A year on from Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine: some would say everything has changed, others maintain the status quo has barely been altered. Failure to agree demonstrates in itself the scene has shifted dramatically, after a year of ‘war delivered by CNN,’ inter alia. Not since the Middle Ages has warfare been a zero sum game. The conflict in Ukraine proves the thesis that, not matter what supporting factors may be brought into play – supplies of ammunition, of tanks, of missiles – the decision on the ground will be made by small unit tactics. It is evident that Ukraine – outnumbered and outmassed – has held its own due largely to a fundamental differentiator. Russian forces have no ‘middle management’. Whereas Russian generals have to lead from the front (where a high percentage have become casualties) to overcome reluctance to engage among their troops, Ukrainian forces have demonstrated agility, flexibility and intelligence at a very low level of command – down to individual squads in many cases – and won tactical advantage over their adversaries, time after time. However, the ultimate decision in Ukraine will not be made on the ground, but at the negotiating table. After a year in which Ukraine has received unprecedented levels of political, moral, economic and practical help from NATO and the broader international community, victory is now closer now than in the early hours of the invasion. Estimated military casualties on both sides total in excess of 250,000 by an enormous margin; Russian technology has been exposed for having feet of clay in many instances, which will have long-term effects for the nation’s exports; the economies of both nations have been severely damaged – the latest estimates suggest it could take well over a decade for the Ukrainian economy to return to pre-war levels of sustainability. But perhaps the greatest blow – arguably with the furthest-reaching consequences – is that one of the oldest of war-related adages has been proven: the first casualty of war is truth. To a degree, the world has accepted the view, promulgated by the mass media, of ‘plucky’ Ukraine standing alone against the powerful (but increasingly impotent) Russian bear. There are echoes here of beleagured Britain standing alone against the Nazi hordes in 1940 – but that view is flawed. The truth lies somewhere between that pole of thought and the apocalyptic view that Doomsday is nigh, fuelled by a conviction that Putin, backed into a corner, will resort to weapons of mass destruction. Despotic though his regime is, Putin still has to honour the potential threats posed by domestic politics and popular opinion. The Russian in the street is increasingly weary (and increasingly vocal about it) of the economic and social consequences of the ‘police action’ in Ukraine. Food shortages are growing, sanctions are having more and more unpalatable consequences – which are becoming increasingly difficult to conceal – and unrest within the Russian military, as well as relations with its ‘implausibly deniable’ adjuncts such as the Wagner Group, are combining to cloud Putin’s future and to limit his decision-making ability. That he still has the power to drive his agenda forward is made obvious by a number of things. His generals (those who have not been fired) continue to prosecute his objectives in Ukraine. His political opposition continues to be relatively muted – but persists, despite sudden outbreaks of communal vertigo and indigestion as a statistically improbable number of his vocal opponents fall from high buildings or suffer terminal food poisoning. His aggressive bluster vis-à-vis the international community continues to fuel conviction among certain political classes that regime change in Moscow is the only viable solution. The larger problem, though, is the perception of the conflict promoted by the mass media. In Britain, as elsewhere, conversations in pubs revolve around why direct intervention is off the table, why ‘the West’ won’t ante up and provide more tanks, why the issue of gifting fighter aircraft is so difficult to resolve. Readers of MilTech will, of course, have a more sophisticated view of the realities of the conflict and will recognize that the outcome will be political rather than military. But the wider public is only in very few instances being given access to the underlying facts, an issue for which the media must bear at least partial responsibility. The stark truth is that Ukrainian forces need help right now – not in 18 months after aircrew and maintenance training empowers the deployment of any aircraft that might be provided. But the debate as to why there is resistance to such a move serves Zelenskyy’s purposes and those of some Western politicians. What it does not do is in any way accelerate a resolution of the conflict. As long as armchair generals opine on our TV screens on the latest tactical activity, the strategic truth will continue to be hidden from the public. As long as Putin is left to pursue his (increasingly frustrated) ambitions and aspirations, convinced that a military solution remains feasible, the conflict will continue. And the truth will continue to lick its wounds in the obscurity of obfuscation and ill-informed opinion. The ‘West’ has made unprecedented moves over Ukraine. That is the unvarnished truth. So is the fact that more needs to be done to avoid ‘celebrating’ a second or third anniversary of the invasion. Much more. Tim Mahon The First Casualty of War…. Tim Mahon is Editor-in-Chief of Mönch Online. 8 · MT 2/2023 Observations from London
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