Nations in Focus MT 2/2022 · 39 current invasion of Ukraine. “You can train an army. You can equip an army. What you can’t give an army is the fighting spirit of the individual soldier.” By comparison with the observed demeanour and behaviour of Russian troops, the Ukrainians possess that spirit. In spades. Which is hardly surprising, given they have been fighting what amounts to a guerrilla war in eastern Ukraine for the last eight years and have now had their backs forced uncompromisingly against the wall, fighting for their homes, their families and (an old-fashioned concept, perhaps), their honour. Fighting spirit is, self-evidently, a critically important component of any successful military strategy. Equally important, in Gen McKenzie’s view, is recognising the reality of the situation as it unfolds – and anticipating the unanticipated. “The battlefield is a dynamic place. It is not a business plan. It is a contest of wills. It’s a contest of plans where unpredictability [and] friction dominate.” Which is where, ultimately, Putin’s ill-founded strategy will fail. He had a plan – certainly: a plan based on unreliable information and analysis, much of which seems to have been provided by apparatchiks too frightened to enunciate the truth, rather than ‘telling the boss what he wants to hear.’ Some of them have already paid a high price for that mistaken judgement. Putin’s plan fundamentally underestimated both Ukrainian resistance and overestimated Western fragmentation – though the latter factor is one he might be forgiven for thinking was a ticked box on the ‘pro invasion’ checklist. None of the above is intended to underestimate the danger extant as far as both Ukraine and Europe are concerned. The ramifications and the geopolitical consequences of the War of Putin’s Ego will echo fordecades to come – not least is the high probability that we are now embarked upon a Second Cold War. There are still hideous levels of risk being run by Ukraine every day – and we continue to support and pray for our colleagues at Defence Express in Kyiv, still exerting Herculean efforts to report as objectively as possible from the embattled capital. No end is in sight: and no clear picture of what that end looks like has yet emerged. The door – remarkably – remains open for a negotiated or diplomatic solution. It is devoutly to be wished that such a solution can be found, before (in)human nature, intolerance and intemperance intervene. A Contest of Wills Part of what makes our world of defence and security so fascinating and engaging – apart from the fact that, ultimately, it affects every one of our lives – is the sheer breadth of intellect, brainpower and human effort that goes into its management: in most places. General Frank McKenzie, commander of US CENTCOM, gave a final media briefing on 18 March, prior to retiring after three years as commander of one of his nation’s most engaged combatant commands. Fresh from testifying to Congress, he purposefully avoided making direct comments on the situation in Ukraine – but his perspective on other areas of conflict, particularly the engagement of Russian forces in Syria, provokes serious reflection. In Syria, he said, US forces “…had a brisk, professional de-confliction relationship with the Russians,” in which the latter were always available at the end of a communications link to prevent potential escalation and to clarify positions. But he believes there is at least one thing the Russians lack. “The one thing the Russians don’t have is the middle management level,” going on to define that as the NCOs and staff-officer individuals “that actually ensure things get done”. That resonates with those of us who have heard panicked radio communications ‘in the clear’ from junior leaders in ambushed armoured columns whose commanders have been killed or incapacitated. And it highlights the apparent lack of motivation, the reported sense of confusion and the ever-present fear among Russian conscript soldiers. If an army does not pay attention to ensuring that junior leaders are competent – and confident – to execute independently, then that army is likely to achieve sub-optimal results. And if there is no competent authority to ensure troops are well fed, accommodated, supplied and supported – the vicious circle of diminishing readiness and willingness begins to spiral downward, towards the abyss. Much has been said about the apparent paucity of Russian equipment in Ukraine – and even more has been said regarding the observation that quantity has a quality all of its own. Analysts will debate the relative merits of that argument for years to come. But another observation made by Gen McKenzie also has a direct bearing on events unfolding in Russia’s Ukrainian and US troops training in Germany in 2019 as part of Combined Resolve XI. (Photo: US Army/ Staff Sgt Tyrone Williams)
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