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MT 5/2022 · 1 To state that the last three years have seen seismic-level changes in the defence and security world – and, indeed, in the world in general, would be to indulge in that most British of linguistic tools – the art of understatement. It is, however, a statement that must, perforce, be made – and be made to cover a longer period of recent history than events post-COVID. Why so? Primarily because we need constantly to remind ourselves that what we are defending against – the threat envelope, if you will – is constantly changing, morphing and expanding. It is not just the glaringly obvious issues that cause headaches for our defence and security planners – like the unwarranted and significantly destabilizing Russian incursion into Ukraine – but the rather more subtle, below-the-line issues that are beginning to make inroads into the resources that are being stretched increasingly thinly around that threat envelope. The problem is that – rather like Joe Public’s reaction to the end of the Cold War (“well, that’s that, then – no more enemy, so we can do away with expensive armed forces”) the almost subliminal issues that arise from great events often gain little exposure in the mainstream media and do not, therefore, receive much attention from the people who will be affected by continued threat proliferation. Climate change is, of course, a major challenge and one that is certainly generating the countless thousands (millions?) of column inches of opinion – some better informed than others – that characterize the formation and manipulation of public opinion in the modern world. As usual, there are as many varied definitions of the nature of climate change as there are definers – ranging from those who deny there is such an issue, blaming it all on the scaremongering tactics of one or another extremes of the political spectrum, to those who see the end of the world as we know it arriving as early as lunchtime next Tuesday. The truth, inevitably, lies somewhere between the two poles. But try telling that to the inhabitants of Pakistan, China or California this week. California is on fire. Nothing unusual in that, one might think – but the indications and prognostications are that current wildfires are more widely spread than has been the case in recent years, and are likely to continue to increase in extent and, perhaps, in frequency. Pakistan is in dire straits: according to some estimates – which do not appear to be overly exaggerated – fully one third of the nation is underwater, and over 32 million people have been displaced. That is a crisis of catastrophic proportions for an economically challenged nation – one that has the potential to spill over into actions that Security Challenges? What Security Challenges? Editorial natural resources perceived to be in short supply – a whole raft of issues that the man in the street does not consider on a regular basis. Politics also has an effect which should not be discounted. Anywhere. The election of Liz Truss as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom by slightly over 80,000 voters (around 0.0012% of the population), and her actions in the first week in office prove little beyond the fact that the Conservative party sees ideology as a preferable solution to common sense approaches to problem solving. And the United States – in which much of the rest of the world sees an aspirational ideal – is arguably more deeply divided today than at any time since the Civil War. The security challenges plaguing resource-constrained planners and their political masters are legion. And they are growing. But defence and security remain shrouded in secrecy and are routinely not subject to the levels of transparency common in other governmental spheres. It’s time for that to change – within the bounds of maintaining operational security. Change in the stability of the global village will only come about with changes in behaviour by large percentages of any social group or population. And such change can only be engendered through understanding of the issues. It‘s time for better, more profound and wider spread communication. Knowing is, after all, half the battle. Tim Mahon Editor-in-Chief of MilTech may affect international security if sufficient assistance cannot be provided in a reasonably short period. China, on the other hand, is suffering from the longest and most severe heatwave since records were first taken 160 years ago. Temperatures consistently above 40°C for days at a time, a drought that is having dramatic effects on water distribution: over 60 Chinese rivers have dried up completely, and the iconic Yangtze is at its lowest level ever. Add to this the fact that later this year (if it has not actually already happened) China will be pushed into second place in the league table of the world’s most populous nations – by India – and it becomes understandable why some of the nation’s governing classes may consider the Middle Kingdom to be at risk of losing its cachet. To what effect, one wonders? Speculation by ‘Western’ pundits on the way in which events are interpreted and decisions arrived at in the Chinese leadership are rarely particularly fruitful, since the difference in mindsets and experiential bases are simply too great for accurate predictions to be made. Some see the cumulative pressures on China – current circumstances have had direct and detrimental effects on food production and industrial output, for example – as having the potential to drive expansionist policies. Others believe that any likely aggression will be channeled into a unilateral ‘resolution’ of the outstanding Taiwan question. That uncertainty is key to the question of security. Uncertainty leads to instability as politicians and populations ponder and prevaricate; instability causes greater sensitivity to the possibility of trigger events setting off a chain reaction of escalation in border incidents, mass migration, economic warfare, competition for
