18 · MT 2/2022 Feature confusion and disrupt decision-making cycles by creating multiple dilemmas for its opponent. Ultimately, the goal is to exploit temporal factors in a bid to shape a battlefield or campaign in Russia’s favour. The exploitation of time is not new, neither to Russian forces nor to their competitors. However, the ways in which the RuAF seek to exploit time are many and varied. For example, the use of electronic warfare (EW) assets at all echelons of the Russian Ground Troops is designed to disrupt the C4ISR architecture that typically enables the Western Way of War. Systems such as the 1RL257 Krasukha-4 and 1L260 Krasukha-2 are designed specifically to disrupt the sensors and communications systems of NATO’s big-wing enablers – aircraft like the E-3 Sentry and E-8 JSTARS. Other systems, such as the R-330Zh Zhitel, seek to disrupt UHF satellite communications and navigation within a range of 30km, whie the RB-301B Borisoglebsk-2, another tactical system, is used to jam radio relays, radios, and UAV control links. The layering of systems from the theatre level to the tactical is designed to delay the decision-making process of a technologically superior opponent, slowing its planning cycles down and introducing uncertainty. This is not necessarily new; Russian EW forces proudly claim to have been the first to use EW during the 1904 Russo-Japanese War. However, the modernisation of Russia’s EW capabilities has allowed other capabilities to exert greater influence on the battlefield. For example, Russia’s artillery is trained to use target coordinates determines via EW to conduct target engagements. Some reports indicate that this can be achieved in under four minutes, which represents a dynamic targeting cycle that would be challenging for Western forces to replicate. The modernised EW systems themselves would not confer a significant advantage, were it not for the Strelets reconnaissance command and control system. Strelets uses satellite position, navigation and timing systems with a digital radio network and touch screen displays to provide real time situational awareness overlayed onto a digital map. Having entered service in 2011, it has been through several iterations, and additional systems have been developed for Russia’s airborne forces too. Strelets is claimed, by senior Russian officers, to enable artillery engagements in tens of seconds. Whilst this presumably requires several processes to happen seamlessly – clear and available communications, gun already in place, no enemy interference, and so on – it is indicative of the type of speed with which the RuAF are hoping to fight. Combined with efforts to degrade the C4ISR infrastructure on which Western forces rely, it is apparent that the Russian way of war aims at slowing down its enemy’s response, amplifying the effects of its own efforts to increase speed, and ensuring that no time is wasted. The Russian Way of War In sum, the Russian way of war is one that is built around its likely opponent’s strengths. It sets out to disaggregate a force that it expects to be technologically superior, and to conduct a conflict more suited to Russia’s armed forces, its political machine and its economic capabilities. While it has evolved significantly since the Cold War in substance, a lot of the style can be traced back to Soviet and even pre-Soviet thinkers. Evgeny Martynov, for example, was a 19th century Russian strategist, who emphasised the need to seek and exploit weaknesses with an opponent’s political system as part of a war. This concept is not far removed from the notion of creating political friction by targeting critical national infrastructure. The Russian way of war is therefore best described as an evolution of unchanged principles, adapted through modern means of delivering effects. The Iskander system can be fitted with two missiles, the short-range ballistic missile is visible in the foreground and the cruise missile canisters just visible in the rear. Russian strategic exercises, such as Zapad-21, have also demonstrated an increased ability to coordinate air-delivered effects with ground manoeuvre. However, there are certainly questions over the application of EW effects, and the deconfliction of airspace. Russia has invested extensively in its ground-based air defences (GBAD), a logical response to NATO’s reliance upon air and missile strikes. However, it is notoriously difficult to deconflict GBAD operations with friendly air power that is in the same airspace. This is even more the case when EW is present in the area, potentially jamming friendly ground communications as well as those in the air. It is not clear how Russia would seek to resolve this issue; it is known to use cable communications where available, and generally accepted that its ground forces are capable of communicating at a section level without radios. However, the likelihood is that the Russian forces would struggle to conduct true multi-domain operations, especially if air power is required for success. It follows that the relatively permissive environment presented by combat in Ukraine, may not be necessarily helpful in determining Russia’s combat capabilities in a conventional, high-intensity conflict. “If You Knew Time as Well as I Do” The Mad Hatter in Lewis Carrol’s Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland told Alice that, “If you knew Time as well as I do…you wouldn’t talk about wasting it”. The Russian way of war encapsulates the essence of the Hatter’s statement; Russia is keenly aware that it cannot waste time in a conflict with the West. The political apparatus cannot afford a prolonged and bloody conflict like Chechnya or Afghanistan; the RuAF are unlikely to succeed in a conflict that allows NATO the time to amass its forces; and the equipment afforded to the RuAF is typically inferior to that of its NATO counterparts, which increases the imperative for an asymmetric response. It is possible to draw further comparisons between Carrol’s distinctive character and the Russian way of war. For instance, it seeks to create The Veliky Novgorod and Kolpino submarines fired Kalibr missiles form submerged positions against ISIS targets in Syria. f
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