14 · MT 2/2023 Hot Spots to have been no Russian attempts to perform a larger tactical or operational take-down of GNSS coverage over Ukraine. Change of Strategy The Battle of Kyiv concluded in early April with Russia’s attempt to capture the Ukrainian capital repulsed. Smarting from the humiliation, Mr. Putin changed his strategy. Russian forces withdrew from all of northern Ukraine, west of the eastern city of Kharkiv. Russia’s president now doubled down on his efforts to expand his grip of eastern Ukraine. This brought a commensurate change in how the Russian Army would use electronic warfare. Although Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) were used from the outset by both sides, media interest in them deepened after the Battle of Kyiv. UAVs continue to be employed for reconnaissance and kinetic attack. This has had an impact on the electromagnetic aspect of the war. UAVs are highly reliant on radio. Radio links connect the UAV to its operator on the ground. These links are used to control the aircraft. They also enable it to downlink video or still imagery, or any other intelligence the UAV collects. Civilian UAVs typically use radio links on frequencies of 2.4 gigahertz/GHz and 5.8GHz. UAVs also use Global Navigation Satellite Signal (GNSS) constellations for PNT data. Constellations like the US Global Positioning System (GPS) and the Beidou GNSS system of the People’s Republic of China transmit PNT signals on frequencies of 1.1GHz to 1.6GHz. Both sides have worked hard to jam UAV radio and PNT links. If a civilian UAV gets either of these signals jammed it may either return to its point of origin or simply land in situ. Steps can be taken to encrypt radio signals linking the UAV to its pilot. For example, an aircraft could be modified with a military-grade GNSS receiver. The GPS constellation transmits unencrypted and encrypted M-Code PNT signals, the latter used by US and allied militaries. Dedicated military UAVs flown by Ukraine and Russia will most probably have encrypted radio and GNSS links. Some UAVs present more of a challenge. The Shahed-136/Geran-2 suicide UAVs supplied to Russia by the Islamic Republic of Iran are less reliant on radio. Although these aircraft use GNSS signals, they are also equipped with an Inertial Navigation System (INS). The INS does not need any external radio link to fly. This means that the Shahed-136 is almost impossible to detect and jam using via its radio emissions alone. This greatly complicates the task of locating the weapon in the first place. The Shahed-136 has a reported radar cross section of under 0.1 square metres making it hard to detect with conventional groundbased air surveillance radars. The aircraft is also physically small with a length of 2.5 metres/m (8.2 feet/ft) and a 2.2m (7.2ft) wingspan. This makes it a challenging target to engage with surface-to-air missiles or anti-aircraft artillery. A further observation is that the Russian Army’s 9K720 Iskander (NATO reporting name SS-26 Stone) tactical ballistic missiles disperse radio frequency decoys as they approach their target. These transmit citizens filmed and shared pictures of Russian Army movements with their smartphones. Families could stay in touch with using their cellphones with seemingly manageable and localised disruption. What should have been another target for the Russian Army’s electromagnetic warriors was largely left unscathed. It is possible that Ukrainian cellphone network was largely left alone as Russian forces also relied on it. Sources in the Ukraine theatre of operations confirmed this to the author. For example, the Russian Army relied on Ukraine’s cellphone network for tactical, operational and strategic communications. This was the consequence of Russia’s deployment of the Era encrypted military cellphone system in Ukraine being a fiasco. Likewise, the Russian Army’s deployment of legacy and new tactical radios and networks into Ukraine has been a disaster. Old and new radios cannot communicate with one another securely. The default thus becomes clear transmissions between soldiers and units. This traffic is easy to intercept and exploit for intelligence. The Russian Army did try to attack Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) Position, Navigation and Timing (PNT), most probably using its R-330Zh Zhitel GNSS jamming system. However, at best, this had a tactical effect. The radio frequency data analysis company Hawkeye 360 recorded some localised GPS (Global Positioning System) jamming near Russian military deployments in the Donbass. GPS jamming was also recorded the Chernobyl nuclear power station north of Kyiv occupied by Russia on 24th February. The jamming was most probably performed to protect Russian units against GPS-guided weapons used by the Ukrainian armed forces. There appears 9K720 Iskander Tactical Ballistic Missile Radio Frequency Decoy. The non-governmental organisation CAT-UXO has done sterling work identifying unexploded ordnance in the Ukraine theatre and the danger this poses. The organisation shared detailed pictures of the radio frequency decoys dispersed by Iskander tactical ballistic missiles as they approach their targets. (Photo: CAT-UXO)
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