for chips). NATO suddenly realised the importance of flexing its muscles again and returning to full speed. In Ukraine today, in East Asia perhaps tomorrow, while at the same time keeping an eye on a multipolar world where superpowers and medium-sized but nuclear powers coexist (a novelty compared to Cold War times). At the same time facing a series of technological challenges, including those relating to conventional armaments. Ukraine and beyond Ukraine, at the eastern border of the Alliance, is currently at the centre of NATO’s thoughts, while the number one threat is Russia. With its invasion, Moscow has openly disclosed its aggressive imperialist aspirations - never entirely hidden, for those who weren’t somehow economically or energetically dependent. Helping Ukraine is simply the top priority for the Atlantic Alliance, a conditio-sine-qua-non for everything that follows. The invasion was unanimously deemed intolerable - and, again, unanimously, it was decided to support the attacked one. In such a context, an incredibly united NATO appears to act as a good cop, a coordinator, a ‘grey eminence’. It is determined to support Ukraine physically, relying on its population’s heroism and the US President’s determination. At the same time, it is forced to balance itself, stay on edge, and not get involved. To show, as NATO’s Secretary General Stoltenberg repeated as a mantra, that “NATO is not part of the conflict”, given that direct Russia-NATO clash would be unacceptable (as has been any direct conflict involving nuclear powers, so far). On the other hand, however, it is determined to defend “every inch of NATO’s territory” shall the invasion cross NATO’s borders. The pre-eminence of Ukraine was already clear in the 2022 NATO Strategic Concept. Remaining behind the scenes, the Alliance now The triumph of Western democracy and value system, toghether with NATO, after the fall of the USSR, celebrated in Francis Fukuyama’s “End of History” book in 1992 has definitively turned out to be nothing more than wishful thinking. The story has continued, and despite peace dividends and nuclear weapons limitations, the clash between great powers has only eased, and for no more than fifteen years. Since 2007, when Putin criticised ‘the United States’ monopolistic dominance in global relations and its “almost uncontained hyper use of force in international relations” at the then Munich Security Conference (MSC), a slow and unstoppable climb towards a policy of power has characterised Russia’s actions. Yet Europe turned a blind eye to what happened in South Ossetia and Crimea, too used to an idea of perpetual peace as a given (and too dependent on Russian gas). And even the United States, which nonetheless started providing weapons to Ukraine in 2014, was preoccupied with the Middle East, domestic politics, and, increasingly, China’s impressive economic and military rise. In the meantime, NATO, deprived of its main Cold War-related main objective, was entangling itself in not always propitious strategic adventures like the Afghan one. In Europe and North-America, the Alliance seemed to be waning in popularity with members’ public opinions, even the most important ones, such as the United States. Suddenly, on 24 February 2022, came the virtual adrenaline injection that contributed to the awakening from the Alliance’s famous ‘brain death’. The invasion of Ukraine was undoubtedly the biggest shakeup in the transatlantic community since the fall of the Berlin wall, worsened by the realisation of the strategic partnership between Russia and China, both with nuclear capabilities and economies that fit together well (gas 10 · MT 2/2023 Hot Spots Caterina Tani NATO: the saga continues The Alliance after one year of Ukrainian war
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