Contents MT 5/2022 · 2 Editorial Security Challenges? What Security Challenges?. ................................... 1 TimMahon, Editor-in-Chief Comment Impact matters!............................................................................................ 5 Marco Giulio Barone Interview Taking the CSL Discussion to the Next Level – and Beyond..................... 6 Exclusive Insights from Joe DePietro, VP/GM, Naval Combatant & Missile Defense Programs at Lockheed Martin Interview conducted by North American Bureau Chief Marty Kauchak Defence of the US and its Allies Long Range Precision Fires on the Pacific Battlefield .............................. 8 Stephen W. Miller Preparing NORAD for the 2030s and Beyond........................................... 12 Marty Kauchak ACV Moving Ahead on All Fronts. ............................................................. 14 Tim Fish Harmonising the ML230LF – Northrop Grumman Expands Bushmaster Portfolio............................... 16 Marty Kauchak Features Protection Systems for Modern Armoured Vehicles............................... 17 André Forkert Training for Next Generation Air Forces................................................... 21 Trevor Nash Carl-Gustaf Changes Future Small Unit Combat..................................... 24 Stephen W. Miller The Future of Tactical Air Transport: Doctrine or Convenience?........... 27 Marco Giulio Barone Mastering the Commons – The Future of Logistics................................. 30 Marco Giulio Barone From the Bridge In the wake of NATOmembership............................................................ 32 Marco Giulio Barone Did We Ever Need a 600-Ship Navy? – What Do We Need Today........................................................................... 35 George Galdorisi Merchant Platforms for Littoral Operations............................................. 38 Massimo Annati Mönch Verlagsgesellschaft mbH (Mönch Publishing Group) Editor-in-Chief, Military Technology: TimMahon Editor-at-Large: Dr Ezio Bonsignore North American Bureau Chief (NewOrleans): Marty Kauchak NATO & EU Affairs Correspondent (Brussels): Caterina Tani Publishers: Uta & Volker Schwichtenberg US Office: 1326 St Andrew Street, Unit B, NewOrleans, LA 70130-5124 Correspondents: Massimo Annati (Italy); Marco Giulio Barone (France); Angus Batey (UK); Dr Theo Benien (Germany); Philip Butterworth-Hayes (UK); Atul Chandra (India); Tomás Chlebecek (Czech Republic); Dr Robert Czulda (Poland); Peter Donaldson (UK); Arie Egozi (Israel); Tim Fish (New Zealand); Kubilai Han (Turkey); Eugene Kogan (Georgia); Denys Kolesnyk (France); Edward Lundquist (USA); Georg Mader (Austria); Stephen WMiller (USA); Jörg Muth (Estonia); Trevor Nash (UK); Dr Stefan Nitschke (Germany); Santiago Rivas (Argentina); David Saw (France); AndrewWhite (UK); Dr Thomas Withington (France) Executive Associate and CEO: Volker Schwichtenberg Executive Associate, CEO and Lawyer: Uta Schwichtenberg Founder: Manfred Sadlowski Deputy Managing Director: Christa André Cover and Layout: Frank Stommel Mönch Verlagsgesellschaft mbH: Christine-Demmer-Straße 7 Tel.: +49-2641 / 3703-0 53474 Bad Neuenahr-Ahrweiler Fax: +49-2641 / 3703-199 Germany E-Mail: miltech@moench-group.com www.monch.com The views published are not necessarily those of the Publisher or Editor. 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MILITARY TECHNOLOGY MT 5/2022 · 3 Cover BAE Systems’ Beowulf articulated all-terrain vehicle has won the US Army’s Cold-weather All-Terrain Vehicle programme, having gained a $278 million production contract in the process. (BAE Systems) Small inserts on cover depict - Paramount’s newly-launched and improved Marauder Mk 2 builds on the original’s reputation for being best suited for an apocalyptic environment. (Paramount Engineering) - Serco’s design for an unmanned vessel has been selected by DARPA for Phase 2 of its No Manning Required Ship (NOMARS) programme. (DARPA) - A surprise announcement at MSPO in early September indicated Poland is to buy up to 96 AH-64EV6 Apache attack helicopters. (US Army) Nations in Focus The Italian Defence Industry Base – A Cornerstone of the National Economy.................................................. 41 Marco Giulio Barone Underwater Technology at DRASS-Galeazzi – Italy’s Legacy in Commando Operations................................................. 46 Marco Giulio Barone C4ISR Forum EW and the DoD’s MOSA Mandate........................................................... 50 Denis Smetana, Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions Columns Letter From America: President Biden – Don’t Forget About Iran................................................ 52 Marty Kauchak Strategic Focus: Threat Matrix: Past, Present and Future Challenges Converge............. 53 Tomás Chlebecek Special Features Safe Escape – Martin-Baker Well Placed for NewMk18 Ejection Seat.......................... 54 Atul Chandra Czech Republic to Procure F-35 and CV90.............................................. 56 Tomás Chlebecek Homeland Security.......................................................................... 58 Industrial Focus. ............................................................................... 60 The Polaris Government & Defense MRZR D4 ultra-light tactical vehicle has now been equipped with an autonomy kit from Rheinmetall for the UK MoD’s Project Theseus evaluation programme. (Photo via Rheinmetall Defence) Index of Advertisers ASELSAN Inc.................................................................................... 4th cover EMBRAER.................................................................................................... 29 Invisio A/S...................................................................................................... 7 Israel Aerospace Industries Ltd - IAI............................................... 2nd cover IDEF............................................................................................................. 11 Iveco - OTO Melara SCRL – C.I.O.............................................................. 43 LAAD.............................................................................................................. 4 PRMExpo..................................................................................................... 15 Weibel Scientific A/S................................................................................... 33
