longer the means to maintain its reach. During his tour of several Central African countries, President Emmanuel Macron announced changes to the French military presence on the continent. The French order of battle in the region should be reviewed in depth, with a drastic reduction in manpower. Faced with an increasingly contested presence, the Élysée has opted for a military deployment below the threshold of visibility. In concrete terms, military bases in Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire and Gabon should see their manpower drop by 70%, with no more than 300 soldiers per base in the future. Instead, the 2,500 French soldiers deployed to Chad and Niger are not affected at this stage. Niger is now the main French stronghold in the Sahel area, since the French army was expelled from Mali, as have been special forces from Burkina Faso. Last December, the French army also had to abandon Bangui (Central African Republic). Djibouti, with its 1,500 troops, will mainly serve the new focus on the Indo-Pacific region. The reorganisation will therefore concern West Africa, where the French military presence will likely be transformed into military academies. Bilateral discussions are underway, but the significant reduction in the number of troops seems to have been decided and could worry African, European, and American partners, who until now have seen Paris as a security provider in the region. The French military is not happy with the current situation, as the new posture poses a logistical problem should it be called to intervene effectively in the event of a crisis. The lack of Close Air Support (CAS) is especially deplored, as aircraft should come directly from France, meaning several hour-long missions and attrition for fighters and tankers. The military withdrawal is just the tip of the iceberg. In twenty years, France’s decline in its former colonies - where it was in a position of strength - is considerable. According to figures published by French economic magazine Challenges, between 2002 and 2021 French economic activities have fallen by 14% in Senegal and by 10% in Côte d’Ivoire and Morocco, historical strongholds of French companies. On the whole continent, French companies have seen their market share fall from 10.6% to 4.4%. A decline that has benefited newcomers like China, that in the same period has multiplied by five its market share (18.8% today). Macron promises that business will be at the core of the new strategy, and that France will be an economic actor benefitting of African growth without paying for the security bill. Meanwhile, the issue is barely visible in the political debate, as public opinion and politicians are stuck in internal issues (health system, retirement, taxes, as usual…). The official narrative is that “the end of Françafrique” and the new approach is a response to the wave of anti-French sentiment in the Sahel. Plenty of French analysts, researchers, and specialists point out that Africa will remain important to France and that Paris is not going to withdraw from the continent. The current move would therefore be just a “change of tone”. Unfortunately, facts and figures tell a different story. The ingredients to gain influence in a region are basically three: culture, economics, and military strength. From a cultural point of view, France does no longer appear seductive. On the contrary, African leaders often bemoan French double standards, contradictions, arrogance, and air of superiority, not only at the governmental level, but also in the daily attitude of French workers, citizens, and tourists. And this feeling grows along with African countries’ ambitions and social and economic development. Economic leverages are no longer effective, as French approach is about bringing as much money as possible to France thanks to investment in Africa – and Macron’s approach keeps going in this sense. Usually, gaining influence passes through the opposite (at least initial) move, namely pledging more money to the desired area to foster its development. Economic return (if any) is an indirect consequence of the political-economic success of such an approach. Lastly, the lost of the role of security provider may bring some spare funds in the short term, but it contributes to decrease the overall French relevance in the region and loosens the Paris’ grip on local politics, thus raising the risk of major instability in critical areas (and next to key supply chains!). For decades, France has lived off its past political, economic, and security capital pledged to the continent. However, that edge is now over, and it is time to reinvest or leave. While proclaiming a new wealth of (private) investment, the new strategy for Africa looks very much like a retreat. Marco Giulio Barone is Editor-in-Chief of Military Technology. 6 · MT 2/2023 Observations from Paris (Photo: Marco Giulio Barone)
Marco Giulio Barone Parole, parole, parole Raising awareness, unchanged budget Recent Italian defence planning documents seem to mark a tipping point in Italy’s strategic posture. Since 2014, when Crimea was annexed to Russia, Italian planners (basically politicians and the military) took time and kept focusing their programmatic documents on terrorism, immigration and all kinds of non-existential threats. Signs of changing times were evident, as global confrontation between the US and China harshened and Russia held an increasingly aggressive posture in the Caucasus, in the Middle East, and now in Ukraine. But only the major Ukrainian conflict was able to shake the Italian establishment and convince it to launch programmes that should have been kicked off five to ten years ago. The programmatic documents Stato Di Previsione Della Spesa per l’Anno Finanziario 2023 (Expenditure Estimates for the Financial Year 2023) and the Documento Programmatico Pluriennale 2022-2024 (DPP, 20222024 Multi-year Planning Document) finally acknowledge that threats are real, and that