Caterina Tani Unexpected Scenarios for an Expected Crisis The last few decades reveal nothing to compare with the storm that hit Ukraine and Europe in February. Constant reports from the field, analysts continuously explaining the situation: the military situation appears extremely fluid, the outcomes uncertain. The hybrid nature of the conflict reflects contemporary attitudes: a mix of tanks and missiles combined with infowar, official and unofficial information manipulation, cyber-attacks and broken promises. Yet, the feeling is that we face an anachronistic war, a nineteenth- century conflict: an actual territorial invasion of a sovereign nation, justified for linguistic, socio-political, and ethnic ‘reasons’ that sound increasingly delirious and misplaced. t. Some see the invasion as a product of Putin’s psychological ‘overflow,’ a sort of pathological “national-narcissism”. In retrospect, it’s it’s easy see the war is nothing but the final act in a long-term strategy. Many factors have to be taken into account in analysing ‘Tsar Vladimir’s’ actions – such as his perception of the USSR’s fall as a “geopolitical tragedy,” and an almost visceral revanchism derived from a thirty-year long humiliation, which exerted tremendous force on a traumatised personality (his father lost a leg in WWII, his mother her mental health, his brother his life). Some also point to a degree of superficiality which led Western countries both to expand NATO, by taking advantage of Moscow’s weakness in the 2000s, and failing to react adequately Russia’s very muscular moves since the end of the 1990s in Chechnya, Georgia, Crimea and Donbas. As also to Russian participation in Syria, used as a testing ground for its military forces,. In the Central African Republic, Mali and Libya, the West reacted very mildly, imposing ineffective sanctions, as some European countries - Germany and Italy in primis - were reluctant to cut their commercial ties with Russia. Today, Putin has simply discarded the mask, sewn insignia on the anonymous uniforms of soldiers who invaded Crimea in 2014, and launched an invasion of a sovereign state – lacking even the excuse of provocation. This does not make him a psychopath. Instead, we see paranoid exasperation with the existential threat that Russia has always perceived, and which did not cease to exist with the end of the Soviet system. Having lost the war against capitalism, there remains hatred for the Western way of life and its ‘values,’ soft power, freedom, democracy (perceived as a collective mystification) and whatever else threatens Russian autocracy. In response, Putin turns to the only dialectic he recognises: forced persuasion through war. The Ukraine crisis is the final act - at least so far - of a play begun almost a generation ago. A barbaric, horrible act, but certainly not “coming out of nowhere,” nor unprecedented. Rather, it is the reactions that are unexpected and extraordinary. Putin’s war (as NATO and the EU called it) was shocking to many. It resulted in solidarity and indignation, perhaps as never seen before, that overwhelmed the bastions of neutrality and crossed political alignments, even affecting some of the traditionally pro-Russian Western lobbies. The invasion led to a tsunami that none of the recent conflicts or previous Russian ‘security operations’ have caused. Alongside enormous mobilisation in favour of Ukrainian resistance, the world has witnessed a series of ‘historic moments.’ First was the heroism of the Ukrainian people, led by a frankly improbable leader who suddenly became decisive, in an era in which heroes – especially of that kind – are rare. Ukraine, which Putin doesn’t even consider worth naming, has grown up and become an adult – a ‘Nation’ of a manner unimaginable to the autocrat in the Kremlin. Another historical event was consolidation of ‘the West’ in a manner seemingly impossible until a scant few years ago. NATO has resuscitated and proven decisive, ready to deploy its potential (including, for the first time, its Response Force), and succeeding in bringing closer formerly reluctant Sweden and Finland. Even more surprising – the EU’s geopolitical awakening, an authentic strategic renaissance after the self-inflicted oblivion following World War II. Despite awareness of the potential, dangerous, boomerang effect, the EU showed unity on sanctions and arms supplies to Ukraine (almost) without hesitation. And further – solidarity: the welcoming policies towards Ukrainian refugees contradict those of the past – the debate around the Dublin agreement, the reluctance of the Visegrads and recent European disunity. Even more incredible, finally, was the triple German U-turn. In a few days, decades of strategic self-mutilation and military introversion have dissolved. Germany gave up North Stream II, agreed to send lethal weapons to Ukraine, and announced rearmament worth €100 billion, becoming the world’s fourth largest spender on defence and achieving the infamous 2% of GDP target, requested by NATO for decades. In (temporary) conclusion, the series of geopolitical tornadoes hitting Europe in this first part of 2022 is unprecedented. One has to go back to the end of the 1930s to find a historical parallel. The catastrophic, tragic results from that are well known: today, such an outcome is (luckily and in theory) not feasible due to the nuclear deterrent. But it remains challenging to imagine how this will end. It will take resilience, courage and luck – maybe, then, time will tell. Based in Brussels, where she is Mönch Group’s NATO & EU Affairs Correspondent, Caterina Tani regularly takes on complex, multi-faceted issues, dissects and explains them. Letter from Brussels MT 2/2022 · 41
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