Marco Giulio Barone Impact matters! The war in Ukraine has forced European countries to brutally put military issues at the top of their agendas, resulting in budget increases after decades of under-investment and capability shortfalls. But, in a scenario that might seem ideal for affirming autonomy in EU defence cooperation, NATO and the US will likely be the big winners. Russia underestimated Ukrainian resilience, and the war is far from over. The conflict is evolving towards a war of attrition, in which the risk of nuclear incident remains high due to skirmishes around the Zaporizhzhia power plant. Although on paper the EU has been working for years on reinforcing defence collaboration, its role in the crisis remains highly symbolic and has little real impact. A brand-new strategic framework is in place, and the political consensus on the need for a ‘geopolitical EU is arguably at a record high level. From a mere political perspective, EU countries succeeded in showing unity against Russia. They were able to rapidly approve a significant package of sanctions, to welcome Ukrainian refugees in Europe thanks to the first activation ever of the Temporary Protection Directive, and to approve assistance measures under the European Peace Facility (EPF). The total amount of EU aid has reached €2 billion since the beginning of the war, of which €490 million is for “military equipment designed to deliver lethal force for defensive purposes” (note that an entire was necessary for translating ‘weapons’ into EU-ropean) and €10 million to “cover the provision of equipment and supplies, such as personal protective equipment, first aid kits, and fuel”. In relative terms, these represent an unprecedented EU effort, as significant military aid was approved at a faster pace than usual. In absolute terms, however, the EU is advancing too slowly, and is ineffective compared to what other stakeholders have done, thus having a limited military impact on the battlefield – which, conversely, is what Ukrainian armed forces urgently require. EU countries are struggling to pledge the promised armaments, mainly due to limited stocks in their (ridiculous) inventories. For some West European countries, especially Germany, sending weapons to Ukraine means accepting a shortage in specific systems. According to the ‘Ukraine support tracker’ from the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, the “gap between committed and disbursed aid has narrowed” for large EU countries between January and August 2022. For example, Poland has already delivered the promised €1.8 billion in equipment, while Germany has delivered only €290 million of the promised €620 million. In the reference period, EU institutions (including Commission, Council and EPF, but also Macro-Financial Assistance and the European Investments Bank) pledged €12.3 billion in financial aid, and €2.5 billion in military aid. Although the COVID pandemic was not the existential threat that a full-scale war could be, EU countries accepted easily to pledge as much as €750 billion to sustain the recovery. Likewise, European countries spent €280 billion on subsidies and tax cuts in the last year to help businesses and households pay their energy bills. Beyond official solidarity statements on Ukraine, the numbers show that EU countries are underestimating the relevance of war in Ukraine (when will they ever learn?). In the same period, the US pledged €10.3 billion in financial aid and €25 billion in military aid. In August, President Biden announced an additional package of about €3 billion, the largest tranche since the beginning of the war. On its side, the UK pledged €2.1 billion in financial aid and €4 billion in military aid and has delivered almost all the weapons systems it committed to. The economic effort of the US and the UK is far higher than the EU’s, and is also more effective on the battlefield. The US delivered about 20 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), UAVs and other artillery systems, and hundreds of thousands of munitions – thereby having a more immediate impact than the 18 CAESAR artillery systems pledged by France or the PZH-2000s that Germany sent in July as its first delivery of heavy weapons since the beginning of the war. Hence, ‘the few’ are having a greater impact than ‘the many’ – who number as many as 27. In principle, the main advantage of pooling resources is to achieve better results. Instead, the European selfish master narrative that European countries are doing “everything possible” to face the Ukrainian crisis, is contradicted by fact and, most of all, by the absence of concrete, solid impact on the battleground – either through the EU or by any single country. The main reason why the US will continue to have a footprint on European soil is that European countries keep leaving immense power vacuums to exploit. And the irrelevance of European countries on their own continent has resuscitated Macron’s ‘brain-death’ of NATO, which remains the principal US-driven alliance in the world (regardless of French disappointment), but also the most credible security provider. Luckily or unluckily, depending on one’s point of view. Marco Giulio Barone is a political-military analyst based in Paris, and a regular contributor to Mönch magazines. Comment MT 5/2022 · 5
