Vol.XLVI · Issue 2 · 2022 ISSN 0722-3226 E 16,00 US $ 27,00 DEFENDING THE ARCTIC I I United with AIRBORNE MOBILITY RMN’S FOURTH LMS INNOVATION IN TRAINING
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MT 2/2022 · 1 With all eyes focused on events in Ukraine for the last month, levels of uncertainty have changed not one iota. We still have little idea of how we really got to where we are now, and even less clue as to where we are heading – except, according to much of the media, to Hell in a handcart. Or, incidentally, why. We suggest that how we got here is not that difficult to determine. Vladimir Putin fundamentally – catastrophically – miscalculated almost every aspect of the situation in Ukraine, and in Russia. Driven by what appears to be his principal motivation – a feverish, obsessive desire for respect – he under-estimated the Ukrainian people, their resolve and their passion for the freedoms they have enjoyed since the break-up of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. He also badly under- estimated how much they have learned since his illegal occupation of Crimea. Coupled to an implacable will to resist and a native propensity to innovation (one senior NATO officer referred to the Ukrainian armed forces recently as “downright sneaky,”) the training that various NATO nations have provided in recent years has given rise to a defiant, capable force that seems destined to continue to inflict disproportionate losses on Russia’s legions. Legions that appear, as far as can be gathered from open sources, to be astonishingly inept, no matter their numbers, their strength or the shiny new nature of their equipment. In a war that is characterized by unprecedented volumes of disinformation, propaganda and ‘fake news,’ the exact nature of the losses inflicted are – and will continue to be – the subject of claim, counterclaim and heated debate. It does seem relatively safe to assume, from Ukrainian, European and US sources, however, that Russian losses in personnel amount to somewhere between 7,000 and 14,000. Moscow acknowledges just 500 casualties to date, leaving unanswered the question as to how it will conceal the actual numbers from a sceptical Russian populace, once the body bags come home. Putin also miscalculated the extent and depth of fracture lines in Europe, and the resolve of the United States. He depended on German reliance on Russian energy supplies; Quo Vadis, Humanus? Editorial With a theme for this issue of training, as we head into the latest iteration of Europe’s largest dedicated military training conference and exhibition (IT2EC in London, 26-28 April), it is worth reflecting on one salient fact emerging from the current conflict. It seems evident that the Russian forces engaged (and there is some debate as to their quality and readiness) lack what the retiring US CENTCOM commander recently described as “middle management:” the NCOs and staff officers who, in other armies, ensure things actually get done. We predict, with a degree of certainty, a lot more discussion in coming months and years regarding the benefits of training junior leaders well, and empowering them with the competence and confidence to execute independently. The outcome of this attempted cannibalization of a sovereign nation is uncertain – except that, eventually, there will be some form of peace. Whether that turns out to be a peace that Ukraine can live with – or that Putin can ‘spin’ as a victory – remains to be seen. But one result seems inevitable. With the moves that NATO has made in force dispositions being described as “permanent – not temporary” by Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, it seems likely we are now embarked on a Second Cold War. Tim Mahon Editor-in-Chief he assumed NATO would indulge in endless fence- sitting long enough for him to engineer a lightning strike to decapitate the government in Kyiv and present the world with a fait accompli; he believed that a deeply divided America, tired of foreign entanglements, would flatly refuse to support Ukraine except rhetorically. More seriously, he also miscalculated the veracity and even the foundation of the intelligence he was receiving. The arrest of senior leadership in the foreign intelligence directorate of the FSB, Russia’s security service, shows two things: one, that his underlings lack the moral courage to tell him the truth, spinning their reports, instead, to reflect ‘what the boss wants to hear’; and, two, that he is already seeking scapegoats to shoulder the blame for the probable defeat he is now seeing gallop over the horizon – accompanied by several other horsemen – recession, fiscal disaster, economic hardship and vastly increased political dissent. Too many analysts and commentators (including this writer) were caught flat-footed by Putin’s literally breathtaking decision to invade – despite what now appear to have been frequent and increasingly vociferous warnings from both American and British intelligence sources that a border incursion “at scale” was a very real probability. Another miscalculation centres on the effectiveness of Russian forces. The money the Kremlin has spent on high-tech equipment (at least some of which appears not to have lived up to expectations, and rather more of it seems not to have appeared at all in theatre) seems not to have delivered the anticipated results. Or, perhaps, the western equipment that has made its way into Ukrainian hands has been rather more effective than advertised.
