As the vast majority of global economic output and trade originates in the Indo-Pacific, its geopolitical position has come into ever increasing prominence in the 21st century. Like the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the communist People‘s Republic of China (PRC) boasts a seemingly coherent alternative narrative and socio-economic model. Unlike rapidly declining Putin‘s Russia, Beijing presents a long-term civilizational challenge to the West and to the superpower position of Washington as its global ambitions and military might are backed by underlying economic power. However, Chinese willingness to attempt altering regional status quo by threat or actual use of military force has historically been limited. In light of the second Russian invasion of Ukraine and its disruptive effects – including the support it has received from China – it is increasingly doubtful that will be the case in the future. One China? Due to Beijing‘s active diplomacy in the Global South, the number of countries officially acknowledging the existence of the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan has decreased dramatically over time. Consequently, it has become politically and economically prohibitive for most foreign governments to realistically consider sales of major weapons system to Taipei. However, crucial US support for its armed forces continues and will be accelerated as a result of the current FY2023 defence budget. Historically, the People‘s Liberation Army (PLA) has expended enormous effort to analyse all Western military operations since the end of the Cold War – from the Gulf War through Kosovo to Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya – to draw transferable lessons learned and apply them in practice. It still lacks relevant real-world combat experience as it fought a limited war the last time in a different era, against Vietnam (1979). But Beijing‘s aggressiveness toward its neighbours in the East and South China Seas steadily increases while it participates in efforts to subvert the rules-based international order. According to the DoD, the likelihood of a potential invasion of Taiwan also rises (2027 time frame). Bad Omens China presents the US with an unprecedented strategic challenge. An accelerating pace of expansion of both the number of nuclear warheads – assessed by the DOD to already exceed 400 and projected to rise further to 1,000 (2030) and 1,500 (2035) – and their delivery systems (DF-41/CSS-20 ICBM, JL-3/CSS-NX-20 SLBM) increases prospects of either trilateral deterrence or requirements to face combined Chinese and Russian strategic arsenals. Beijing already possesses the largest navy and has recently overtaken Washington in the number of ICBM launchers. Its conventional military build-up represents a pacing near-peer threat of the century while the North Korean nuclear programme constantly escalates. But China (closely aligned with Pakistan) is not the only Asian power on the ascent. The rise of India, currently displacing the PRC as the most populous country of the world – in stark contrast to its completely unsustainable demographics – presents it with a strategic challenge of its own, including a maturing nuclear triad. New Delhi, also pursuing economic modernization, defence emancipation and striving for major regional clout, is among key drivers of global superpower competition. Its strategic choices with regards to the Quad (US, Australia, Japan) and legacy dependence on Russian military technology will greatly influence both Asia and the world. However, key dynamic that will determine the country‘s future is internal. While the world‘s attention has been captivated by the murky circumstances of the COVID-19 outbreak and more recent surprising and widespread public protests, China initially benefited from the pandemic. It had boosted global propaganda and disinformation campaigns and enhanced position vis-à-vis the West before its outdated social engineering models caught up with it, damaging national economy in the process.The most unsettling aspect of Xi Jinping‘s ‘digital‘ totalitarianism is that regime stability and security have become the sole priority, in effect trumping economic and social development, the traditional source of its domestic legitimacy in the post-Mao Zedong era. Xi‘s increasingly personal autocratic rule provides the regime with unprecedented domestic control but decreases its flexibility externally, exposing it to grandstanding and miscalculation, especially in ever more complex geopolitical circumstances. The most consequential recent example is the revelation of a brazen global high-altitude surveillance/ SIGINT balloon programme, leading to the most serious incident with Washington (January-February) since the US Navy EP-3E Aries II aircraft collision (2001). Global Response The landmark 2021 AUKUS (Australia-United Kingdom-US) alliance has altered the strategic landscape in the Indo-Pacific and created aftershocks throughout the region and beyond, especially in Beijing. To mount a timely an effective response to Chinese and Russian challenges, the US and Europe must further enhance political, security, defence and technological cooperation with key overseas allies (Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan) and regional partners (India, ASEAN). The best way to prevent the current scenario unfolding in Ukraine from happening in Taiwan (or elsewhere) is to maintain a robust deterrence posture, provide both countries with advanced military capabilities for their self-defence but keep all available communication channels open to avoid direct superpower confrontation. Wavering to do so would be at our common peril. Tomáš Chlebecek Xi Jinping‘s China: Dragon on the Move? ˇ Based in Prague, Czech Republic, Tomáš Chlebecek is an independent national security, defence, and naval analyst. He focuses on US and European defence policy, strategy, budgets and programmes, current military operations, intelligence, proliferation, arms control and terrorism. He is a regular contributor to Mönch magazines. ˇ 46 · MT 2/2023 Strategic pills from China
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