A confluence of technology and collaborative forces is enabling Lockheed Martin to advance its Aegis Combat System programme. While in one case the company is seeing its return on investment from advancing the Aegis common source library (CSL) Baseline 9 and 10, “we’ve also been investing ourselves to transition the common source library into the DevSecOps Continuous Integration-Continuous Delivery Pipeline. What that has enabled us to do is where we were pulling from the CSL or inputting into it once a quarter, we’re able to do it once every three to four weeks,” Joe DePietro, Vice President and General Manager, Naval Combatant & Missile Defense Programs at Lockheed Martin, told MilTech. A resulting major milestone on the programme’s roadmap will occur later this summer, when the company concurrently completes CP 22-1 (a Baseline 9 load) and Baseline 10 for DDG-125. “The goodness of what is happening is we are converging. So, while we talk of baselines, we’re really not going to have to do that anymore. In reality, the only difference is one ship will have a [legacy] SPY-1 and one will have a [Raytheon] SPY-6. All the interfacing, all the planning for the BMD mission, all the things will be common because of the way we have been approaching this development – we’re really taking the CSL discussion to the next level.” DePietro paused to put in a pitch for the huge returns on investment the Aegis team is gaining from the Virtualized Aegis Weapon System, which has most recently helped advance Baseline 10. “We have been able to go to PMRF [Pacific Missile Range Facility] to get more air time with the SPY-6 array out there. We’ve been able to give it to Raytheon to allow them to do testing at their facility, and we’ve been put a version this at Ingalls [Shipbuilding, Pascagoula, Mississippi] for the build of DDG-125. Within one hour or two, we can shift from Morristown [New Jersey] to the virtualized Aegis a full combat system load that we can then take to the ship and load as opposed to people building hard drives in Morristown and transferring by internet to Pascagoula or shipping them to Dahlgren [Virginia].” Lockheed is also expanding the technology envelope through collaboration in its increasing involvement in the Program Executive Office Integrated Warfare Systems (PEO IWS) Software Factory-Forge, a Navy software factory aiming to establish the infrastructure necessary to bring updates to the fleet in as quickly as a single day. Of added significance, Lockheed Martin is concurrently working on Ship Self Defense System (SSDS) Baseline 12, bringing to bear Aegis’s operational readiness testing system (ORTS) to permit software-driven testing to look at system health. In yet another related, internal R&D effort, the community expert reported work on a common weapons controller, that allows Lockheed Martin to look at self defence up through IAMD (Integrated Air and Missile Defence) out of that one common weapons controller. “When you think about it that’s already moving in a direction toward the integrated combat system (ICS). The whole idea is with the software factories and the development, and systems engineering and software integration, as they look at the ICS of the future, we’re showing the ability and are able to say, ‘We can do a single software development that will support weapons control for self defence, all the way to IAMD. That’s part of that moving forward evolution,” he reflected. International Lockheed Martin remains engaged in expanding Aegis programme capabilities in non-US navies. In one instance, the Lockheed Martin executive said his offices are working with SCOMBA, a Navantia combat management system for Spanish warships, to develop an interface for Aegis to work with the system to do all the radar control and AAW mission sets, for example. “This further shows the flexibility of containerizing and componentizing the design of the CSL. We can now take segments and put them together and interface those to even host-nation combat systems to be able to expand into domains where they may not be able to have that capability today.” Further, Lockheed Martin also remains in discussion for a possible mid-life upgrade for Spain’s Álvaro de Bazán-class F-100 frigate programme. Work would certainly take advantage of onboard systems in the new Bonifaz-class F-110 Aegis frigate programme, with the prospect of affordably translating that capability back to legacy F-100 vessels. The build of the F-110 force is on contract to Navantia. The company is also in discussions with the Hellenic Navy about the possibility of a mid-life upgrade for the four Hydra-class frigates of the MEKO 200HN design. “This would use a CSL-based combat system as part of that upgrade and it would bring integrating some common systems of what the US has, whether it be on LCS or others, and also use some of the existing systems, ASW for example, on that ship,” DePietro concluded. 6 · MT 5/2022 Inteview Interview conducted by North American Bureau Chief Marty Kauchak. Taking the CSL Discussion to the Next Level – and Beyond Exclusive Insights from Joe DePietro, VP/GM, Naval Combatant & Missile Defense Programs at Lockheed Martin f Spain’s F-100 Álvaro de Bazán-class frigates are prime candidates for a potential mid-life upgrade that could leverage ongoing work on the Aegis system, according to Lockheed Martin. (Photo: Lockheed Martin)
