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MT 3/2022 · 1 One of the consequences – some might say penalties – for living in (relatively) open democracies is that free speech is not only practiced but encouraged – no matter the quality, veracity or rational foundation. The emergence and meteoric ascendance of social media in the last two decades has fuelled, reinvigorated and given new prominence to one of the more pernicious aspects of human behaviour en masse: conspiracy theory has become socially acceptable. Conspiracy theory is not a new phenomenon. It has been the root cause of wars – domestic and foreign – campaigns of exploration and oppression, development of economic and diplomatic policy, for two millenia. As long as two or more of us are gathered in our own name, so shall there be a degree of belief in the extraordinary, the unlikely or the frankly ludicrous as the underlying cause of our misfortunes, rather than a careful, considered analysis of those inconvenient artifacts of rational thought – facts. Conspiracy theorists hold that the CIA arranged for the assassination of John Fitzgerald Kennedy, almost certainly in cahoots with organized crime; that the Moon landing was a hoax; that Angela Merkel is Hitler’s granddaughter; that 5G cell towers are the mechanism by which COVID spread; that Britain’s royal family consists of space-faring lizards taken human form; or that the war in Ukraine has been engineered by big business to dominate the energy and commodities markets. Only one of those theories is the subject of outright fabrication by your Editor – and it has nothing to do with reptiles! The problem with conspiracy theory is that it appeals to those who eschew rational thought in favour of finding someone to blame and – preferably – pointing the virtual finger at them and shouting loudly. Quite why that is supposed to resolve anything defies explanation, frankly And the theory conveniently ignores the one overriding objection that reasonable people mount: how on Earth can one believe that a secret so vast, and involving as many people as would have had to be involved in fabricating the story of the Moon landing, for example, could be kept – in that case for almost 53 years. In the era of Assange and Snowden, it is unlikely, to say the least, that somebody ‘in the know,’ or on the fringes of pertinent knowledge, would not have sought the advantage or notoriety that (regrettably) attaches to the growing sport of whistleblowing. Conspiracy theorists have done considerable damage, it has to be said, to the reputation, reliability and utility of social media. Never Ascribe to Conspiracy That Which is Due to Stupidity Editorial caused the war. The US instigated it with NATO’s help in order to dominate the Ukraine agricultural market and cripple Russia’s energy industry. NATO represents an ‘existential threat’ to Mother Russia and should be dismembered and destroyed, even at the cost of using nuclear weapons. Such thinking leads into dangerous waters. Just recently Aleksey Zhuravlyov, the Deputy Chairman of the Kremlin’s Defence Committee, suggested that Russia could (and should) destroy Britain in four minutes and Finland in ten seconds, using its all-powerful Satan missile. Quite apart from the fact that Russian equipment has not worked as advertised in Ukraine, and ignoring the confused, almost incoherent nature of the delivery (he appears to be a graduate of the Donald J Trump Institute for Rhetorical Eloquence), there is a disturbing sense of inviolate hubris – no recognition of the inevitable consequence of executing such a policy. The threat is not being taken seriously – otherwise there would be far more visible activity and protest at the British government’s appalling laxity in allowing such a state of affairs to develop. But the fact that we have built an environment in which such threats can be made – and widely circulated – is in itself a dangerous development. Bearing in mind I live in a high-priority target area, I might have as much as a femtosecond to regret my error. Russians would have decades. Tim Mahon Editor-in-Chief of MilTech The indiscriminate use of social media to promulgate radical ideas, to fabricate ‘evidence,’ to vilify public figures or bodies, to undermine rational debate and to give hugely disproportionate prominence to the voice of often frankly deranged (or driven by cynical self-aggrandising machinations) minorities, erodes democracy. It diminishes the quality of the wider democracy that was an aspirational goal of those who first came up with the social media concept. And – from a national and collaborative security perspective – it opens the door to actors of ill intent, who use it to prey on the vulnerable or to exercise disproportionate effect on public opinion. And trying to exploit it can have unanticipated detrimental effects. Consider the case of the soi-disant ‘Ghost Pilot’ of the Ukraine Air Force, reputed to have shot down 40 Russian aircraft. An active social media campaign to elicit international empathy for the fate of the plucky warrior when his death was announced quickly became counter-productive when his fictional nature was revealed. Conspiracy theory needs to be debunked and discounted. Debate – and the constant awareness that, more often than not, what theorists ascribe to conspiracy is, in fact, the consequence of inveterate stupidity – need to be encouraged and facilitated at a ‘whole of nation’ level in order to minimise its negative effects. A case in point. Increasingly, as the Russians experience setback after contretemps after humiliating defeat in Ukraine, the theories are coming more and more to the fore. NATO aggression