heavy money is needed to prop-up the Italian military with fighters, tanks, warships, missiles, and other serious hardware. Hence, the budget for 2023 is €27.75 billion, 6.4% more than 2022, thus confirming the slow yet steady growth in Italian defence spending in the last six years. However, the so called “Funzione Difesa” (literally Defence Function, including ordinary funds for the Air Force, the Army, and the Navy) only takes €19.66 billion. As independent armed force with both police and military duties, Carabinieri (and Forestali corps) are allocated €7.6 billion, only half a billion of which can be counted for military duties (estimated). In addition, the Ministry for Entrepreneurship and Made in Italy (MEMI) contributes to key Italian procurement programmes with further €2.36 billion, while the Ministry of Economics and Finances (MEF) covers the costs of overseas deployments with a €1.55 billion contribution. All this accounting magics are needed to declare to NATO the highest possible figure while communicating to the Italian public opinion (always critical of defence spending) the lowest possible one. The good news of raising spending is compensated by the constantly bad news about timing and quality. Despite programmatic documents changed of tone and identified the Ukrainian war, tensions around Hormuz and in the Eastern Mediterranean, and constant instability in Libya as threatening scenarios, the current government confirmed that Italy will meet the 2% of GDP defence investment guideline in 2028, in line with the previous government’s planning. As a reminder, official NATO guidelines considers 2% a minimum and not a plateau. As far as quality is concerned, of the €19.66 billion assigned to armed forces, €11 billion go to personnel (56%) and only €2.5 billion to operations & maintenance (12.7%). Investment, including both ordinary budget and MEMI funds, amount to €8.44 and remains unchanged from the previous year – but it will be affected negatively by inflation. Hence, most of the increase in Italian defence budget goes to personnel and No, Italy is not investing more. The argument that “personnel is the best investment” might appear solid, but the low level of allocations for operations and maintenance raises serious doubts about combat readiness. To sum up, the raise in Italian defence spending is a major change in the country’s approach and, somehow, in its mentality. Today, major programmes finally benefit of a fair degree of certainty that further cuts will not come, as it was the case in the 2008-2018 decade. The budget effectively allows for modernization in all sectors. New programmes will have enough financial resources to be confirmed, bills of existing programmes will be paid and maybe some further batches of F-35s fighters, Freccia IFVs, Centauro II MGS, and PPA multirole frigates will be ordered. In addition, Italy will be able to respect its international commitments in East Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East, and to be a little more prepare to respond to eventual further crises. Notwithstanding this, the military weight of Italy in Europe and in NATO will likely decline. While the Italian budget improves slightly, France and Germany are rapidly expanding their budgets and filling their capability gaps, while north European countries are about to double the size of their armed forces, and procurement programmes are expanding as well. In East Europe, by 2028, when Italy will meet the 2% target, Poland might have the largest and best equipped force in Europe and spend as much as 5% of its GDP in defence. For Italy, expanding the expenses on personnel while maintaining minimum combat readiness and constant level of investment might prove insufficient to remain relevant in Europe and the Mediterranean. Ambitions spelled out in programmatic documents are not substantiated by a sufficient level of quality and timely investment, so far. Marco Giulio Barone is Editor-in-Chief of Military Technology. Observations from Rome MT 2/2023 · 7 (Photo: Italian Ministry of Defence)
A year on from Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine: some would say everything has changed, others maintain the status quo has barely been altered. Failure to agree demonstrates in itself the scene has shifted dramatically, after a year of ‘war delivered by CNN,’ inter alia. Not since the Middle Ages has warfare been a zero sum game. The conflict in Ukraine proves the thesis that, not matter what supporting factors may be brought into play – supplies of ammunition, of tanks, of missiles – the decision on the ground will be made by small unit tactics. It is evident that Ukraine – outnumbered and outmassed – has held its own due largely to a fundamental differentiator. Russian forces have no ‘middle management’. Whereas Russian generals have to lead from the front (where a high percentage have become casualties) to overcome reluctance to engage among their troops, Ukrainian forces have demonstrated agility, flexibility and intelligence at a very low level of command – down to individual squads in many cases – and won tactical advantage over their adversaries, time after time. However, the ultimate decision in Ukraine will not be made on the ground, but at the negotiating table. After a year in which Ukraine has received unprecedented levels of political, moral, economic and practical help from NATO and the broader international community, victory is now closer now than in the early hours of the invasion. Estimated military casualties on both sides total in excess of 250,000 by an enormous margin; Russian technology has been exposed for having feet of clay in many instances, which will have long-term effects for the nation’s exports; the economies of both nations have been severely damaged – the latest estimates suggest it could take well over a decade for the Ukrainian economy to return to pre-war levels of sustainability. But perhaps the greatest blow – arguably