could be dropped onto a target with a reasonable degree of certainty that they would create the desired outcome. Deployment of the SVP-24 allowed the Russian forces in Syria to reduce the number of aircraft in a bombing run down to one, whereas two or three were required before. This enabled the Russian forces in Syria to increase their sortie rate, and attend to more targets in a typical day. Greater accuracy still is provided by Russia’s evolving arsenal of cruise missiles, the most prominent of which is the 3M-54 Kalibr family. The Kalibr has been deployed across the Russian navy and can now be found on even its smallest patrol vessels. Air-launched variants also exist, and in Syria targets were engaged with missiles launched from the Caspian Flotilla at ranges up to 1,500 kilometres. They can be used in anti-ship and land attack roles, providing Russia with the ability to strike at range against critical nodes of an opponent’s operational system. Reconnaissance and targeting data at sea is provided through a mix of sensors, such as the Konteyner overthe-horizon (OTH) backscatter radar in Kovylkino, which covers most of Europe. Additional OTH radars are deployed by Russia’s navy, including the Mineral-ME, which can use its passive radar to detect radar emissions and triangulate them using radars on other Russian vessels. Its active channel can then be used to conduct target designation for the ship’s own weapons, those of other vessels or land-based anti-ship systems. Russia has also improved its aerial and space-based reconnaissance assets; the latter in particular were used extensively as part of targeting missions in Syria, according to the Jamestown Foundation. Although Kalibr entered service in the 1990s, it is the development of specific concepts of operation around long-range strike capabilities that are significant. To Russian thinkers, it has become known as the reconnaissance-strike (recce-strike) circuit or complex. Recce-strike is the coordination of long-range, operational or strategic reconnaissance assets, with precision strike missiles, electronic warfare and cyber effects. Like much of Russia’s current force structure, it was first envisaged in the late 1980s along with a tactical equivalent called Reconnaissancefire. However, the gradual collapse of the Soviet Union, and the economic troubles that befell Russia thereafter, prevented its successful realisation. There is some evidence that a form of recce-strike was used in Chechnya, most notably to conduct a targeted strike against Chechen leader Dzhokhar Dudayev in 1996. The main purpose of Recce-strike is to engage targets that are critical to the opponent’s continued functioning; this can include critical personnel or infrastructure – both military and civil – as well as troop formations and command and control nodes. Its development has expanded to include ground-based systems, such as the 9K270 Iskander with its short-range ballistic and cruise missiles and the P-800 Oniks anti-ship missile system, or air-launched systems like the Kh-47M2 Khinzhal hypersonic cruise missile. It is common for the strike elements of Recce-strike to be dual-purpose: both Khinzhal and the missiles fired by Iskander are thought to be nuclear-capable, for The Russian way of war has moved in three key directions since 2008: greater accuracy; smoother integration of domains; and increased decision-making speed. Sam Cranny-Evans explores what actual changes have taken place, and how they enable the Russian armed forces to protect the Russian state. Greater accuracy Accuracy and precision have become the hallmarks of Western warfare. NATO forces can strike very specific targets (accuracy), and do so with optimised efficiency (precision), by carefully matching weapons to the nature of the target. It has led to claims that western forces can put “warheads on foreheads”. Russia was in the process of developing its own guided munitions when the Soviet Union was dissolved in 1991, which event forces a hiatus in their production and development. However, the various US-led conflicts between 1991 and 2008 demonstrated the need for greater accuracy, Russia’s own experiences in Chechnya and Georgia also informed the development of what Russian thinkers refer to as “high precision munitions”. For the Russian Armed Forces (RuAF), the concept of precision and accuracy is not the same as it is for their Western counterparts. The core principle is that a weapon should be accurate enough to achieve the intended outcome; this is a concept referred to as reasonable sufficiency. The concept balances cost with industrial capability, and enables the RuAF to fight in the modern world without incurring the kinds of costs associated with boutique western capabilities. For example, the SVP24 airborne navigation and sighting system was deployed extensively to Syria, after entering service in 2008. The SVP-24 provides calculations based on the speed of an aircraft, meteorological factors, and the nature of the weapon to be dropped, to provide an optimal release timing for the pilot. It was developed so that ‘dumb’ bombs, without any guidance, 16 · MT 2/2022 Feature Samuel Cranny-Evans Developments in the Russian Way of War The S-400 provides the long-range element of Russia‘s strategic air defence system. It is designed to protect critical infrastructure from aerospace and missile strikes and complicate the attempts of an opponent to achieve air superiority. (All images Rusian MoD) f
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