Contents 2 · MT 2/2022 Mönch Verlagsgesellschaft mbH (Mönch Publishing Group) Editor-in-Chief, Military Technology: TimMahon Editor-at-Large: Dr Ezio Bonsignore North American Bureau Chief (NewOrleans): Marty Kauchak NATO & EU Affairs Correspondent (Brussels): Caterina Tani Publishers: Uta & Volker Schwichtenberg US Office: 1326 St Andrew Street, Unit B, NewOrleans, LA 70130-5124 Correspondents: Massimo Annati (Italy); Marco Giulio Barone (France); Angus Batey (UK); Dr Theo Benien (Germany); Philip Butterworth-Hayes (UK); Atul Chandra (India); Tomás Chlebecek (Czech Republic); Dr Robert Czulda (Poland); Peter Donaldson (UK); Arie Egozi (Israel); Tim Fish (New Zealand); Kubilai Han (Turkey); Eugene Kogan (Georgia); Denys Kolesnyk (France); Edward Lundquist (USA); Georg Mader (Austria); Stephen WMiller (USA); Jörg Muth (Estonia); Trevor Nash (UK); Dr Stefan Nitschke (Germany); Santiago Rivas (Argentina); David Saw (France); AndrewWhite (UK); Dr Thomas Withington (France) Executive Associate and CEO: Volker Schwichtenberg Executive Associate, CEO and Lawyer: Uta Schwichtenberg Founder: Manfred Sadlowski Deputy Managing Director: Christa André Cover and Layout: Frank Stommel Mönch Verlagsgesellschaft mbH: Christine-Demmer-Straße 7 Tel.: +49-2641 / 3703-0 53474 Bad Neuenahr-Ahrweiler Fax: +49-2641 / 3703-199 Germany E-Mail: miltech@moench-group.com www.monch.com The views published are not necessarily those of the Publisher or Editor. 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Your MILITARY TECHNOLOGY Contact Asian Eastern Pacific (ASEP) Mr. Vishal Mehta PO Box 11328 Mobile: +91 99 999 85 425 IARI, New Delhi 110012 E-Mail: vishal.mehta@ India moench-group.com Belgium, France, Pakistan Mr. Georges France Mönch Verlagsgesellschaft mbH Tel.: +33 1 60 82 98 88 6, impasse de la Grande Fax: +33 1 60 82 98 89 F-91510 Janville-sur-Juine E-Mail: georges.france@ wanadoo.fr Italy Mr. Franco Lazzari RID Tel.: +39 01 85 30 15 98 Via Martiri della Liberazione, 79/3 Fax: +39 01 85 30 91 71 I-16043 Chiavari (GE) E-Mail: franco.lazzari@rid.it lazzari@moench-group.com Portugal, Spain, Latin America, Middle East Mr. Antonio Terol Garcia Tel.: +34 91 3 10 29 98 Fax: +34 91 3 10 24 54 E-Mail: antonio@terolgarcia. e.telefonica.net terol@moench-group.com Australia, Canada, Scandinavia, UK, USA Tel.: +44 7968 714280 Mrs. Sally Passey (Director) E-Mail: sally@bspmedia.com BSP Media Editorial Quo Vadis, Humanus?. ................................................................................ 1 TimMahon, Editor-in-Chief Guest Editorial Software Reuse for Airborne Systems: the FACE Approach.................... 4 Dr Benjamin Brosgol, Senior Technical Staff, Adacore Comment Brave NewWorld.......................................................................................... 6 Denys Kolesnyk Human Waves and Unmarked Graves........................................................ 7 Samuel Cranny-Evans Theme: Training & Simulation The Force-on-Force Training Challenge..................................................... 8 Trevor Nash The Answer is Improbable. Probably… An Interviewwith Improbable Defence. ................................................... 11 Partnering for Progress An Interviewwith Garth Smith – President, MVRsimulation................... 14 IT2EC Preview............................................................................................ 15 Gary Waterfall, Senior Defence Adviser at Clarion Events Feature Developments in the Russian Way of War................................................ 16 Samuel Cranny-Evans In Defence of the Arctic. ............................................................................ 19 TimMahon The US Defense Industry is More Fit than Frail........................................ 22 Marty Kauchak Recovery and Higher Defence Spending. ................................................ 24 Singapore Airshow Presages Degree of Economic Recovery Gabriel Dominguez Nations in Focus Trying to Maintain the Pace of Modernisation......................................... 28 Chile’s Armed Forces in 2022 Santiago Rivas Hungary’s Defence Industry Taking Flight............................................... 31 TimMahon The Invasion of Ukraine............................................................................. 34 Letters Letter from America: The US Spends Too Much on Defence................. 40 Marty Kauchak Letter from Brussels: Unexpected Scenarios for an Expected Crisis.... 41 Caterina Tani Looking East: A ‘New Era’ – the Burgeoning Sino-Russian Bloc............ 42 Gabriel Dominguez Strategic Focus: Catch 2022: Cold War II................................................. 43 Tomás Chlebecek
MILITARY TECHNOLOGY MT 2/2022 · 3 C4ISR Forum Talking at the Same Time. ......................................................................... 44 Thomas Withington Strength in Numbers.................................................................................. 44 CESMO and the Power of EW Interoperability Peter Ellis and Steve Horsburgh, Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions From the Bridge Look Ma – No Hands!................................................................................. 50 Edward Lundquist Counter-Air Defence Capabilities Mature................................................ 52 Stefan Nitschke Analysis The Implications of Graphene................................................................... 54 Peter Donaldson Enhanced Deterrence................................................................................ 55 North Korea Ramps Up Pace of Missile Testing Gabriel Dominguez Homeland Security Forum. ......................................................... 56 Industrial Focus. ............................................................................... 60 Rear Echelon The US Needs a Maritime Defense Strategy – and a Budget That Supports It................................................................... 64 Elaine Luria Cover Featuring increasingly prominently in the formulation of long-term strategy is the prospect of protecting - and defending - national interests in the resource-rich Arctic region. (Royal Navy) Small inserts on cover depict -The ENOK AB (airborne) on display at Enforce Tac in March. (Stefan Nitschke) - The Royal Malaysian Navy commissioned KD Rencong, its fourth Littoral Mission Ship, on 28 January. (Malaysian MoD) - The modular aircraft approach adopted by Aeralis has been instrumental in starting a rethinking process among training authorities. (Aeralis) Photo on Contents page In addition to Israel, at least ten other countries currently operate or have orders for the ATMOS self-propelled howitzer. (Elbit Systems) Index of Advertisers ADEX............................................................................................................ 51 Aeromaritime Systembau GmbH. ............................................................... 