with the furthest-reaching consequences – is that one of the oldest of war-related adages has been proven: the first casualty of war is truth. To a degree, the world has accepted the view, promulgated by the mass media, of ‘plucky’ Ukraine standing alone against the powerful (but increasingly impotent) Russian bear. There are echoes here of beleagured Britain standing alone against the Nazi hordes in 1940 – but that view is flawed. The truth lies somewhere between that pole of thought and the apocalyptic view that Doomsday is nigh, fuelled by a conviction that Putin, backed into a corner, will resort to weapons of mass destruction. Despotic though his regime is, Putin still has to honour the potential threats posed by domestic politics and popular opinion. The Russian in the street is increasingly weary (and increasingly vocal about it) of the economic and social consequences of the ‘police action’ in Ukraine. Food shortages are growing, sanctions are having more and more unpalatable consequences – which are becoming increasingly difficult to conceal – and unrest within the Russian military, as well as relations with its ‘implausibly deniable’ adjuncts such as the Wagner Group, are combining to cloud Putin’s future and to limit his decision-making ability. That he still has the power to drive his agenda forward is made obvious by a number of things. His generals (those who have not been fired) continue to prosecute his objectives in Ukraine. His political opposition continues to be relatively muted – but persists, despite sudden outbreaks of communal vertigo and indigestion as a statistically improbable number of his vocal opponents fall from high buildings or suffer terminal food poisoning. His aggressive bluster vis-à-vis the international community continues to fuel conviction among certain political classes that regime change in Moscow is the only viable solution. The larger problem, though, is the perception of the conflict promoted by the mass media. In Britain, as elsewhere, conversations in pubs revolve around why direct intervention is off the table, why ‘the West’ won’t ante up and provide more tanks, why the issue of gifting fighter aircraft is so difficult to resolve. Readers of MilTech will, of course, have a more sophisticated view of the realities of the conflict and will recognize that the outcome will be political rather than military. But the wider public is only in very few instances being given access to the underlying facts, an issue for which the media must bear at least partial responsibility. The stark truth is that Ukrainian forces need help right now – not in 18 months after aircrew and maintenance training empowers the deployment of any aircraft that might be provided. But the debate as to why there is resistance to such a move serves Zelenskyy’s purposes and those of some Western politicians. What it does not do is in any way accelerate a resolution of the conflict. As long as armchair generals opine on our TV screens on the latest tactical activity, the strategic truth will continue to be hidden from the public. As long as Putin is left to pursue his (increasingly frustrated) ambitions and aspirations, convinced that a military solution remains feasible, the conflict will continue. And the truth will continue to lick its wounds in the obscurity of obfuscation and ill-informed opinion. The ‘West’ has made unprecedented moves over Ukraine. That is the unvarnished truth. So is the fact that more needs to be done to avoid ‘celebrating’ a second or third anniversary of the invasion. Much more. Tim Mahon The First Casualty of War…. Tim Mahon is Editor-in-Chief of Mönch Online. 8 · MT 2/2023 Observations from London
for chips). NATO suddenly realised the importance of flexing its muscles again and returning to full speed. In Ukraine today, in East Asia perhaps tomorrow, while at the same time keeping an eye on a multipolar world where superpowers and medium-sized but nuclear powers coexist (a novelty compared to Cold War times). At the same time facing a series of technological challenges, including those relating to conventional armaments. Ukraine and beyond Ukraine, at the eastern border of the Alliance, is currently at the centre of NATO’s thoughts, while the number one threat is Russia. With its invasion, Moscow has openly disclosed its aggressive imperialist aspirations - never entirely hidden, for those who weren’t somehow economically or energetically dependent. Helping Ukraine is simply the top priority for the Atlantic Alliance, a conditio-sine-qua-non for everything that follows. The invasion was unanimously deemed intolerable - and, again, unanimously, it was decided to support the attacked one. In such a context, an incredibly united NATO appears to act as a good cop, a coordinator, a ‘grey eminence’. It is determined to support Ukraine physically, relying on its population’s heroism and the US President’s determination. At the same time, it is forced to balance itself, stay on edge, and not get involved. To show, as NATO’s Secretary General Stoltenberg repeated as a mantra, that “NATO is not part of the conflict”, given that direct Russia-NATO clash would be unacceptable (as has been any direct conflict involving nuclear powers, so far). On the other hand, however, it is determined to defend “every inch of NATO’s territory” shall the invasion cross NATO’s borders. The pre-eminence of Ukraine was already clear in the 2022 NATO Strategic Concept. Remaining behind the scenes, the Alliance now The triumph of Western democracy and value system, toghether with NATO, after the fall of the USSR, celebrated in Francis Fukuyama’s “End of History” book in 1992 has definitively turned out to be nothing more than wishful thinking. The story has continued, and despite peace dividends and nuclear weapons limitations, the clash between great powers has only eased, and for no more than fifteen years. Since 2007, when Putin criticised ‘the United States’ monopolistic dominance