limitation notwithstanding, Recce-strike will form an important element of the Russian way of war going forward, as will its tactical cousin – recce- fires. Recce-fires marries tactical reconnaissance assets, such as the Orlan-10 UAV, with artillery and EW to combine multiple domains against targets in a dynamic manner, as opposed to the more deliberate targeting cycle of recce-strike. Multi-Domain Effects Evident throughout Russian writing is the need to deliver coordinated effects that move beyond the use of land and air assets in the same operational environment. Reports from Ukraine indicate that multi- domain operations were very much a preferred route for Russian forces. One example that is widely cited, is the use of mobile phone intercepts to conduct artillery targeting. It is understood that using international mobile subscriber identity-catchers (IMSI-catchers), which were mounted on Orlan-10s, the Russian forces were able to monitor Ukrainian movements. They were also able to mimic cell phone towers and send fake messages to local subscribers, indicating that they were about to be engaged or something of that ilk. Similar messages would be sent to family members of soldiers on the front line, informing them of the death of their relatives, prompting a flood of messages to the previously identified numbers. Once it was confirmed that these numbers were in the approximate locations of Ukrainian defences, they could be engaged with artillery, EW and additional psychological pressure to surrender. instance. Their development enables Russia to conduct what it refers to as non-contact warfare, which holds that inflicting sufficient damage upon an opponent from long range can prevent a conventional conflict from occurring, or limiting its horizontal escalation. Notionally, the concept envisages the use of calibrated reversible damage in the early phases of a crisis, raising the prospect of unacceptable levels of damage should the opponent choose to continue in its escalatory manner. However, as the damage would be reversible and limited, it would provide reasonable opportunities for both sides to de-escalate. Should this fail, the concept would expand to include partners of the chosen state, creating friction at a political and military level, with the goal of preventing additional countries joining the conflict and limiting it to a local war. In the shaping phase of a conflict, it would extend to irreversible damage against an opponent’s infrastructure and military installations, raising the level of damage for the opponent’s way of life and signalling Russia’s intent, all the while seeking an end to the conflict on Russia’s terms. This concept, of course, has multiple limitations, and – pending an absence of any serious escalation in Ukraine at the time of writing – we are yet to see it fully in action. As is always the case, context matters, and Russia is not the formulaic state that it is often portrayed as. Military strategy is regarded as an art by Russian theorists and officers, implying that it is something creative and designed to be geared for the situation in hand. So, while this is understood to be Russia’s chosen approach to deterring conflict – or compelling an opponent to do what it wants – it may not always be the case that this course is chosen. There are further limits; Russia’s stock of guided missiles is estimated to be around 1,500, a proportion of which it would have to reserve to meet its requirements for nuclear deterrence. This indicates that its ability to engage targets with massed missile strikes may be limited. This A Research Associate at the Royal United Services Institute in London, Sam Cranny-Evans is a regular contributor to MilTech. Feature MT 2/2022 · 17 The Orlan-10 is the primary tactical reconnaissance UAV in service with Russian Ground Troops, it is used for multiple roles including electronic warfare and artillery correction. This image shows the trailer element of the R-330Zh Zhitel EW system, it has been observed in Ukraine and provides one of the core elements of a motor rifle brigade‘s EW equipment. The Su-25 can be fitted with the SVP-24 providing it with an increase in accuracy when using conventional unguided munitions. It was used extensively in Syria.
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