45 ASELSAN Inc.................................................................................... 4th cover Embraer. .......................................................................................... 2nd cover Eurosatory...................................................................................................... 4 ILA................................................................................................................ 59 MSPO. ......................................................................................................... 10
Guest Editorial MT 2/2022 · 5 In a typical scenario, a FACE-conformant avionics application resides in the Portable Components Segment (PCS). It invokes RTOS services portably, either via a POSIX or ARINC 653 API provided by the Operating System Segment (OSS), or through standard programming language syntax (in C, C++, Ada 95, Ada 2012, or Java). If the application needs to communicate with other PCS software, it uses functions from the Transport Services Segment (TSS). The TSS interfaces are defined in IDL, enabling type-safe communication between components written in different programming languages. The FACE Technical Standard accounts for safety and security considerations by defining POSIX and ARINC-653 subsets known as ‘profiles’ (Security, Safety Base, Safety Extended, and General Purpose) for accessing OSS services, with space and/or time partitioning based on the profile. Since programming languages like C++, Ada, and Java realise run-time functionality through standard language syntax, rather than API calls, the Technical Standard likewise defines language subsets (‘capability sets’) with restrictions on permitted features. FACE conformance with a safety or security profile/capability set does not guarantee specific assurance properties, but it avoids features that could complicate safety or security certification. Using a language like Ada can help. Ada was designed to directly support developing high- assurance software, and its contract-based programming features facilitate demonstrating specific safety or security properties. The FACE approach is gaining momentum, with more and more procurements requiring FACE conformance. Although the FACE Consortium has been US-centric thus far, the aerospace and defence industry for allied counties is multinational, and plans are underway to allow international participation (initially Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom). As companies and projects come on board, the reuse benefits can finally be realised. Further general information is available at https://www.opengroup.org/face, or https://www.adacore.com/industries/defense/face for details of AdaCore’s support for the FACE effort. Reuse has been a goal for software developers since the earliest days. In principle, it should be possible to take a component designed for one system and redeploy it in a new application and/or different platform. In practice, life is not so simple. A number of issues have inhibited effective software reuse, but an initiative being shepherded by the US Department of Defense – the Future Airborne Capability Environment (FACE) effort – offers an innovative solution for military airborne systems. The exponential increase in computing performance and capacity over the years has enabled new and complex functionality in modern aircraft, and software has become the dominant factor influencing cost. However, military system procurers and contractors have rarely focused on ensuring that software components can be reused in other systems, or ported to different platforms. One result has been vendor lock-in, incurring high costs for component porting. Differences in processor, Real-Time Operating System (RTOS), peripherals, etc., can require significant effort to adapt the software. One factor inhibiting reuse is contractual: designing a reusable component requires additional effort up front, but the savings only show up on future systems. There is little financial incentive to design for reuse. Licensing is a related impediment, if reusing the original software is restricted or prohibited. Other issues are technical. Effective reuse of a component requires the developer to carefully specify its interface, including prerequisites (conditions for using the component) and obligations (conditions that the component brings about). Portability, a type of reuse, entails avoiding platform dependencies (eg, word size, address range, operating system functions). These issues are not new. Reuse and portability have been topics of focus amongst programming language and software methodology researchers and practitioners for decades, with notable results. Modern programming languages provide features directly supporting reuse (eg, object orientation, data encapsulation, generic templates, contract-based programming), and reuse at the level of programme libraries is common practice. Similarly, through standard language semantics and pragmatic style conventions, programmers can write portable source code (ie, having equivalent effects when compiled for different target machine architectures). The challenge is to achieve reuse on a wider scale, at the level of software components encapsulating specific airborne software functionality. The FACE Consortium was founded in 2010 to meet this challenge. Chartered under The Open Group and comprising representatives from government, industry, and academia, the FACE Consortium has formulated a two-pronged approach: • A Technical Standard defining requirements for software portability and reuse, with supporting procedures to check conformance; and • Business processes addressing procurement practice and incentivizing industry to produce FACE conformant products. At the heart of the FACE Technical Standard is a reference architecture with well-defined interfaces based on open industry standards (POSIX, ARINC-653, IDL). The architecture comprises several layers (known as segments) and separates platform-specific and platform-independent behavior. The FACE technology also specifies a data modeling architecture enforcing a consistent view of data exchanged between software components. Dr Benjamin Brosgol, Senior Technical Staff, Adacore Software Reuse for Airborne Systems: the FACE Approach Dr Brosgol is a member of the senior technical staff at AdaCore. He has been actively involved with the FACE effort since 2017 and is currently Vice Chair of the FACE Consortium’s Technical Working Group. Dr Benjamin Brosgol, a senior member of Adacore’s technical staff, is currently Vice Chair of the FACE Consortium’s Technical Working Group. (Photo: Adacore)
