Marco Giulio Barone Parole, parole, parole Raising awareness, unchanged budget Recent Italian defence planning documents seem to mark a tipping point in Italy’s strategic posture. Since 2014, when Crimea was annexed to Russia, Italian planners (basically politicians and the military) took time and kept focusing their programmatic documents on terrorism, immigration and all kinds of non-existential threats. Signs of changing times were evident, as global confrontation between the US and China harshened and Russia held an increasingly aggressive posture in the Caucasus, in the Middle East, and now in Ukraine. But only the major Ukrainian conflict was able to shake the Italian establishment and convince it to launch programmes that should have been kicked off five to ten years ago. The programmatic documents Stato Di Previsione Della Spesa per l’Anno Finanziario 2023 (Expenditure Estimates for the Financial Year 2023) and the Documento Programmatico Pluriennale 2022-2024 (DPP, 20222024 Multi-year Planning Document) finally acknowledge that threats are real, and that heavy money is needed to prop-up the Italian military with fighters, tanks, warships, missiles, and other serious hardware. Hence, the budget for 2023 is €27.75 billion, 6.4% more than 2022, thus confirming the slow yet steady growth in Italian defence spending in the last six years. However, the so called “Funzione Difesa” (literally Defence Function, including ordinary funds for the Air Force, the Army, and the Navy) only takes €19.66 billion. As independent armed force with both police and military duties, Carabinieri (and Forestali corps) are allocated €7.6 billion, only half a billion of which can be counted for military duties (estimated). In addition, the Ministry for Entrepreneurship and Made in Italy (MEMI) contributes to key Italian procurement programmes with further €2.36 billion, while the Ministry of Economics and Finances (MEF) covers the costs of overseas deployments with a €1.55 billion contribution. All this accounting magics are needed to declare to NATO the highest possible figure while communicating to the Italian public opinion (always critical of defence spending) the lowest possible one. The good news of raising spending is compensated by the constantly bad news about timing and quality. Despite programmatic documents changed of tone and identified the Ukrainian war, tensions around Hormuz and in the Eastern Mediterranean, and constant instability in Libya as threatening scenarios, the current government confirmed that Italy will meet the 2% of GDP defence investment guideline in 2028, in line with the previous government’s planning. As a reminder, official NATO guidelines considers 2% a minimum and not a plateau. As far as quality is concerned, of the €19.66 billion assigned to armed forces, €11 billion go to personnel (56%) and only €2.5 billion to operations & maintenance (12.7%). Investment, including both ordinary budget and MEMI funds, amount to €8.44 and remains unchanged from the previous year – but it will be affected negatively by inflation. Hence, most of the increase in Italian defence budget goes to personnel and No, Italy is not investing more. The argument that “personnel is the best investment” might appear solid, but the low level of allocations for operations and maintenance raises serious doubts about combat readiness. To sum up, the raise in Italian defence spending is a major change in the country’s approach and, somehow, in its mentality. Today, major programmes finally benefit of a fair degree of certainty that further cuts will not come, as it was the case in the 2008-2018 decade. The budget effectively allows for modernization in all sectors. New programmes will have enough financial resources to be confirmed, bills of existing programmes will be paid and maybe some further batches of F-35s fighters, Freccia IFVs, Centauro II MGS, and PPA multirole frigates will be ordered. In addition, Italy will be able to respect its international commitments in East Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East, and to be a little more prepare to respond to eventual further crises. Notwithstanding this, the military weight of Italy in Europe and in NATO will likely decline. While the Italian budget improves slightly, France and Germany are rapidly expanding their budgets and filling their capability gaps, while north European countries are about to double the size of their armed forces, and procurement programmes are expanding as well. In East Europe, by 2028, when Italy will meet the 2% target, Poland might have the largest and best equipped force in Europe and spend as much as 5% of its GDP in defence. For Italy, expanding the expenses on personnel while maintaining minimum combat readiness and constant level of investment might prove insufficient to remain relevant in Europe and the Mediterranean. Ambitions spelled out in programmatic documents are not substantiated by a sufficient level of quality and timely investment, so far. Marco Giulio Barone is Editor-in-Chief of Military Technology. Observations from Rome MT 2/2023 · 7 (Photo: Italian Ministry of Defence)
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