Contents 2 · MT 3/2022 Mönch Verlagsgesellschaft mbH (Mönch Publishing Group) Editor-in-Chief, Military Technology: TimMahon Editor-at-Large: Dr Ezio Bonsignore North American Bureau Chief (NewOrleans): Marty Kauchak NATO & EU Affairs Correspondent (Brussels): Caterina Tani Publishers: Uta & Volker Schwichtenberg US Office: 1326 St Andrew Street, Unit B, NewOrleans, LA 70130-5124 Correspondents: Massimo Annati (Italy); Marco Giulio Barone (France); Angus Batey (UK); Dr Theo Benien (Germany); Philip Butterworth-Hayes (UK); Atul Chandra (India); Tomás Chlebecek (Czech Republic); Dr Robert Czulda (Poland); Peter Donaldson (UK); Arie Egozi (Israel); Tim Fish (New Zealand); Kubilai Han (Turkey); Eugene Kogan (Georgia); Denys Kolesnyk (France); Edward Lundquist (USA); Georg Mader (Austria); Stephen WMiller (USA); Jörg Muth (Estonia); Trevor Nash (UK); Dr Stefan Nitschke (Germany); Santiago Rivas (Argentina); David Saw (France); AndrewWhite (UK); Dr Thomas Withington (France) Executive Associate and CEO: Volker Schwichtenberg Executive Associate, CEO and Lawyer: Uta Schwichtenberg Founder: Manfred Sadlowski Deputy Managing Director: Christa André Cover and Layout: Frank Stommel Mönch Verlagsgesellschaft mbH: Christine-Demmer-Straße 7 Tel.: +49-2641 / 3703-0 53474 Bad Neuenahr-Ahrweiler Fax: +49-2641 / 3703-199 Germany E-Mail: miltech@moench-group.com www.monch.com The views published are not necessarily those of the Publisher or Editor. 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Your MILITARY TECHNOLOGY Contact Asian Eastern Pacific (ASEP) Mr. Vishal Mehta PO Box 11328 Mobile: +91 99 999 85 425 IARI, New Delhi 110012 E-Mail: vishal.mehta@ India moench-group.com Belgium, France, Pakistan Mr. Georges France Mönch Verlagsgesellschaft mbH Tel.: +33 1 60 82 98 88 6, impasse de la Grande Fax: +33 1 60 82 98 89 F-91510 Janville-sur-Juine E-Mail: georges.france@ wanadoo.fr Italy Mr. Franco Lazzari RID Tel.: +39 01 85 30 15 98 Via Martiri della Liberazione, 79/3 Fax: +39 01 85 30 91 71 I-16043 Chiavari (GE) E-Mail: franco.lazzari@rid.it lazzari@moench-group.com Portugal, Spain, Latin America, Middle East Mr. Antonio Terol Garcia Tel.: +34 91 3 10 29 98 Fax: +34 91 3 10 24 54 E-Mail: antonio@terolgarcia. e.telefonica.net terol@moench-group.com Australia, Canada, Scandinavia, UK, USA Tel.: +44 7968 714280 Mrs. Sally Passey (Director) E-Mail: sally@bspmedia.com BSP Media Cover Combat-proven and demonstrating its in-built flexibility, the Eurofighter remains a viable, powerful component of tomorrow’s air combat systems. (Eurofighter Jagdfluzeug GmbH) Small inserts on cover depict - A computer-generated image of Turkey’s TF 2000 air defence warfare destroyer. (TNFC) - We examine the French Scorpion programme, which includes the Jaguar reconnaissance vehicle, on page 58. (Nexter) - New operators continue to join the C295 club. (André Forkert) Editorial Never Ascribe to Conspiracy That Which is Due to Stupidity................... 1 TimMahon, Editor-in-Chief Comment Chinese Whispers........................................................................................ 4 Sam Cranny-Evans You Can Get There FromHere …Special Operations Vehicles. .............. 5 AndrewWhite Artillery as Coercive Diplomacy.................................................................. 6 Debalina Ghoshal Features Shrinking Horizons – Threats to Air Power.................................................. 8 Trevor Nash SERVICE COMMENTARY War in Ukraine – The Role and Importance of Air Forces........................ 14 Europe’s Land Armaments Sector In the Wake of War – Back to Basics......................................................... 16 Marco Giulio Barone Powerful Capabilities in Prospect for the Eurofighter Typhoon............. 24 Interview with Eurofighter’s new Chief Operating Officer (COO) Programmes, Wolfgang Gammel Countering Tactical UAS and Loitering Munitions.................................. 26 Stephen WMiller Reassessing Readiness Coping With the CBRN Threat in the Naval Environment........................ 32 Sarosh Bana Behind-Armour Effects.............................................................................. 35 Samuel Cranny-Evans Evolution to Revolution in SOF Vehicle Design: IAI/ELTA’s Z-MAG....... 39 C295: New Users for the ‘Mini Herc’......................................................... 40 André Forkert Confronting the Struggle to Reach Space from Latin America.............. 44 Santiago Rivas Nations in Focus France and an EU Army?. ........................................................................... 48 David Saw Scorpion - A Transformational Programme for the French Army. ......... 56 David Saw Letters Letter from America: The US Isn’t Ready for the Coming Cyberattacks.60 David Saw Letter from Brussels: Is the EU Getting Serious on Defence?................ 61 Caterina Tani Strategic Focus: Sick Man of Eurasia: A Bitter End to Superpower Self-Delusion............ 62 Tomás Chlebecek From the Bridge The Evolution of the Drone Carrier. ........................................................... 63 Massimo Annati First Sea Trials for Anadolu LHD............................................................... 66 Sinan Altinel
MILITARY TECHNOLOGY MT 3/2022 · 3 C4ISR Forum Open Skies................................................................................................... 68 Thomas Withington Wireless Communications at the Tactical Edge Trade-offs and Hurdles.............................................................................. 72 Dominic Perez, Curtiss-Wright Defense Solutions The Digital Battlefield Gap......................................................................... 74 Stephen WMiller Interviews The Continuing Evolutions of UGVs Interviewwith MilremRobotics. ............................................................... 76 Marco Giulio Barone In Defence, We Are Very Keen on UAVs Interviewwith Jackson Schneider, President & CEO of Embraer Defense & Security.................................... 78 Interview conducted by André Forkert in Santiago, Chile Proud of Building Relationships Maj Gen Barry R Cornish – Commander, US 12th Air Force. .................. 80 Interview conducted by André Forkert in Santiago, Chile Commentary Using AI to Improve Speech Quality......................................................... 82 Homeland Security Forum ................ 83 Industrial Focus ................ 85 Rear Echelon Battlefield Drone Operators Stay Two Steps Ahead of Air Defences................. 3rd cover Philip Butterworth-Hayes Index of Advertisers ARQUUS...................................................................................................... 49 ASELSAN Inc............................................................................................... 37 ADEX............................................................................................................ 65 BERETTA DEFENCE TECNOLOGIES.............................................. 