Early on the morning of 24 February, Russia conducted airstrikes, then followed up with a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, involving all branches of Russia’s military potential. This aggression was preceded by large-scale military exercises near the Ukrainian borders, where Moscow had been massing its troops for months. Before the invasion, many Western leaders tried to communicate with Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, aiming to reinvigorate the Minsk agreements, and ensure that military escalation did not become an option. The key efforts were led by French President Emmanuel Macron. French diplomacy, however, proved to be insufficient. Numerous Western analysts – including this one! – considered that a full-scale invasion would not be a suitable option for Moscow, given the high military and economic costs involved. Thierry Burkhard, Chief of the French Defence Staff, has also recently acknowledged that the French intelligence services’ assessment differed from the so-called Anglo-Saxon conclusion, saying that they believed that the “conquest of Ukraine would have a monstrous cost, and that the Russians had other options” to make President Zelensky and the Ukrainian government fall. He also noted that the invasion “was not a surprise” per se. This raises two questions. The first concerns the difference in assessments, which lies partially in a certain degree of caution vis-à-vis US intelligence, inherited since the 2003 war in Iraq. In other words, the lack of trust between Paris and Washington plays hand in hand with revisionist and rogue states like Russia. The second question is – if we knew that Russia would invade Ukraine, why haven’t we significantly boosted Ukraine’s air defence capabilities – and why have we waited so long to deliver anti-tank missiles, the deliveries of which began just weeks before the invasion? Why didn’t we help Ukraine to avert this war, by significantly improving the country’s military capabilities? The answer is rather obvious. The collective West opted for dialogue. However, history, including the most recent, teaches us that diplomacy alone – diplomacy unsupported by overt strength – does not work with Russia. Moscow has been planning this invasion for some time already and has been thoroughly deceitful – even just a few days before attacking Ukraine, openly misleading President Macron during his visit to Moscow. Since 2008, we have been pursuing the logic of diminishing the risks. But by pursuing this, and by trying to reset relations with Russia on numerous occasions, we nourished a sense of impunity and permissiveness in Moscow. As a result, we have achieved a major war in Europe started with no legitimate reason by Russia – a UN Security Council member and arguably the second nuclear power in the world. Throughout this recent period, and even over the preceding months, we have been trying to analyse Russia through our own prism and logic. Fundamentally, however – we have misread Russia. We were trying to appease but ended up in helping engineer a war. Russia’s anti-West stance is nothing new – it manifested itself for the first time in relatively recent history in 1999, when Russian troops captured the Slatina Air Base in Kosovo. We have miserably misread Russia – and simultaneously over- estimated its conventional military capabilities. But we also under- estimated the Ukrainian armed forces, which are fighting a defensive war rather successfully. As of today, Russia has failed to establish air superiority in Ukrainian skies, and has not managed to capture the Hostomel airfield north of Kyiv with the use of its special forces to establish an air bridge to quickly transport its troops. The Russian army appears to lack morale and seems unable to provide the efficient logistics needed to support prosecution of the initial plan – to quickly capture Ukraine. Moscow envisioned a ‘blitzkrieg,’ but 10 days into its invasion, no strategic city has been captured, and the Russian army has suffered heavy losses. So it’s time to address the major question – what we can do for Ukraine? First, we have to destroy the Russian economy – make every Russian citizen feel the consequences of Putin’s decision. Second, we have to fully understand that Ukraine will continue to fight, and that Russian troops are not welcome there. We have to start being serious and supply aircraft, air defence systems and all possible modern weapons – if we are not willing to ‘close the sky’. We also have to start asking questions. Will the European Union become a tangible geopolitical unit, able to defend itself and project power in a world where treaties and agreements are no more? How will the West address Russia’s growing appetite – and potentially defend Finland and Sweden? Will Article 5 of the Washington Treaty work? We are rather left with unanswered questions and uncertainty, while trembling every time Moscow raises the spectre of nuclear arms. As for Russia, it seems set to continue its drift into isolation and decline on the margins of Europe and Asia with no tangible prospects. The world we grew up in is no more. The world order has been destroyed – welcome to the brave new world. Denys Kolesnyk Brave New World 6 · MT 2/2022 Comment A specialist in information warfare and in all matters Ukrainian, Denys Kolesnyk reflects on the most recent events absorbing world attention. Not all Putin‘s vaunted equipment has necessarily worked as advertised. (Photo: Atlantic Council)
