16 · MT 3/2022 Feature Second, confirming and accelerating new land equipment programmes. The good news is that programmes already ready to launch will not suffer from teething problems: money will come to fund them in full. For example, French renewal of the entire land component will now receive full financing – and will likely be expanded. On the other hand, companies whose products are not quite ready risk a loss of momentum and potential failure to ‘get to market’. Another key issue centres on regaining those capabilities lost over time – point defence and short-range anti-aircraft systems, surface-to-surface missiles, and heavy artillery, for example. Third, we need a changed mentality on emerging technologies. Solutions currently at the fore have been breeding in a kind of limbo for years. In other words – the technology was available, and its suitability was agreed and acknowledged – but the lack of funding or political will slowed down fully-fledged development. This is the case, for example, in unmanned technologies, loitering munitions, hypersonic weapons, and artificial intelligence (AI). These are the three driving trends we need to evaluate in greater depth: and where better to do so than at Eurosatory? Military Quantitative Easing When the crisis in Ukraine erupted, European countries were already increasing budgets and rethinking their defence apparatus, driven by the 2014 crisis and under US pressure (through NATO) for fairer burden sharing. This notwithstanding, raising budgets is insufficient to fill the gap created in the last decade in European procurement and defence planning. Lockheed Martin, Raytheon Technologies, Boeing, Northrop Grumman and General Dynamics remain the world’s top five companies, with a $180 billion dollars turnover, accounting for 54% of global arms sales and taking an export market share of over 39% in major armaments. The premise that, in a modern conflict, armies will go to war ‘as they are’ – with little or no possibility of careful mobilisation – has been entirely confirmed by the crisis in Ukraine. This understanding has cascading effects on the procurement of land systems in Europe. MilTech offers an overview of the issue. Drivers and Tipping Points The market for land armaments in Europe is about to enter a new phase, largely due to NATO’s and the EU’s renewed interest in rebuilding their conventional military capabilities. The promise of potential procurement arises from the West’s willingness to re-engage in a global rearmament affecting all sectors of sovereignty: energy, high-tech industries, and defence. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine merely precipitated a movement that began after the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and was reinforced by former US President Donald Trump’s sharp criticism of NATO and the cost of its funding by the Americans. Step by step, Europe has moved away from a policy of ‘peace dividends.’ born of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. From an industrial point of view, a contract war is now occurring between the European and American defence industries. The EU is expressing a desire for ‘sovereignty,’ even if some member states intend to remain under Washington’s umbrella, favouring ‘Made in America’ – some have already chosen to pledge billions in land armaments: for instance, Poland’s order for Abrams MBTs. The European land armaments market is driven, therefore, by three main dynamics. First, a sudden increase in funds for procurement. Borrowing from the EU Central Bank’s financial rescue programme, we might call this ‘Military Quantitative Easing’. In effect, the crisis in Ukraine in 2014 had already raised awareness of the need to refurbish ammunition and equipment stocks, and to accelerate key procurement programmes. Nevertheless, European countries have been continuing giving priority to domestic agendas (mainly welfare) and improvements have been limited. Today, urgent requirements are issued, but the situation is complex. A suggestive view of the KNDS tank demonstrator featuring a Leopard 2 hull and Leclerc turret at Eurosatory 2020. The new tank will not appear until the mid-2030s, leaving Leopard 2 as the only third generation tank still in production in Europe. (All photos Marco Giulio Barone except where otherwise indicated) Otokar’s Tulpar light tank might represent a cheap alternative for replacing East European armies’ T-55s and -72s. Marco Giulio Barone Europe’s Land Armaments Sector In the Wake of War – Back to Basics
RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy MTM5Mjg=