4th cover Diehl Defence GmbH & Co. KG. ................................................................. 29 EMBRAER.................................................................................................... 47 ESG Elektroniksystem- und Logistik-GmbH............................................... 41 Eurofighter Jagdflugzeug GmbH................................................................. 11 FMV - Försvarets Materielverk.................................................................... 31 FUTURE FORCES Exhibition & Forum. ...................................................... 71 General Dynamics European Land Systems S.L........................................ 21 HENSOLDT AG............................................................................................ 43 HUDSON Supplies Inc.. .............................................................................. 17 IDET............................................................................................................. 20 ILA................................................................................................................ 12 Invisio A/S...................................................................................................... 7 Israel Aerospace Industries Ltd....................................................... 2nd cover I/ITSEC......................................................................................................... 67 LAAD............................................................................................................ 30 LEONARDO. .................................................................................................. 9 MSPO. ......................................................................................................... 50 NEXTER....................................................................................................... 53 OTOKAR Otomotiv ve Sav.San AS............................................................. 23 Peli Products S.L.U.. ................................................................................... 55 Roketsan A.S............................................................................................... 27 SAFRAN ELECTRONICS & DEFENSE........................................................ 19 Streamlight, Inc............................................................................................ 51 Weibel Scientific A/S................................................................................... 13 VINCORION - JENOPTIK Advanced Systems GmbH................................ 59 Nexter’s Caesar 6x6 155mm SPH, much discussed already this year at the major shows. (Nexter)
It is apparent from Chinese state-sponsored news publications that the Russian narrative around the war in Ukraine has found a home in Beijing. The message has been modified to reflect China’s foreign policy concerns, and confidently states that the United States is the country responsible for the war. It is worthwhile examining the narrative that is emerging from Beijing, as it may offer insights into the characteristics of the relationship with Russia, as well as with the US, in the aftermath of the war. The Global Times, while not necessarily reflecting consensus within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), does serve to provide an insight into the ways in which the war and its causes have been interpreted. For instance, on 27 March the outlet posted an article questioning the legitimacy of NATO stating, “NATO, under the leadership of Washington, is the real initiator and driving force behind the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, because what the US really needs is tense and conflicting Russia-Europe relations”. This type of statement is reflective of Russian attitudes towards NATO, which see the alliance as an extension of US power and a threat to Russian interests. The author, a scholar at the Shanghai International Studies University, closes by referring to China’s foreign policy of “win-win cooperation,” and asserting that the pursuit of US hegemony is short-sighted, given the international architecture that is “increasingly dominated” by this win-win model. Win-win cooperation is a concept promulgated by China, which has been present since at least 2009 and which aims to establish international partnerships on an equal basis. Its stated purpose is to encourage countries to treat each other as equals, and engage in mutual cooperation to benefit each other. The scholar’s reference to win-win may be considered a subtle nod in the direction of those countries considered to be China’s partners, with mutual interests in the US. It establishes the groundwork for arguing that US actions – perceived to be enacted through NATO – are counter to the concept of win-win cooperation which nations friendly to Beijing are reliant upon. A separate article published by the PLA Daily on 24 March refers to the security situation in Europe with a more conciliatory tone than the Global Times. It notes that European leaders conducted “shuttle diplomacy” to try and avert war, but could not overcome US promotion of NATO’s expansion. This, the author claims, has led European countries to pursue large and costly defence programmes at the expence of social welfare. The piece draws parallels between Russia and the US, noting the former’s permanence through its geographical location, and the latter’s tendency to lose interest in Europe. The author argues that a balanced and stable security architecture in Europe is nowhere in sight, and that “strategic autonomy” will require careful consideration. This interesting piece, which again mimics Russian claims about NATO expansion and a lack of European autonomy in its security, subtly raises the concept that Europe could enjoy peace - if only it was able to sever ties with the US. It also takes pains to associate US political machinations with the social pain that European citizens are now experiencing, and will experience in the future because of increased defence spending. One final article from the PLA Daily, published on 20 March, accuses