Samuel Cranny-Evans Human Waves and Unmarked Graves Has the PLA adjusted its attitude to casualties? China’s past attitudes to casualties and tactics have led to catastrophic loss of life, and a military that struggled to overcome technologically advanced foes. How has this attitude evolved, if at all? From Civil War to Vietnam Recent reflection on the PLA’s attitudes to combat losses has been instructive. The two phases of China’s civil war, leading to establishment of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and People’s Republic of China, are estimated to have cost around 2.4 million lives during combat, and a great many more through ‘democide’ and famine; the Korean War cost the People’s Volunteer Army between 110,000-920,000 lives – the former figure cites Chinese sources, likely accounting for the disparity; an estimated 20,000 PLA personnel died in the short 1979 war with Vietnam. Mass casualties have been a hallmark of Chinese 20th century conflicts, but evidence suggests attitudes to casualties are changing, and that future conflicts might take a dramatically different form. Body Armour, Medical Tents and Armoured Ambulances A tendency for very high combat losses has typically been the result of human wave tactics and a relative lack of technological development. Two root causes for high combat losses offer themselves for analysis: a lack of concern for human life; and a poor understanding of modern, technology-driven warfare. Attempts at force preservation were often driven by operational necessity; the UN’s concentrated firepower and air superiority in Korea forced PVA forces to move into position at night, and often launch attacks under cover of darkness: doing so in broad daylight would have incurred disastrous losses. However, there are now indications that the PLA is taking steps designed specifically to preserve human life. For instance, in 2020 details of a tender for 1.4 million sets of body armour emerged via Global Times – a protective vest for every frontline soldier, and the first time in history that protective equipment has been extended to the entire force. From December 2021, the PLA officially began to receive its new Type-21 combat uniforms, and personal electronic devices, such as the Beidou communication and navigation handset, are now in widespread circulation among soldiers. All this indicates increased investment in the rank and file, and a greater desire to preserve and protect the lives of those soldiers the state has spent money and time training. Naturally, the equipment serves to enhance unit survivability, which in turn indicates an increased awareness of the realities of modern conflict and the need to maintain effective fighting units with a limited pool of manpower to fall back on. The PLA has also worked on increasing its medical facilities; in the wake of the 2020 clashes with Indian troops in the Galwan Valley, a new flying hospital was established in Tibet, to deal specifically with future regional incidents. In addition, one of the most prominent aspects of China’s UN commitments has been its medical deployments. Medical ships have visited Africa, and PLA medical personnel have been deployed in support of natural disasters. The PLA has also sought out exposure to foreign medical practises, including advice on trauma surgery from British surgeons. Furthermore, the PLA is now replete with armoured medical vehicles; there is an ambulance variant of almost every APC in PLA service, and medical drills are regularly conducted. The PLA is also forward-leaning in its medical care, having rehearsed the use of exoskeletons, UGV and UAV to evacuate mock casualties on exercise. Finally, available evidence suggests every PLA soldier is now mechanised, with ‘Shanks’ pony’ and the ‘liberation shoe’ no longer the primary means of transport. Even the PLA’s light infantry are provided with armoured 4x4s. The PLA’s writings certainly indicate an awareness of the realities of modern conflict, and a desire to fight in a modern, informatised way. This furthers the argument that attitudes towards the loss of personnel, and towards the very conduct of a war, have evolved significantly. So What? The above is certainly not a complete answer to the PLA’s attitudes to casualties in conflict. There is a political element missing, as the demands and goals of the CCP would decide how aggressively the PLA would pursue its goals, and against whom. However, it does indicate that the PLA has evolved dramatically from the undeniably brave forces that tried to overwhelm UN positions with rifles and bayonets in Korea. It suggests the PLA has taken steps to invest in and preserve its personnel, on a level comparable with its peers. Despite this, its ability to prevent mass casualties will largely depend on the ability of its NCOs and commanding officers to fully exploit their equipment and formations in combat. Failure to realise their potential will likely lead to heavy losses, regardless of the investment in medical care and personal equipment. A Research Associate at the Royal United Services Institute in London, Sam Cranny-Evans is a regular contributor to MilTech. Comment MT 2/2022 · 7
8 · MT 2/2022 Theme: Training and Simulation The US Marine Corps will shortly be receiving its latest generation of laserbased TESS in the form of FoFTS-Next from Saab Inc. (Photo: US DoD) Live training has always been held in the highest regard, as providing a training environment that uses real troops, real vehicles and real communications, and therefore is most representative of actual combat. At present, it is the most trusted method of providing psychological and physiological stress to troops within a relatively safe and controlled environment. The only simulated aspect is the ammunition, although battlefield effects such as smoke obscurants and sound effects are widely used. Despite the benefits of previous generations of live collective training systems, there are a number of gaps when considering the current nearpeer, highly kinetic, all-arms conflict for which many nations are now training. Historically, one-way, laser-based tactical engagement simulation systems (TESS) were used which, although ballistically inaccurate, did allow infantry and armour units to train together. With greater ballistic accuracy being obtained using two-way lasers, the issue that still pertains is that lasers cannot penetrate leaves or grasses and, therefore, soldiers can be protected by using such foliage as cover. This has led the US Army to investigate the replacement of laser-based TESS that is at the core of its Instrumentable-Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (I-MILES) through