The US Army PrSM development by Lockheed Martin was initially to provide improved deep-fires capabilities, allowing for adversary disruption and destruction. It has evolved into a multi-target capable 200+km system using the existing HIMARS launcher. A multi-mode moving target/ship seeker was tested in 2020. (Photo: LMCO/USArmy) The ‘Terrain’ Much of the attention being given to a Pacific conflict has been oriented on confronting the Peoples Republic of China in the South China and/or East China Seas. These ocean areas are bordered by land masses of Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia and by smaller islands extending south from the Japan mainland with China to the east. However, analysts like Patricia M Kim of the Thornton Center for East Asia Studies viewing PRC initiatives abroad over the past two decades suggest it has a broader intent to advance its presence in strategically important theatres, including Cambodia, and into Africa. More specifically, its 2022 accords with the Solomon Islands suggest the possible scope of a Pacific confrontation could be much wider. Therefore, considering this wider contingency – how LRPF may be deployed and employed and their requisite roles – may be more diverse than initially suggested. The Tools: Ground-Launched Anti-Ship/Surface Defence Although attention on LRPF systems had, at least for armies, been striking deep ground targets, the additional need for such capabilities against surface ships is highlighted in a Pacific conflict. This is already recognized and embraced by a number of other militaries concerned with threats to their coastline. Vietnam’s Naval Coastal Artillery have had batteries of the Russian Bastion-P mobile guided missile with active- passive radar seeker and 350 km range against sea targets (greater against land targets) since 2011. They also field ZIL 8X8 truck-mounted 450km range P-5 Pyatyorkas and IMI’s 306mm Extra with 150km range. Poland has expanded its ground-launched Coastal Missile Squadrons using the Kongsberg Naval Strike Missile (NSM) – already widely adopted for naval platforms and aircraft, offering both proven anti-ship and land attack capabilities in a single missile. With an 125kg titanium alloy blast/ fragmentation warhead with a programable intelligent multi-purpose fuse, it is relatively lightweight at 400kg, allowing for mounting platform adaptability and mobility. Navigating by GPS, inertial and terrain recognition,n its infrared imaging seeker and onboard target data base allow independent detection, recognition, and target discrimination. The US Marine Corps has integrated NSM onto a JLTV 4X4 chassis as its Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS) for use by Marine Littoral Regiments. NSM is ideally suited to expeditionary employment, since its relative compactness and light weight facilitate transport even by CH-53 helicopter, C-130 transport and landing craft. This also aids its ability to displace quickly once fired, and to hide to avoid being targeted. The successful integration and launch of the Joint Strike Missile air-launched variant of NSM from the F-35A and C offers valuable possibilities for coordinated ground and air NSM attack. The missile has also been proposed as a candidate to meet Australia’s land-based anti-ship missile Project Land 4100 Phase 2. Kongsberg and Thales are teamed offering the ‘StrikeMaster,’ with two NSM canisters mounted on the Bushmaster vehicle. Ground-launched NSM is particularly well suited to defending a site from naval intrusion or securing a maritime choke-point. As Hans Christian Hagen, VP Business Development at Kongsberg stated, “Its manoeuvrability, ability to use a round-about route, and ability to confidently differentiate “red” target ships from “white/neutral” make it ideal in what could be expected to be a complex target environment.” That the The new emphasis on strategic interests in the Pacific presents a range of military challenges. One of these is an added emphasis by Western ground forces on building their capabilities for delivering long-range precision fires. This mirrors capabilities that have already been resident in the Soviet/Russian and the Peoples Liberation Army. It includes not only ground strike but anti-access coastal defence, as adopted by Vietnam and several Baltic states as a deterrent to hostile sea-borne encroachment. Long-range precision fires (LGPF) have been used by ground forces as deep fires, intended to disrupt and destroy opposing supporting logistics, command and control, and air defences. These roles are being demonstrated by Ukraine’s successful employment of the M270 HIMARS. The operational demands of a Pacific campaign and the conditions it represents will further expand the demands placed on LRPF and their roles and missions. Stephen W. Miller Long Range Precision Fires on the Pacific Battlefield 8 · MT 5/2022 Defence of the US and its Allies f
Defence of the US and its Allies MT 5/2022 · 9 has programmed 120 PrSM missiles in its 2023 budget, while a Marine Corps spokesperson, indicated its PrSM fielding remains “predecisional”. The Japanese Ground Self Defence Force is embarked on accelerated development of an advanced version of its current Type12 trucklaunched anti-ship missiles. The upgraded version from Mitsubishi Heavy Industries extends its range from the current 200 to at least 900km with a further extension to 1,400km planned. The new missile also has a lower radar-cross section to reduce detection, in-flight satellite link target data updating, enhanced Terrain Contour Matching and on-board target discrimination. Of benefit is that the improved missile still uses the 8x8 tactical truck which is easy to move and conceal. The Type 12 SSM – Upgraded will begin deployment in 2023. Ship and aircraft versions of the Type 12 are to follow. The Tomiuri Daily reported on 23 August that Japan’s MoD has committed to deploying 1,000 Type 12s to the southwestern islands and Kyushu. Taiwan has launched a similar ground LRPF missile deployment with both ground strike and anti-ship systems. The includes the March 2022 NSM is equally capable of precision strike of a ground target is another benefit that recommends it in supporting the changing mission or taskings of a ground combat command, especially in an expeditionary operation . As impressive as the performance of the NSM is, it is nevertheless important