Washington of forming “gangs to continuously create regional confrontation”. The author expands the analysis to the Middle East, where the US and its allies created chaos and a security and governance deficit. US policy in the Asia Pacific Region - from the Five Eyes organisation to bilateral military ties with other nations – is described as, “a disaster that disrupts regional peace and stability”. The author argues that the end goal is an Asia-Pacific version of NATO that will ultimately harm the interests of all involved, and concludes with a warning against the US continuing with a “Cold War mentality” or risk a shameful failure. This, of course, represents just three articles published in China since the war in Ukraine began. However, they are potentially indicative of a concerning trend in an anti-US narrative that stands to gain unity around the banner centred on the international harm caused by Washington’s fomenting of war in Europe. These articles begin to create the groundwork for linking US actions in Europe to the suffering of peoples around the world. Consider for example Nigeria, one of the poorest nations in the world, but also reliant upon wheat from Ukraine and Russia. How might its citizens respond to a narrative informing them that the increased price, and possible scarcity of wheat-based goods, is a result of Washington’s machinations in Europe. Nigeria is not the only country facing this dilemma: Jordan, Tunisia and Libya may be in a similar situation. Alternatively, how might Russia and China seek to gain from attitudes in the Middle East, which have hardened against the US since the conflict has begun? Oil-producing countries, such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, have resisted US pressure to increase oil production to reduce the price of oil. Various analysts cite disputes between their ruling parties and the Biden administration as the reason for the friction. It stands to reason that, should China and Russia feel it expedient, they could affect some form of change in the international community, driving it away from the US. Watching articles such as those mentioned above, may serve as a valuable early indication of the direction that Beijing’s narrative takes, as well as a sign posting its intended goals. Sam Cranny-Evans Chinese Whispers 4 · MT 3/2022 Comment A research associate at the Royal United Services Institute in London, Sam Cranny-Evans frequently covers issues Chinese and Russian for MilTech.
Andrew White You Can Get There From Here… Special Operations Vehicles Over the last two decades, special operations forces (SOF) have deployed to some of the most austere and remote areas of the world to counter violent extremist organisations (VEO), often at reach far beyond traditional logistics support. As a result, the special operations vehicle (SOV) has provided SOF units at the lowest tactical level with critical capability in terms of mobility, lethality, survivability and connectivity. However, after just weeks have elapsed since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February, the international SOF community is once more considering some very different operational requirements for SOV platforms, as they consider conducting missions against highly capable and well equipped peer adversaries. Whether conducting counter-insurgency operations in the Sahel region of West Africa or offensive action missions in eastern Europe, modern SOF units are demanding access to a wide variety of SOV platforms, heavily dependent upon the mission at hand. As a result, SOF units around the world must retain access to a fleet of light, medium and heavy SOVs, in addition to non-conventional types of vehicles, which can be used for more discreet and even clandestine special operations. Light Lightweight Tactical All Terrain Vehicles (LTATVs) provide small units with maximum levels of mobility, in addition to the capability for transporting a limited number of light, medium and even heavy weapons and specialist equipment for a specific mission. LTATVs can support long-range operations, often forward-deployed as internally transportable vehicles in the cargo holds of transport helicopters – a concept often referred to by the SOF community as ‘fly and drive’ operations. However, due to their limited size, power and payload capacity (typically, they can carry between two to four operators), LTATVs are unable to provide SOF operators with adequate levels of survivability. Instead, platforms rely upon high levels of manoeuvrability and appropriate tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) to evade detection and/or targeting by enemy forces. Medium Medium SOVs, which can also be used to support ‘fly and drive’ operations, are capable of carrying between six to eight personnel, in addition to a greater amount of payload capacity, by comparison with lighter SOVs. Additional payload capacity can be used to carry greater volumes of firepower, C4ISTAR mission suites, armour and/or specialist equipment, including tethered UAS. The larger chassis design of a medium SOV also means larger fuel tanks can be used to support enduring special operations, which could include long-range reconnaissance missions in the most remote areas of the world. Heavy At the heavy end of the scale, SOVs resemble mine resistant, ambush protected (MRAP)-style platforms, which are ideally suited to enabling the tactical insertion and extraction of assault teams, particularly useful in dense urban environments, where the threat of ambush can be more prevalent. Heavy SOVs, which can carry more than a dozen operators, provide the necessary scale of payload to carry maximum levels of ballistic protection; iC4ISTAR mission suites to coordinate command and control and situational awareness; and, finally, integrated remote weapon stations or turrets to provide assault teams with organic firepower. Non-Standard Finally, civilian armoured vehicles (CAVs) and non-standard commercial vehicles (NSCVs) can be employed by SOF for more discreet operations, particularly when conducting operations with partner nation forces. Typically up-armoured and featuring upgraded suspension systems, CAVs and NSCVs still provide small unit teams with 4x4 mobility, albeit with limited additional