the adoption of new technologies such as geo-pairing. The other shortfall of I-TESS is that soldiers appreciate neither the need to ‘lead’ targets, nor the impact of ‘ballistic drop’ with rounds fired at longer ranges. A further aspect is that lasers travel at the speed of light and therefore the lag between squeezing the trigger and impact on the target is not representative of the real ammunition. This US-led laserless TESS project is still underway, and has now been subsumed into the wider US Army Synthetic Training Environment (STE) programme. Although such a requirement is to be welcomed, the substitution of I-MILES will not happen overnight. Nations have invested billions of dollars in laser-based TESS and its replacement will take decades to achieve and, globally, will cost a fortune. The end result is that many nations will ‘soldier-on’ with current laser-based systems for many years to come. The Risks of Negative Training Considering the need to make force-on-force training challenging (not to mention effective) for its participants, particularly in “inducing fear and stress,” the use of realistic battlefield effects is so minimal that this shortfall contributes significantly to negative training. In the real world, for example, the first indication that troops have come under fire is the ‘crack and thump’ of rounds fired and their impact with the There is a certain amount of confusion as to what force-on-force training is all about – and what the military wants to achieve through its wider adoption. To the law enforcement community, force-on-force training concentrates on providing training, “that induces fear and stress of a life-threatening situation using role players and real firearms that fire non-lethal ammunition”. Typically, this training features individuals or small groups firing non- lethal training ammunition (NLTA) of the types provided by companies such as UTM, Simunition or GMK. According to the Force Science Institute, such training has significant advantages over conventional range practice, specifically in that ‘suspects’ can shoot back; such exercises induce increased levels of stress; because suspects can shoot back, trainees are more likely to appreciate the need to adopt cover; and, finally, such training is more motivational than conventional range practice. This approach is not anathema to the military, of course, as such training is provided in so-called shoot-houses or to specialist groups. However, the military considers force-on-force training as more than just individual or small team training. Military force-on-force training is on an altogether different scale, and falls under the banner of collective training, which can encompass forces from company up to brigade sizes. Even at this larger scale, though, many in the military ask whether their concept of force-on-force training should not also “induce fear and stress,” and be more “motivational”? The question is, how are these desired attributes to be added? Realism and Fidelity The US Joint Publication JP 1-02 defines military force as, “an aggregation of military personnel, weapon systems, equipment and necessary support, or combination thereof”. Force-on-force, therefore, sees two such aggregated forces pitted against each other to train at the collective level in the live training domain. Trevor Nash The Force-on-Force Training Challenge f
Theme: Training and Simulation MT 2/2022 · 9 opposing wills,” the Corps recognised this was not the case: changes had to be made. ITX rotations made great use of live fire phases in a number of scenarios, as does the British Army during its exercises in Kenya. The Tactical Training and Exercise Control Group that provide the ITX OPFOR with some exercise control functions – and are also responsible for safety – are able to deviate from standard safety procedures in the DA-PAM 365-63 range safety manual to allow marines to operate closer to terminal weapon effects. Although ITX rotations allow such proximity, this is still a sanitised experience compared to real life. It is no surprise, therefore, that the USMC reported that there were still shortcomings in training outcomes. After all, live ordnance is designed to kill, so its use in a training environment must be handled with care and can never replicate real combat. But exposing exercising troops to live fire scenarios is not a panacea, as live targets don’t shoot back. In addition, most targets remain static or pop-up from static and, therefore, predictable positions. From an artillery perspective, fire is directed against static targets – usually old tank hulks. These targets do not move, which therefore makes adjusting fire onto the target an easy proposition. In real life, the targets would be moving away from shell impacts and seeking cover. So what does the US Marine Corps seek to achieve with FoFTS-Next? In June 2021 the USMC System Command’s Program Manager for Training Systems (PM TRASYS) awarded Saab Inc a contract, potentially valued at $127.9 million, “to help Marines better understand the future battlefield and improve their overall performance, both individually and as part of a unit”. FoFTS-Next is a two-way, laser-based solution that is replacing the Instrumented Tactical Engagement Simulation System (ITESS) and, according to the Corps, brings a number of key improvements that, together, introduce “near real-time friction”. These improvements include time-annotated records of an individual’s movements, details of weapon use and accurate ballistic models. The latter provide accurate ammunition time of flight and ballistic trajectories. One other key benefit of FoFTS-Next is that the system complies with NATO’s Urban Combat Advanced Training Technology (UCATT) ground, foliage or structures around them. Such impacts are magnified in the case of larger calibre or anti-armour weapons. At present, these effects are not simulated during force-on-force training and, in most scenarios on large training areas, are impossible. The reasons for this failure are normally laid at the door of technical issues, safety, cost or environmental restrictions. Whatever the case, these can lead to unrealistic training and the drawing of false lessons by participants and senior commanders. The other negative factor associated with such training is the integration of other kinetic and non-kinetic assets, such as indirect fire, air-launched