to put this in perspective as regards use in the Pacific, where distance influences every system’s role. NSM’s maximum range of 185km must be put in an operational context: it cannot cover, for example, the 400km gap between Okinawa and the disputed Senkaku Islands. As Mark Cancian at the Center for Strategic Studies suggests “NSM must get close to an adversary to be effective, that will be difficult. Once conflict begins … it will be dangerous if not impossible.” However, the ground launched NSM is ideally suited to denying a specific piece of ocean or securing a critical choke-point as part of a larger air-naval-ground force. The Tools: Offensive Greater range is essential to facilitate offensive LRPF, especially in the Pacific. The US Army Precision Strike Missile (PrSM), now entering active service as a deep-strike system against critical ground targets could contribute to such a capability. Of particular importance is that PrSM is designed to be fired from the fielded tracked M270A1 MLRS and the more easily deployable 6x6 M142 HIMARS. With two missiles per pod, HIMARS will carry two while MLRS has four. The Army Fires Cross Functional Team stated, “PrSM’s 400 km+ range, optimized unitary warhead, and precision guidance are intended to address threat air defences, missile sites, command and control, staging areas, and high-pay-off targets.” In a Pacific conflict, it could potentially target opposing incursions, airfields, and landings. Enhancements already planned include “a multi-mode seeker capable of engaging moving land and maritime targets, autonomous target detection, and extending the range using air-breathing ram-jet propulsion.” With these improvements, it becomes a long range multi-target capable system, that has the advantage of being widely present on the battlefield. The PrSM and Guided MLRS, particularly employed from HIMARS, offer a significant capability to Pacific combat. The number of potential launch systems alone provide a widespread possible strike or anti-ship capability. With any HIMARS or MLRS able to deliver either land or anti- ship fire, it become increasingly difficult for an opponent to counter. Even the 92km range GMLRS, which will add a multi-role air-burst effect and has a 150km Extended Range version (entering production in 2023), could be used to effect in many Pacific scenarios. Plus, HIMARS particularly is both readily transportable by air or ship to where it is needed and, once there, can move with minimal constraints or impact on what may be limited roads and infrastructure. The latter, plus the ability to be dispersed, concealed, and displaced to enhance survivability, as demonstrated in Ukraine, lends itself to anticipated operating conditions. That it can self-reload is also a major advantage, permitting a low signature and allowing independent operation. A single HIMARS with accompanying resupply truck(s) could repeatedly move-shoot-move, compounding an adversary’s response. HIMARS is already fielded in the region by Singapore, with Taiwan and Australia also receiving them. The US Army A former US Marine and defence industry executive, Stephen W Miller has extensive international hands-on experience in operations, systems development, acquisition and field support, from which he derives a unique perspective on the critical nature of their connection. The effectiveness of LRPF in the Pacific relies not only on precision but also numbers. Even ship-killing is not straightforward ‘one missile, one kill’. Here in RIMPAC2020 the 4,500t USS Buchanan could not be sunk ,despite hits by three AGM-114 Hellfire air-to-surface missiles, three Harpoon anti-ship missiles, and a 1,100kg laser-guided bomb. (Photo: USN) Japan has committed to an accelerated programme toward fielding an advanced version of the Type 12 truck-launched anti-ship missile system, extending range to 900km initially, with fielding in 2023. Additional upgrades contemplate a 1,500km range. (Photo: USArmy) f
Hypersonic and Hyper-Velocity Japan announced it is pursuing accelerated development of two classes of standoff hypersonic systems - the Hypersonic Cruise Missile (HCM) and the Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile (HVGP). The idea is to field initial ground-launched systems as early as 2024, while pursuing increased 1,500km range, targeting and navigation improvements for later inclusion. Official data indicates that both ship-defeating and ground/surface attack warheads are to be available. The former is to pierce a ship deck and the later using multiple EFPs (explosively formed projectiles) for area suppression. The United States has been actively developing hypersonic weapons since the early 2000s, with the current focus on hypersonic glide vehicles. However, as reflected in a July 2022 CRS Report to Congress, at present the Army, Navy, Air Force and DARPA each have hypersonic programmes. The Army Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW) pairs the Common Hypersonic Guide Body (C-HGB) with the Navy booster to provide a weapon with over 2700km range. However, the Army sees what is has named Dark Eagle as “a strategic attack weapon system,” although it could address “defeat of A2/AD and suppress adversary long range fires, and engage other high payoff/time sensitive targets.” It currently reflects LRHW as part of its proposed Strategic Fires Battalions. It aims to introduce an initial operational capability in 2023. DARPA is also pursuing its own hypersonic research, some of which could have application directly to service efforts. One effort is directed to providing an approach that could be compatible with the VLS – with obvious potential benefits to both Navy and Army. Its Operational Fires (OpFires) sought to lever its Tactical Glide Booster to a ground-launcher to “penetrate air defenses.” A successful demonstration was conducted using a Marine Corps vehicle in 2022, however, MCSC indicated