payload capacity. These types of vehicles have been particularly popular during campaigns in the Middle East, allowing SOF teams to blend into local environments. Emerging Requirements Seeking to maintain tactical advantage on the contemporary battlefield, SOF units regularly pursue a wide range of improvements to SOVs, ranging from the integration of emerging technologies through to more efficient and cost-effective maintenance, repair and overhaul procedures. Areas of interest include the introduction of hybrid electric engines, which could allow SOF to conduct ‘silent drive’ approaches to target areas in a more stealthy manner. Similarly, another emerging and critical requirement is the reduction in electromagnetic signatures of SOVs, to reduce detection and targeting by enemy forces equipped with surveillance sensors. Similarly, SOF continue to explore (semi-) autonomous capabilities for SOVs – a concept which would allow small units to quickly re-role LTATVs in particular to conduct reconnaissance, fire support and even distraction operations. SOF are also interested in the development of scalable and lighter weight armour materials. Current armour solutions can be heavy, while also decreasing levels in SOV durability over time. Also being pursued are efforts to increase storage capacity; reductions in gross vehicle weight (associated with armour upgrades); generation of exportable power; enhanced networking (C4ISTAR); telepresence for optionally-piloted platforms; and augmented reality (AR) capabilities to support maximum levels of situational awareness. With a background embracing multiple tours with the British armed forces and a wealth of experience in covering defence issues as a reporter, Andrew White regularly covers the special operations beat for MilTech. Comment MT 3/2022 · 5
The Ukraine conflict has highlighted the relevance and importance of artillery systems – both tube artillery and rocket launchers – not just as combat effectors, but as a tool for coercive diplomacy , even in the presence of sophisticated ballistic and cruise missiles. This is not necessarily a new phenomenon – but it is, perhaps, worth examining how both Russia and Ukraine are using their respective heavy artillery assets in pursuit of their military aims. In April, the Russian Defence Ministry claimed that its missile and artillery forces had hit four hundred targets in Ukraine overnight. In March, both Russia and Ukraine were using the 2S7 Pion 203mm howitzer – a 46t self-propelled system capable of reaching ranges in excess of 47,000 metres. In the case of Russian artillery, it appears they were used to engage civilian targets also. The heaviest and most powerful artillery system in use on either side, the Pion howitzers have wreaked havoc on Ukrainian cities and have reportedly been the systems causing the most casualties. Reports from Ukraine indicate that Russia is also using an improved variant, the MALKA, allegedly capable of mounting nuclear warheads. The use of such systems on high value Ukrainian targets – such as Kyiv or Kharkhiv – reinforces the argument that artillery is playing a distinctive role in the conflict, enabling Moscow to achieve its aims through coercive diplomacy. The use of systems such as Malka is helping the Russians achieve a conventional ‘assured destruction’ of critical targets. Leveraging lessons undoubtedly learned from its 1994 debacle in Chechnya, Russia appears to have recognised the benefits of widespread use of artillery in urban areas for gaining local control. In a recent article in the online journal The Conversation, Alexander Hill, Professor of Military History at the University of Calgary, suggests that “with Russian aircraft vulnerable to Western-supplied anti-aircraft weapons, this leaves Russian artillery […] in many ways, the principal Russian weapon in Ukraine”. Again, the Russian army appears to have learned from its successes, such as the 2015 battle of Zenopillya, in which Russian artillery completely destroyed two Ukrainian mechanised battalions in a notably short period of time. It also recalls the action at Debaltseve where, using Grad rocket launchers, Russia killed 6,000 Ukrainian soldiers. It appears that multiple rocket launch systems (MRLS) have become a critical component of the siege warfare situation now extant in Ukraine today, too. Both Grad and Uragan MLRS have been used in attacks on Kharkiv and other targeted cities, as has the Tornado-G MLRS, an upgraded version of the standard BM-21 122mm system. While sophisticated missile systems and aircraft have played a crucial role in Russia’s strategy in Ukraine, the role of artillery systems to force Ukraine to the negotiating table cannot be ignored. Current indications are that Putin’s fundamental strategy if based on a ‘land grab,’ and that he seeks to capture as much Ukrainian territory as possible prior to peace talks resulting in a favourable outcome – and is making significant use of artillery as a tool in that strategy. Moreover, Russian ground forces have suffered significant casualties and been forced to withdraw, leaving artillery to effectively hold ground – never a comfortable tactic. In fact, in March the British MoD was quoted as saying “Russia will likely continue to compensate for its reduced ground manoeuvre capability through mass artillery and missile strikes”. It would be overstating the case, however, to say that Russia is only using artillery for coercive diplomacy. While artillery is being used against high value targets to achieve a decisive victory, Ukraine also expects to create the same psychological effect with its own artillery – effectively, to coerce Russia into accepting a peace acceptable to Ukraine. That puts into context the recent Twitter appeal by President Volodymyr Zelensky for supplies of 155mm artillery systems and munitions. Canada has agreed to send four M777 ultra-light howitzers (used to great effect in Afghanistan by Canadian forces) to Ukraine, and Britain’s Prime Minster, Boris Johnson, identifying the struggle in Ukraine as an “artillery conflict” – at least right now – has also agreed to send artillery systems: unconfirmed reports suggest the AS-90 155mm system could be sent, along with 45,000 rounds of ammunition. The United