weapons, minefields, UAS and CBRN. In addition, stressing the logistic and medical CASEVAC processes is also difficult. The reason that laser-based TESS started with the simulation of infantry and armour direct-fire weapons over 40 years ago is simple; they were the easiest to replicate – albeit with a recognised lack of fidelity – but the question on many military lips today is – how far have we really progressed? Companies such as Cubic Defense would argue that there has been progress, and cite their ‘synthetic wrap’ solution as proof thereof. The company says that this solution “expands the instrumented live training environment by adding virtual and constructive training systems, allowing the soldier to train with platforms and deliver effects that would otherwise be precluded by cost, scarcity or safety”. Such additions include Joint Fires and ISTAR that can be melded into live field training: although marginally beneficial, they lack realism. Saab, also, would doubtless highlight improvements to ballistic simulation and the addition of new types of weapons into the mix that, taken together, have given laser-based TESS an added dimension. As in the case of synthetic wrap, however, compromises have to be made – and realism becomes a casualty. FoFTS-Next There is no doubt that the US Marine Corps is grappling with some of these thorny questions, considering how best to improve force-on-force training and, indeed, all its current training. Its new, invigorated approach was reflected two years ago, when it changed the status of its Training and Education Command from a two- to a three-star post. Over the past two years, the current head of this command, Lt Gen Lewis Craparotta, has emphasised the need to invest in force-on-force training, to enable units to learn representative training lessons that can be applied to combat situations. Such training has become a priority for the Corps, and this is reflected in the Force-on-Force Training System-Next (FoFTS-Next) programme, designed to improve “warfighter readiness”. The concept behind FoFTS-Next came from the USMC’s Integrated Training Exercises (ITX), held at the Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center (MCCAGC) at Twentynine Palms, California. Reflecting on the MCDP 1 Warfighting tactical manual, which says “exercises should approximate the conditions of war as much as possible; that is, they should introduce friction in the form of uncertainty, stress, disorder, and A long-standing, well-established practitioner of and commentator on the training and simulation market, Trevor Nash brings unique perspective to MilTech’s coverage of the sector. The realism of laser-based TESS has improved over the years, with the addition of systems such as Cubic’s synthetic wrap. (Photo: Trevor Nash) Safety issues mean that troops on exercise cannot be subject to the terminal effects of real weapons such as the USMC M777 155 mm howitzer. (Photo: US DoD) f h
the past four decades – and those improvements are likely to continue, despite the US Army’s wish to replace laser-based systems such as I-MILES with alternative technologies, possibly including geo-pairing. Should that turn out to be the case, the focus should be on trying to make the overall force-on-force live training environment more holistically representative of the battlefield, by extending the use of improved and more realistic battlefield effects. This approach is expensive, but expecting exercising troops to be seduced into the simulated high-intensity kinetic battle when vehicle kills are depicted using a flashing light on a tank turret – as is currently the case in many nations around the world – does nothing to “induce fear and stress,” or to motivate exercise participants. Force-on-force training is vitally important. It is not, however, just about the TESS technology – it is about the environment that technology has to work in; that is where the investment needs to be made. In addition, collective force-on-force training needs to be considered within the complete environment, as a culmination of training or a capstone event, that has built on individual and team competencies such as weapon skills, camouflage and concealment, tactics, range work, leadership and battlecraft. It is in many of these areas that realism is lacking. For example, the need for greater exposure to weapon terminal effects through a process of ‘battle inoculation’ and a radical modernisation of current ranges to include ‘smart targets’. live simulation standards, allowing nations equipped with this common code, known as ULEIS, to train together. In USMC parlance, this ULEIS code is referred to as the Marine Corps Training Instrumentation Systems (MCTIS). As this standard is adopted increasingly across NATO and coalition forces, the case for retaining laser-based system is clearly strengthened. Between 2023 and 2026, the Corps’ Systems Command plans to field FoFTS-Next to Marine Corps bases in California, North Carolina, Hawaii, Virginia, Japan and Guam. Although it represents a clear advantage over the legacy ITESS system, does it provide a true force-on-force training capability? Looking Forward The answer is not simply a binary yes or no. As noted above, the capabilities of laser-based TESS have been dramatically improved over 10 · MT 2/2022 Theme: Training and Simulation One way in which force-on-force training could be improved is through the use of more realistic battlefield effects, such as sound generators and pyrotechnics. (Photo: Trevor Nash) f