this was not their effort. Implications and Implementation The capabilities offered by some Long Range Precision Fires challenge traditional definitions of ‘tactical’ and ‘operational’. In some cases they border on being viewed as strategic – opening new military and political concerns. With weapon ranges measured in hundreds of kilometres, the divide between defensive and offensive capability becomes less apparent. A question raised for US forces by CRS is who “is receiving permission for their basing in Europe and the Indo-Pacific”. This is hardly a forgone conclusion for stationing ground-based systems on non-US territory. It could particularly be a red flag for forward pre-conflict force insertion, as proposed in the US Marine Stand-in-Forces (SIF) concept or in Army response contingency plans. The CRS in March 2021 also identified service duplication issues in some long-range programmes. The USAF has questioned the rationale for the Army LRHW, which it states it can more effectively accomplish with its air-launched hypersonic weapons. It could similarly question how a 1,600km range TLAM fits within the codified Marine Corps mission, and why the Army should duplicate existing capabilities. The pursuit of LRPW is stretching the current guidelines on what long-range precision fires capabilities and missions most appropriately fall within each service’s responsibility. That these concerns are apparent even before the systems are fielded increases the importance of assuring a common framework and integrated approach as to how they will be employed. acquisition of Boeing’s Harpoon Coastal Defense Systems (HCDS) and further production and improvement of its indigenous Hsiung-Feng III supersonic missile, which employs a semi-tractor trailer launcher with four missiles. Taiwan plans to increase its launchers to seventy before 2023. Deep strike of up to 1,000 km will be provided by the HsiungSheng missile, which is entering production, with 100 planned by 2025. Equipped with either bunker-defeating or fragmentary warhead, it is capable of hitting Chinese mainland targets. The US Army and US Marines are separately pursuing efforts (though in “close coordination”) towards a ground-launched configuration of the Tomahawk Land-Attack cruise missile (TLAM). The R/UGM-106 Block V has a range of more than 1,600km, with in-flight data link, and a multi- mode seeker. At 6.27m length and 1,557kg with booster, it is not a compact missile and presents launcher and transportability challenges. The 1970’s USAF Ground Launched Cruise Missile version employed a heavy tractor trailer configuration – an approach the US Army appears to be following in its Typhon Mid-Range Capability (MRC) missile system. Typhon adapts the USN four-cell Vertical Launch System to a three-axle semi-trailer using a M983A4 8x8 Oshkosh prime mover. A battery is presently to be organized with four launch systems, a reload truck/trailer, support vehicle, and trailered operations centre. The Army MRC will be able to fire both TLAM and SM-6 Standard missiles. The proven supersonic SM-6 surface attack version has a range of 450km, in-flight data link, and dual-mode seeker: it uses Navy-developed software and technology. According to manufacturer Raytheon Missiles and Defense, it offers anti-air, ground strike and anti-ship in one missile. Capitalizing on this multi-functionality would be a major advantage for forces deployed at a distance – a circumstance that could typify combat in the Pacific. The particulars of the MCSC ground launched TLAM are less clear. The project office declined indicating whether the launcher might be the VLS or an elevated type, or whether the platform would be a trailer or multi-axle truck. The Navy contracted in May with Raytheon for 54 Tactical Tomahawk All-up Round VLS missiles for the Marines for 2025 delivery, including “Maritime Strike Tomahawk with Joint Multiple Effects Warhead”. Given this commitment and schedule, one would expect that a launcher would be further defined. Speculation suggests it could be a semi-trailer like the Army using the Marine’s LVSR mover or MTVR or 10x10 LVSR, either manned or unmanned. In each case, like the Army, air transportability will likely be limited to C-17s, with ground mobility highly dependent on local conditions. In addition, given its significant footprint and unique signature concealment, discrete movement, tactical emplacement, security and protection will require special effort. Another broader question noted by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) is the issue of “receiving permission for their basing in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific regions,” a proposition that is far from a forgone conclusion. Another basic programme question is why the US Army and US Marines are in effect developing two different systems, using the same munition to execute the same roles and missions. The CRS in a March 2021 report identified potentially unnecessary duplication by the services in some of these long-range weapon programs. The US Army’s Typhon Mid-Range Capability (MRC) missile systemtakes advantage of the Naval Vertical Launch System, allowing it to fire the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile as well as the current SM-6 Standard Missile, which has the ability to engage sea surface, land and air targets. (Photo: US DoD) 10 · MT 5/2022 Defence of the US and its Allies f
