Hot Spots MT 2/2023 · 13 Admitting Defeat Russia’s apparent EW shortcomings from 24th February until Mr. Putin abandoned his attempts to seize the Ukrainian capital Kyiv could fill a book. Russian airpower performed a desultory air defence suppression campaign against Ukraine’s Integrated Air Defence System (IADS). Television viewers around the world witnessed courtesy of correspondents standing on rooftops in the capital that the IADS was still capable of detecting incoming air raids and warning the population. Thus at least some of the radars and telecommunications the IADS relied on had survived intact and unjammed. TV journalists relayed their reports across civilian Satellite Communications (SATCOM), revealing that Russia was unable to jam satellite communications across the country. Even an attempt to hack the Viasat SATCOM network Ukraine relied on for military and civilian communications was quickly remedied. Within hours, a software patch had rendered Russian hacking null and void. Ukrainian Conspicuous by its apparent absence en masse at the start of the conflict, the Russian Army’s electronic warfare tactics changed when the war in Ukraine entered its current phase. It is one year since Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine. The country’s President Vladimir Putin launched the first invasion with his infamous ‘little green men’ in late February 2014. Russia’s initial forays saw the country occupy Ukraine’s southern Crimea Peninsula and parts of her eastern Donbass region. The Russian Army waged Electronic Warfare (EW) with aplomb during this first phase of the war. Ukrainian troops found their cellphones either jammed or relaying false and demoralising text messages. The latter were sent by Russian psychological warfare cadres. Ukrainian military radios suffered significant jamming. Even the army’s Correction-D30 artillery fire control software was infected with Russian X-Agent malware. No surprise then that a biblical intensity of EW was expected before and during Mr. Putin’s second invasion on 24th February 2022. Many observers, your correspondent included, was surprised by how sporadic and lackadaisical Russian Army EW was according to Ukrainian sources. Specialising in radar, communications systems, electronic warfare and all things of C4I, Dr. Thomas Withington is a defence journalist, writer and regular contributor to Mönch magazines. Thomas Withington What Happened Next GPS jamming recorded by Hawkeye 360 satellites over Ukraine in February 2022. Satellites belonging to radio frequency data provider Hawkeye 360 recorded instances of Russian GNSS jamming. This graphic shows where jamming was recorded around Chernobyl and in eastern Ukraine. (Photo: Hawkeye 360).
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