States, too, has assisted Ukraine with heavy artillery systems and associated components. The delivery of such systems by Canada the UK and US, at a time when Ukraine was receiving only defensive weaponry from NATO member states, significantly increases the nation’s offensive capabilities. The Netherlands also plans to send German-made PzH2000 155mm self-propelled systems to Kyiv’s aid, while France is also transferring a number of 155mm Caesar systems. All these donated systems will enhance the Ukrainian ability to provide and sustain direct fire support in a conflict increasingly urban in nature. However the conflict in Ukraine turns out, it has already illustrated the intensified nature of urban warfare – the density of terrain, the inherent difficulties in discriminating between combatant and non-combatant personnel being just two of the multiple criteria of concern. Artillery has already played a major role in the confrontation, challenging traditional measurements of success and failure. Russian artillery, particularly, faces challenges as the conflict takes on a more asymmetric character, with more civilians becoming actively engaged in resisting the invasion. Ukraine, for its part, needs to consider how best to achieve effective coordination between artillery and manoeuvre units in an urban warfare context. Debalina Ghoshal Artillery as Coercive Diplomacy 6 · MT 3/2022 Comment Debalina Ghoshal is a Non Resident Fellow with the Council on International Policy, and author of over two hundred articles, papers and commentaries.
power has delivered success, often in concert with ground or maritime forces. Equally, there are occasions when it has failed. Perhaps the first failure was one of expectation. According to air power proponents such as Douhet and Mitchell, air power would be able make armies and navies redundant, by striking at a nation’s means to make war and destroying civilian morale. History has shown that air power failed to live up to these early expectations. Superficially then, air power seems to be that ‘wonder weapon’ that can potentially solve all exigencies but, alas, for a number of reasons, it is no panacea. An examination of the Russian Aerospace Force’s (VKS) performance in Ukraine will testify to that. The rhetoric surrounding air power’s inability to deliver battle winning ‘shock and awe’ capabilities 24/7 can be grouped under a number of headings that include financial, political, logistical, technological and geographical. Investment Imperatives From the financial perspective, combat aircraft have been getting more expensive over time. This has occurred through general inflation, so-called defence inflation and the fact that, as aircraft have evolved, increasing amounts of technology, typically stealth materials, smart weapons, ISTAR and datalink systems, have been added. Using 2017 constant US dollars as a benchmark, in 1956 an F-4 Phantom cost $20 million. In the early eighties the F-16 Falcon cost $3540 million, while the unit cost of an F-18C Hornet was $65 million, the same as the F-15 Strike Eagle. Today, the F-35C Lightning II tops out at $138 million but even that is overshadowed by the F-22 that back in 1998 cost $250 million. The Numbers Game This does raise the question of nations potentially rowing back from procuring such expensive platforms. In the US, for example, that country’s stated acquisition of 1,763 F-35s is coming under scrutiny. Work on the F-15EX II as a successor to the F-16 is underway – and where does all this In comparison to land and sea power, air power has only been part of the military lexicon for a little over a century. During that short time, the technologies underpinning and supporting the air domain have grown exponentially, and accelerated the machinegun-firing, 80mph biplane of 1914 to the modern 5th-generation strike platform capable of Mach 3+ and firing BVR [beyond visual range] hypersonic missiles. Although platform and weapon technologies have improved to make the modern aircraft more lethal, the question often asked is, has air power’s utility intrinsically increased at the same rate as these generational improvement to performance? In answering this question, we must define what we mean by air power, consider its characteristics and look at what it can achieve. According to the US Air Force Air University at Maxwell AFB, “air power is the integrated employment of all air and space forces to control and exploit the air and space environments to achieve national security objectives”. This somewhat broad definition goes on to say that air power “exploits the properties of its operating medium to realize unique operational characteristics and thus employ unique capabilities to provide the nation [with] a broad range of military options” In “exploiting the properties of its operating medium,” the characteristics of air power come to the fore. These are numerous, but air forces widely agree that the main elements are height, speed, reach, agility, concentration and ubiquity. These characteristics are fine in theory, but “concentration and ubiquity” obviously require mass and numbers of platforms to achieve that mass. Finally then, what can air power achieve when employed at the strategic, operational and tactical levels? As far as strike aircraft are concerned, on which we focus here, air power can destroy, degrade or disable physical resources; isolate or channel military forces; influence or modify behaviours at the military or political level; and, finally, it can reassure, persuade, deter or generally coerce at the political, military or civilian level. Great Expectations It should also be appreciated that those that champion the doctrinal benefits and utility of air power are the air forces themselves. Objectivity in such discussions is often lacking. However, history has shown that air With a military, industrial and journalistic background encompassing air defence, air power and training and simulation, Trevor Nash dissects and reassembles issues for MilTech regularly. Trevor Nash Shrinking Horizons – Threats to Air Power 8 · MT 3/2022 Feature A VKS Su-35 air defence fighter was introduced into service in 2014. (Photo: Rosoboronexport)