12 · MT 5/2022 Defence of the US and its Allies capabilities and protect Canadians from new and emerging threats. Capt. Alexandra Hejduk, Canadian Armed Forces, PA3-NORAD Operations Officer, called attention to a document stating the nation’s “investment of $3 billion over six years from existing Budget 2022 allocations, starting in 2022-23, with $1.9 billion in remaining amortization” for a plan that “includes a series of new and enhanced capabilities to ensure our Canadian Armed Forces and NORAD can detect, deter and defend Canadians against threats well into the future.” These NORAD-enabling initiatives fall under five inter-related areas of investment that, most significantly, are expected to bolster the CAF’s ability to detect threats earlier and, more precisely, by modernizing the nation’s surveillance systems. “We will build a new Northern Approaches Surveillance system that will significantly expand the CAF and NORAD’s situational awareness of who and what is entering Canadian airspace from the North, and we will continue to strengthen the CAF’s current spacebased surveillance capabilities,” the document states. The approximate C$1 billion investment in a new northward-facing, over-the-horizon radar system in the Arctic, would provide long-range surveillance to detect threats against US or Canadian cities. The radar would start operation in 2028. Further, the plan seeks to: improve CAF’s ability to understand and communicate threats to those who need it, when they need it, through investments in modern technology; strengthen that armed force’s ability to deter and defeat aerospace threats by modernizing its air weapons systems; ensure the Canadian Armed Forces can launch and sustain a strong military presence across the country, including in Canada’s North, through investments in new infrastructure and support capabilities – to include acquiring additional air-to-air refueling aircraft; and future-proof its capabilities to defend North America through investments in science and technology. Canada’s plan to buy additional refueling aircraft took an important, incremental step forward, in May, when the Royal Canadian Air Force issued Airbus a sole source request for proposal for four new A330 MRTTs. The contract is expected to be awarded in 2023. Back in the US Gen. VanHerck placed two important markers on the table at this May’s SASC subcommittee hearing when he pointed to the need to buy an over-the-horizon radar (OTHR) and other sensors, and to modernize and expand the Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS), with a focus on the Western Pacific and Eastern Atlantic. The commander initially Established in 1958 against the backdrop of the Cold War and threat of former Soviet Union air attack, Canada and the US formally established North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) – a binational military command. Don’t be deceived by the command’s age and original founding charter. At 64-years old, NORAD is gaining a spring in its bureaucratic step as it seeks relevance well beyond this decade to deter and defeat rapidly emerging threats to the Canadian and US homelands, from Russia and China, and even rogue states and other actors. Dynamic, Complex Threat Set to North American Homeland On 18 May, Gen Glen VanHerck, US Air Force, Commander of US Northern Command and NORAD, told the US Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces that the threats to the US and, by extension, North America, are increasingly complex and difficult to manage, and include the multi-domain battlespace and, more than ever before, the Arctic. The dual-hatted commander shaped the multi-domain battlefield for the senators and their staff members during this routine budget hearing, first explaining “the threat to North America is complex. Over the last year, our competitors have accelerated their fielding of kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities specifically designed to threaten our homeland.” Moving beyond generalities, the four-star officer pointed out Russia and China continue to aggressively pursue and field advanced offensive cyber and space capabilities, cruise missiles, hypersonic weapons, “and delivery platforms designed to evade detection and strike targets in our homeland from multiple vectors of attack and in all domains.” One specific, representative threat on VanHerck’s short-list is Russia’s new family of advanced air-, sea-, and ground-based cruise missiles to threaten critical civilian and military infrastructure. He explained, “The AS-23a air-launched cruise missile, for instance, features an extended range that enables Russian bombers flying well outside NORAD radar coverage – and in some cases from inside Russian airspace – to threaten targets throughout North America.” The general went on to state “Quite bluntly, my ability to conduct the missions assigned to USNORTHCOM and NORAD has eroded and continues to erode [as the US] is under attack every day in the information, space and cyber domain […] USNORTHCOM and NORAD’s ability to defend against modern threats requires improved all domain awareness, updated capabilities, and policies and strategies that reflect the current strategic environment and the advanced capabilities of our competitors.” It will come as no surprise to regular readers of MilTech that the general added a geographic dimension to his overview, noting, “Meanwhile, I require access to ready and trained forces to operate throughout the USNORTHCOM area of responsibility, including the Arctic, to respond in crisis and quickly execute homeland defense campaign plans.” Political Will Plus Investments Canada and the US are demonstrating a hefty amount of political will and focusing near- and long-term budget investments, in some instances, beyond their future years defence programmes, to deter and defeat the disparate threats facing the North American homeland, as noted above. On cue, on 20 June, Canadian civilian and military defence officials announced Canada’s plan to modernize that nation’s continental defence Marty Kauchak Preparing NORAD for the 2030s and Beyond A Royal Canadian Air Force CF-18 Hornet (above) makes its approach for take-off during Operation NOBLE DEFENDER. The operation demonstrated NORAD‘s various capabilities for the defence of North America. (Photo: USAF/Staff Sgt. Carlos Ferran)
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