in global relations and its “almost uncontained hyper use of force in international relations” at the then Munich Security Conference (MSC), a slow and unstoppable climb towards a policy of power has characterised Russia’s actions. Yet Europe turned a blind eye to what happened in South Ossetia and Crimea, too used to an idea of perpetual peace as a given (and too dependent on Russian gas). And even the United States, which nonetheless started providing weapons to Ukraine in 2014, was preoccupied with the Middle East, domestic politics, and, increasingly, China’s impressive economic and military rise. In the meantime, NATO, deprived of its main Cold War-related main objective, was entangling itself in not always propitious strategic adventures like the Afghan one. In Europe and North-America, the Alliance seemed to be waning in popularity with members’ public opinions, even the most important ones, such as the United States. Suddenly, on 24 February 2022, came the virtual adrenaline injection that contributed to the awakening from the Alliance’s famous ‘brain death’. The invasion of Ukraine was undoubtedly the biggest shakeup in the transatlantic community since the fall of the Berlin wall, worsened by the realisation of the strategic partnership between Russia and China, both with nuclear capabilities and economies that fit together well (gas 10 · MT 2/2023 Hot Spots Caterina Tani NATO: the saga continues The Alliance after one year of Ukrainian war
Hot Spots MT 2/2023 · 11 NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg with Finnish Prime Minister Sanna Marin. China and the (still) Pacific attitude China has been for quite a few years US’ primary concern, and this was somehow being reflected in NATO’s rhetoric. However, on 24 February things changed. After intense debates, the US’ China first option has been outclassed by Ukraine, still remaining deeply rooted in American strategic thinking. China is indeed the only geopolitical entity that could overtime outclass US planetary hegemony, Moscow’s superpower status now being limited to its nuclear dimension. In the Strategic Concept, China is mentioned for the first time, and for the first time, the global interests of a geographically limited Alliance are introduced. However, China is called a strategic competitor - certainly not as a ‘threat’ – even though the conflict might have affected the Concept’s wording. In the US Defense Strategy, China remains the primary military, economic, technological, and diplomatic competitor. In the meantime, China is glueing itself to Russia against Western hegemony. In its recent alleged peace proposal, flaunting dubious neutrality, China did not deny that Moscow’s intervention was somehow provoked by the Western actions while US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken recently warned that the partnership could turn into ‘lethal support’. In any case, China will gain more and more importance in the years to come, also to NATO. We will see whether the European states will then be called upon to help the United States in the Pacific. For now, the Atlantic Alliance is inviting its Pacific friends, such as Japan, Australia, and South Korea, to its summits. Relationships with the EU, rearmament, enlargement NATO will finally need to define its relationship with the European Union. The EU has been trying for a while to build its defence, but the war put an end to discussions on the Macronian version of the ‘strategic autonomy’, giving instead an emphasis on the concept of “complementarity” between the EU and NATO . This word, which still lacks a precise definition, is used to describe the relationship between the two in January’s Joint Declaration. Perhaps the joint project on Military Mobility, which originated under the PESCO banner and has also become of strategic importance for NATO, is what can give such idea. In general, however, the military supremacy of the NATO instrument in the European theatre remains strongly urges countries to provide as much support as possible to Ukraine: armaments, sensors, communication, intelligence, training, and logistics, which has no equivalent in the Alliance’s history. But the support is practically delivered in other formats outside NATO, such as in Ramstein’s Ukraine Defense Contact Group (which gathers some 50 countries) or other bilateral or multilateral fora. However, the Atlantic’ fingerprint’ remains. NATO’s ratio behind actions is that a Russian victory would seriously endanger the stability of the Western world. When Stoltenberg says, “If the war ends tomorrow our security environment has changed for the long term,” or that “Kremlin wants a different Europe, one where Russia controls neighbours,” he is most likely not exagerating. After all, that is what happened until 30 years ago. Moreover, what will happen in Kyiv will also impact the future of Moldova or Georgia, potential next targets of Moscow’s imperialist ambitions. It is no coincidence that Putin recently revoked a 2012 decree recognising Moldova’s sovereignty in regards to Transnistria. Nor is it a coincidence that NATO is pledging the countries’ support. And again, it is no coincidence that Biden recently went to Warsaw, Kyiv and Bucharest. Today, nobody can make reliable assumptions about the war. What is certain is that the escalation has united NATO, making the Ukrainian victory something vital to preserving the world’s democracies against Putin’s authoritarianism. Which is, more or less, what has been said by the former Russian President Medvedev about the conflict a few days ago: “Russia risks being torn apart if it stops a special military operation (SMO) before victory is achieved.” NATO British multinational Group training in Estonia. Based in Brussels, Caterina Tani is MilTech’s NATO and EU Affairs Correspondent. Meeting of Ukraine defence Contact Group in Brussels. (All Photos are courtesy of NATO) f
RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy MTM5Mjg=