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they were over the Western Front in the First World War. Air superiority – the ability to conduct air operations without undue interference or air supremacy – the ability to conduct air operations without interference – do not have to be strategic to include the complete theatre of operations, but can be applied locally, along with associated fly lines to and from the target area. To succeed, they demand a composite force to address C2, aerial refuelling, suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD), EW, AD and strike to ensure success and, often, integration with ground force deep fires. Although the VKS is now under the spotlight in Ukraine, the question of western air forces’ capabilities and robustness should also be examined, especially given the permissive environments experienced in Afghanistan and operations against ISIS in Iraq. Mounting operations against forces without a serious AD capability can lead to false lessons being learned or, worse still, complacency. That lesson was hoisted aboard by the RAF’s Tornado GR1 force during the 1991 Gulf War, where they lost eight aircraft, and by the VKS in Ukraine today. The latter also highlights the air power imbalance where a multi-million dollar strike aircraft can be destroyed by a $40,000 FIM-92 Stinger. In theory, by operating at medium level, strike aircraft can put themselves above the range of MANPADS, but that pre-supposes that air superiority has been gained by the neutering of longer-range SAM systems and AD C2 systems. This ability to destroy the enemy’s aircraft does not have to be achieved in the air, of course. As defence expenditure has generally declined over the past few decades, and the unit price of air platforms has risen, air forces procure fewer aircraft. These assets therefore become more valuable, both to their respective air forces and their destruction to the enemy so, in theory, this should generate a requirement for greater force protection. The vulnerability of aircraft on the ground was highlighted in September 2012, when the Taliban attacked Camp Bastion and destroyed six US Marine Corps AV-8Bs and damaged two others. It was also seen in the Falklands (Malvinas) conflict in 1982, when an eight-man British Special Air Service team destroyed or disabled 11 Argentine aircraft on Pebble Island. Airpower in the Run-Up to War? Those events occurred in warzones with numerous troops protecting the airfields. What about the scenario in which an undeclared war is preceded with an attack by special forces on a handful of key airfields containing a nation’s strike aircraft? leave the Next Generation Air Dominance programme? The quality versus quantity argument is alive and kicking. The cost-cutting associated with major aircraft programmes was also evidenced with the F-22 Raptor. The original procurement of 750 aircraft from 1994, was cut to 648. This figure was reduced again to 442, 339 and 277 before the then US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates cut the number to 187 in 2009. According to the air power strategist Martin van Creveld, between 1996 and 2008, the number of combat aircraft used by the “world’s leading air forces” was cut by one-third. It’s not just the cost of the airframe that needs to be taken into account. Spares to sustain the aircraft have become correspondingly more expensive, especially when one considers the added complexity of modern sensors, datalinks and weapons. The other factor is the cost of training and retaining the technicians to maintain and support the aircraft. The third factor is the cost of the weapons that the platform has to deliver, an issue that has been magnified over the years as ordnance has become smarter and correspondingly more complex. Unlike iron bombs that are relatively easy to manufacturer, weapons such as the AIM-120, AGM-158 JASSM, JBU-32 JADM and AGM-154 JSOW are expensive and take time to produce. As the price of aircraft, support and weapons increase, air forces can no longer afford to procure as many platforms as they once did, even as recently as two decades ago. This has resulted in the steep rise in development of surrogate unmanned platforms, such as the Boeing Australia Ghost Bat, and European programmes such as Tempest and the Future Combat Air System (FCAS). Such systems have yet to be deployed in anger, and so their efficacy is yet to be proven. There Are Known Knowns… What is known, and this seems to be a lesson that the VKS has forgotten in Ukraine, is that to exploit air power requires air superiority or air supremacy. These much vaunted maxims are as valid today as Ukraine has shown how $40,000 FIM-92 Stinger MANPADS can destroy multi-million dollar aircraft if air superiority is not won. (Photo: DVIDS) f The US is looking to cut back the number of F-35s that it is buying as a cost saving measure. (Photo: Trevor Nash) 10 · MT 3/2022 Feature
Feature MT 3/2022 · 13 Operations Network (DMON), combined with an air force’s culture and doctrine, also allow aircrew the opportunity to show initiative, leadership, confidence and flexibility. These human factors are difficult to quantify, but are important in differentiating the good air force from the mediocre. Today then, air power is clearly required as an important part of the combined force, but it is not the panacea that many had predicted; reality has not truly met the rhetoric generated by its evangelical supporters. Its capabilities are often overblown and decried by the ‘boots on the ground’ brigade. The truth is, like any form of warfare, air power has an important role to play, but is undergoing a slow decline due to the high cost of ownership and membership dues associated with being a member of the ‘air power club’. The other issue, of course, concerns the fragility of runways and the airfield’s support infrastructure. This is not a new problem. Witness the RAF’s Harrier Force deployments away from RAF Gütersloh to woods and service stations in the 1970s but, with the rise of long-range air- and ground-launched missiles, fixed runways are fast becoming a major liability. Like the Harrier Force, will the near future see more emphasis placed on dispersed operations? Having considered financial, logistical and technological issues, what about the political framework dictating how