Observations from Berlin MT 2/2023 · 5 Stefan Nitschke That is About to Change The German Bundeswehr is running out of reserves of spare parts and ammunition. That was so widely heard at the end of 2022. And it was not very well understood by political decision-makers and, of course, by large parts of the civil society. The following is not an anecdote. It is a real sketch of a situation that is worrying. Before picking apart the story, we should take a close look at what was behind the surprise announcement by Chancellor Olaf Scholz during a special Sunday plenary session on 27 February, reacting to Russia’s unlawful attack on the Ukraine a few days earlier. He proclaimed a “100 billion special fund” (Sondervermögen) for the German Armed Forces, promising billions of Euros for the acquisition of advanced military hardware. Thanks to this, the Bundeswehr should “develop into an efficient, ultra-modern and well-advanced military force,” in order to fulfill Germany’s obligations as “one of the most important” NATO member states. Other political announcements spoke of the Bundeswehr as the largest and, in the future, most powerful (conventional) armed force on the European continent. But this is another story. The proclaimed 100 billion special fund should be used for investments in “the best” of weapon systems and equipment: more (upgraded) Puma infantry fighting vehicles and successors of the Fuchs armoured personnel carrier and BV 206 tracked all-terrain carrier for the army (Landstreitkräfte); new ECR Eurofighter combat aircraft (for electronic warfare), a successor of the Tornado fighter bomber, precision weapons for Heron TP drones, heavy lift transport helicopters (Schwerer Transporthubschrauber; STH), light support helicopters and space-based early warning satellites (Twister) for the Luftwaffe; new missile corvettes, frigates, submarines, multi-role combat boats, surface-ship-launched guided missiles, anti-submarine precision-guided missiles, underwater warfare sensors and long-range maritime patrol aircraft (P-8 Poseidon) for the navy (Marine); and new communications systems, night vision equipment, personal protection suits and navigation systems based on artificial intelligence. The ‘wish list’ might be longer. However, the project got a slow start. Some programmes were “caught cold,” delivering strong arguments for defunct procurement processes and procedures. Now, more than a year since Chancellor Scholz’ announcement in Parliament, there has been little or no improvement in the art of defence procurement in Germany. It was said that the “100-Milliarden-Sondervermögen” was so badly planned, leaving a number of procurement initiatives with a question mark. The original idea of the 100 billion for defence spending was to use extra money to provide the Bundeswehr with the material it needs for the 2020s and beyond – and more quickly and in larger quantities than the slightly increased annual defence budget (of around 50 billion Euros) would allow. The approximately 50 billion would ensure that Germany is nearing its commitment to spend 2 % of GDP on defence from 2022 onwards. To be sure, based on current growth projections, 2 % of GDP would be some 75 billion Euros (US$91 billion) in 2022. This would make Germany the third largest defence spender in the world after the United States and China. Despite the fact that outgoing Defence Minister Christine Lambrecht made a quick decision (in mid-December 2022) to invest billions of Euros for the acquisition of the American-made F-35A stealth aircraft (in order to maintain Germany’s nuclear sharing role), contracts for other important military hardware were almost lacking. Industry representatives spoke of a slow – and failing – process that can have serious effects on the Bundeswehr’s defensive readiness in case of conflict. That was seen in the technical problems with Puma infantry fighting vehicles during a training exercise last December. Of the 18 vehicles used in the manoeuvre, not a single one was left operational. The situation is more serious than anticipated. Their operational problems were seen as a major setback, since all these combat vehicles were originally assigned to NATO’s spearhead VJTF 2023. So, it was feared that the Pumas may instead be replaced with the older but proven Marder infantry fighting vehicle. The German land forces were listing 350 Puma infantry fighting vehicles in their inventory, and an additional 229 vehicles were on the agenda after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. That said, the Bundeswehr needs functional equipment. The problems with the Puma had been known for a long time. Another serious point is the depletion of stockpiled ammunition and spare parts. After many years of austerity, the Bundeswehr now finds itself in an embarrassing position – lacking ammunition of many sorts, spare parts, main battle tanks, armoured personnel carriers, heavy artillery and air defence systems. Above all, there is a lack of rocket and tube artillery. “The army is not well equipped,” said the Chief of the Army, Lieutenant General Alfons Mais. Rather than an information meeting with the industry at the official level, a so-called “munitions summit” (on November 28) had come into play, which was intended to help clarify fundamental production issues. Participants came to the conclusion that the defence industry must (and will) be prepared for the Bundeswehr’s modernization. Production capacities must be ramped up and new ones created for ammunition, battle tanks and armoured personnel carriers, heavy artillery and air defence systems. This cannot be done at the “push of a button,” however. The national production capacities are necessary to cover the increased demand of the Bundeswehr as well as other EU and NATO partners. After all, contracts for 200 Leopard 2 A7 main battle tanks, 150-200 howitzers and 200-250 armoured personnel carriers (Lynx/Puma) are expected. That said, the process of creating military equipment – from early design to commissioning – takes some time, often years, sometimes decades. And the industry is not allowed to produce and stockpile ammunition without a contract. The dilemma is that wrong political decision-making and pure processes in the procurement authorities seem to be responsible for the current situation of the Bundeswehr – and for a lack of contracts. It is highly questionable whether an “ammunition summit” was really necessary to solve the problem, because any mere quantity analysis – in the Ministry of Defence and among the military command – would have been sufficient to identify the long-known shortcomings in equipment and ammunition. Editor-in-Chief of companion journals Naval Forces and Wehrtechnik, Dr Stefan Nitschke is a frequent and welcome contributor to MilTech.
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