Based in New Zealand, Tim Fish casts an analytical eye over matters regional, naval and ground-based for MilTech on a regular basis. On 16 December 2022 the Japanese government released three important defence documents: the National Security Strategy (NSS), National Defense Strategy (NDS) and Defense Build-up Program. Their purpose is to acknowledge the rapidly changing strategic environment in the Indo-Pacific region with advances in Chinese military capabilities, especially Northwest Asia, where the risk of a crisis between China and Taiwan is increasing, and to respond to them. The NSS was the first such paper released by Japan since 2013 and it highlights that China has replaced North Korea as the key threat to Japan’s security. Although the Pyongyang government still represents a significant danger due to its nuclear weapons programme, China is more of a concern because of its size, the development of ground-breaking defence systems such as hypersonic missiles, and its more aggressive stance towards Taiwan. The latter could have an impact on the nearby Senkaku/Diaoyu islands that controlled by Japan but also claimed by China. Despite this the NSS emphasises the need for dialogue and cooperation with China to build trade and that both countries can contribute to develop a ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) even though China’s recent activities, particularly with its ‘island building’ strategy in the South China Sea, run counter to this. Robert Ward, the new Japan Chair at the IISS told Military Technology that the three strategic documents are “historic” because they “represent a definitive break with the post-war so-called Yoshida doctrine, which envisaged a lightly armed Japan that depended on the US security umbrella.” This follows polls cited by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) indicating that the population of Japan is less resistant to defence expansion and supports reduced levels of reliance on the US. The NSS states it will overcome any domestic obstacles to achieve its national security goals. The influence of the Russo-Ukraine War is also notable with an attention on security of food and energy supplies but also raising concerns that China and Russia are strengthening ties, which could raise tensions over the disputed Northern territories/Kuril Islands. Under the NDS, Japan is set to start taking more responsibility for its own defence and is providing the funds to modernise its capabilities and make them more focussed on the challenge from Beijing. In this way Japan wants to increase the credibility of the US-Japan security alliance by making a much larger contribution. “The new NSS has a bleak assessment of Japan’s strategic environment and the threat to Japan,” Ward said, “Japan’s calculation will be that more credible deterrence capabilities make conflict less likely. But clearly a deteriorating security situation in and around the East China Sea in particular raise the risk of Japan needing to be ready to make decisions on deployment of its military and boost its ability to do so effectively.” The NSS and its accompanying documents are the logical next step from earlier work by former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who led reforms in 2016 to develop policies to support a FOIP and allow Japan to undertake more pro-active efforts to build up regional security through alliances such as the Quad (US, Japan, Australia and India) that aim to uphold the rules-based order. “We see this continuing under Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, for example in the Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) signed with the UK and increasing security cooperation with the Philippines,” Ward said, “Relations with South Korea are also improving, which is very important in terms of regional security. Japan is framing the changes within the need to contribute more to the security alliance with the US, which the NSS and elsewhere describe as the ‘cornerstone’ of Japanese security. As such, Tokyo’s defence changes appear to be broadly welcomed by Japan’s partners in the region and beyond.” The Defence Build-up Program will increase Japan’s defence expenditure from around the 1% of GDP mark up to 2% by 2027 – a significant uplift – and from April 2023 through to March 2028 will see total defence spending of about ¥43 trillion ($321 billion). This will make Japan the world’s third largest spender on defence after the US and China. “The doubling of the budget is noteworthy, of course, but it’s also important to note that some of the increase will be achieved from reallocation of existing budgets, for example the coast guard. How to pay for it is also a difficult political issue,” Ward said. Tax increases will be required, and this means Kishida’s government will have to make a good case for prioritising defence and narrow the civil-military relations gap to give the Japanese public a broader understanding of its military forces. These funds are designed to enhance military capability with a focus on conventional counter-strike systems. Despite this focus the NSS keeps Japan as a defence-focussed state committed to nuclear non-proliferation. “The counterstrike capability will require Japan and the US to work more closely together,” Ward said, “The announcement of a planned new SDF joint command will also facilitate this cooperation.” As well as the counterstrike capability, Japan wants to develop its cyber defence capabilities, invest in advanced technology across new domains, develop a more flexible defence posture and increase resilience. Ward explained that this approach will see an increase in the number and dispersal of ammunition stores across the country and a reorganisation of the Army’s brigades and divisions across Japan positioning more in the south to be closer to Taiwan. But Ward said that significant challenges remain: Japan’s defence- industrial base “needs strengthening”, the military-civilian gap “is hampering Japan’s advanced research and development capability”, there are vulnerability in Japan’s cyber security “partly legal/partly skills related” and Japan’s demographic trends “which will challenge Japan Self-Defense Force recruitment targets.” Tim Fish Breaking the Yoshida doctrine Observations from Japan MT 2/2023 · 45
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