Theme: Training and Simulation MT 2/2022 · 11 and expensive to build, slow to run, and narrow in focus. Our experience in building virtual worlds for the gaming community has given us an opportunity to change all that. Those who have used our operational planning and collective training environments see the value they add in achieving their objectives – not least because we’ve directly involved the users in the development of these technologies. We’ve also built them with collaboration in mind, allowing users in different locations to work together. But it is a departure from the way people have done things before, so there is going to be a period of transition. We cannot take the freedoms we cherish in liberal democracies for granted. We need to be ready to defend them against regimes that are willing to employ the most brutal and cynical of tactics, ignoring international law and human suffering, even taking courses of action that seem counter to their own long-term interests. And we all need to work together – across public and private sectors, and with international Founded on the belief that virtual worlds, as created for the video games industry, can have profound impact on societies – even to the extent of helping protect them – Improbable Defence focuses on making defence organisations more operationally effective and helping government design (and implement) policies better suited to confronting and mitigating fast-moving challenges. The company responded to some far-reaching questions and discussed the benefits of synthetic environments with MilTech in the run up to IT2EC 2022. MilTech: What are you seeing as current events unfold in Ukraine? Are you being vindicated in what you have been saying for years? JR: It’s not a question of being vindicated. The importance of synthetic environments has long been understood. It’s just that they’ve been slow Tim Mahon The Answer is Improbable. Probably… An Interview with Improbable Defence Improbable’s (virtual) worldview encompasses every aspect of military operations, facilitating improvement from concept and doctrine development through training, mission rehearsal and mission implementation. (All images Improbable Defence)
12 · MT 2/2022 Theme: Training and Simulation In a sense, every global challenge of our time – from climate change to Covid, from political polarisation to mass migration – is now a security issue or, more accurately, can be used as a means of achieving a nation’s goals. What’s more, they’re more closely interconnected than ever. In some conflicts, the distinctions between war and what we used to call peace are also becoming more blurred. As a result, the operating environment becomes more ambiguous. The big changes include the increasing use of sub-threshold operations and the deployment of unattributable or non-state forces. Cyber attacks, increasingly sophisticated disinformation campaigns, developments in psychological warfare, the role of social media in driving public sentiment that influences policy decisions, the plethora of open-source intelligence material, the weaponisation of the civilian population to generate political unrest and refugee flows, and the availability of data on contributing factors like infrastructure and weather – all these things mean that we’re competing everywhere and all the time, even though open conflict may be less prevalent. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine is, in a very real sense, the end-stage of a much wider, longer lasting campaign that’s been being waged for years – politically, economically, technologically, psychologically and by proxy. But, just as technology and the general abundance of data is contributing to these challenges, they also offer an opportunity to help governments build their resilience and prepare for the next conflict, whatever form that might take. With more and more accessibility to data, the fidelity of Improbable’s models and synthetic environments increases, further unlocking their potential to reflect real-life scenarios accurately, and to drive operational readiness. MilTech: Where do the most glaring capability gaps lie? How easily or otherwise might they be plugged or bypassed? And to what extent does COTS – hardware and software – hold a viable answer? JR: Gaps lie in: • being able to make use of all our data (live data, historic data, covertly and overtly collected) more effectively and efficiently. To funnel this data into models, in order to calculate likely/possible outcomes. To fill in any gaps in data coverage, using data we already have; • being able to re-use models we already have; • being able to build new models, really quickly, that incorporate real- time data from inception. partners and allies. Government, industry and academia need to work together to bring out the best in one another to defend our way of life. At Improbable, this is why we get out of bed in the morning. Especially so since Ukraine. We feel we have something valuable to bring to the table. Ukraine reveals the multi-dimensional aspects of warfare, beyond the conventional considerations of military hardware and headcount: refugee flows, disinformation, cyber, weather, sanctions, infrastructure – all are playing a greater role than ever. Ukraine shows that even a well-drilled force, with modern equipment and a willingness to use indiscriminate force, can be slowed and stopped by terrain, by poor logistic planning, by under-estimating the population, by weather and by an adversary which doesn’t fight in a predictable manner - a failure to devote sufficient time to developing a true understanding of the operational environment. Ukraine also reveals – if anyone needed reminding – that things don’t play out exactly as you might imagine they would. Sometimes catastrophically so. You need to be able to challenge your plans and decisions before you act, and then be prepared to adapt rapidly as the situation changes. Collaboration between HQs and forces in the field, between government departments, between allies, and within alliances, is crucial. The more you can share access to a common operating picture with the same level of detail, to develop a shared/agreed understanding of the interdependencies, the better your decisions will be. The opposite leads to chaos, a breakdown in command and control and, ultimately, failure. MilTech: Hybrid, asymmetric, OOTW, low-intensity conflict, digitised warfare – are any of these accurate descriptions? Wherein lies the fundamental difference between warfare (as opposed to peacekeeping) in the 2020s and, say, 20 years earlier? JR: The essential nature of warfare hasn’t changed, but its character is constantly evolving, as each side seeks advantage. The world has become much more connected and interlinked – information flows almost instantaneously. This means that information war (Russians call it INFOWAR) has a greater place in operations, especially those in the sub-threshold space. The same information-age technologies that have transformed our societies, from private-sector satellites to smartphones, automation to autonomy, have had a similar effect on how we defend those societies. At the tactical level, an SSE easily lends itself to the development, rehearsal and perfection of small unit tactics.
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