air power can be used? The Political Dimension During the 1991 Gulf War, US-led coalition forces had the full support of participaing governments, and air power was used as the military demanded, and in concert with allied ground forces. This success helped to salve the wounds of Vietnam, where the US Air Force was constrained and directed by Washington as to how air power was employed. The Gulf War was seen by many as the first Effects Based Operation (EBO), resulting from the work of Colonels John Boyd and John Warden, USAF air power theorists, who developed a codified method of defeating the enemy from the air by targeting what became known as the Five Rings – leadership; key industries; supporting infrastructure; the population’s will and resistance; and finally, the enemy’s military forces. The problem with theories is that people who have to interpret them often adopt a tick box, rote approach. The result was that the success of Desert Storm could not be replicated in the Balkans, because national participants could not agree common aims and therefore political factors thwarted the utility of air power in this particular instance. Some commentators, including Dr Peter Gray from the University of Wolverhampton, stated that, “air power did make a major and significant contribution” to securing the Dayton Peace Accord. Usually associated with ground operations, geography can also offer challenges to air operations. At either end of the spectrum are the flat, featureless deserts of Iraq and the forested undulations and mountains as well as urbanised areas of the Balkans and Ukraine. The latter provides plenty of cover to hide personnel and equipment and conceal AD weapons. THE Effect of Homo sapiens In discussing the efficacy of air power, attention should also be directed to training. As highlighted above, successful composite air operations are a result of many different types of air assets working together in a complex environment. As RUSI’s Justin Bronk recently highlighted, the poor performance of the VKS in Ukraine has been largely down to a lack of sophisticated and networked training simulators, in contrast to those used by allied air forces such as the US, UK, France and Australia. High-fidelity networked training systems, such as the USAF’s Distributed Mission A tactical advantage or a cost-saving measure? A number of nations are considering the concept of loyal wingmen. (Photo: Boeing
14 · MT 3/2022 SERVICE COMMENTARY Air Force – Operational, Fast and Flexible The security situation in Europe requires responsive armed forces. We proved our flexibility and responsiveness, by deploying additional Eurofighters to Romania only a few hours after the beginning of the Russian attack, and are still doing so today. We patrol NATO airspace side by side with our partners, monitor the closure of German airspace to Russian aircraft with our radar systems, perform reconnaissance flights with our ECR Tornados over the Baltic Sea, and refuel allied combat aircraft with our A400M and A330 of the MMU at Eindhoven. In Slovakia, our ground-based air defense forces also make an important contribution to the security of the Alliance on NATO’s eastern flank. Our Future – Modern, Interoperable and Multinational Our security is based on credible deterrence. Precisely for this reason, the decision in favour of the F-35 is logical. By procuring the most powerful combat aircraft in the world, we will implement the modernisation of our Air Force even faster and more consistently. Thus, we will cooperate even more closely with the other F-35 nations in Europe, and in the Alliance, in terms of training, logistics and operations. Common weapon systems are the best basis for interoperability. In addition to the introduction of the F-35, we will enable our Eurofighter for electronic combat in cooperation with industry. State-of-the-art technology is required to survive in current and future scenarios. Besides the replacement of our Tornado fleet, other priorities, such as the heavy transport helicopter, short-range and very short-range air defence system, territorial missile defence and the Next-Generation Weapon System have already been defined, and rapid decisions have been announced. A unique commentary for MilTech on the occasion of the ILA 2022 Berlin Air Show, from Generalleutnant Ingo Gerhartz, Inspector of the German Air Force since 2018. All over Europe, we are currently experiencing a turning point in history. We are deeply appalled by the brutality of Russia’s invasion and the horrible pictures of the suffering of the Ukrainian population fighting for independence and democracy. The failure of the conquest of Kiev, the fighting in urban areas, the massive employment of cruise missiles, drones, MANPADS and anti-tank rockets, the importance of logistics, morale and combat power and, last but not least, the tactical skills of small units – all these aspects will have to be analysed. Since the beginning of the second phase, the war has been characterised by a strategy of attrition pursued with great brutality, and the interaction of artillery, tanks and infantry. The importance of airpower has been evident in all phases since the beginning of the war. Despite the massive superiority in numbers and the use of stateof-the-art fighter jets by the Russian Air Force, the striking power of the Ukrainian air defence, and the bravery and determination of the Ukrainian pilots, are already defining elements of this war. As a matter of fact, the most pressing question for us is: to what extent does the war in Ukraine not only shape our future but – above all – our present as well? And further: what are the consequences of how are we going to apply airpower within NATO, especially with regard to the future of European security? Air Force - Ready to Take Responsibility The return of the war of aggression in Europe clearly shows that the very same core qualities that have always characterised air forces will continue to be required in the future, in order to meet the challenges arising at this turning point. War in Ukraine – The Role and Importance of Air Forces German and American aircraft training side by side in the Blue Flag exercise. (Photo: Bundeswehr)
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