programmes for exploitation of liquefied natural gas (one of the nation’s principal foreign currency earners) must be on the target list for enhanced sanctions, as major players such as Shell and BP telegraph plans to exit the Russian energy sector. In part, such reconsideration may have something to do with the recent increase in doubts over the viability of some of these projects – particularly those focused on the recovery of Arctic offshore oil. But motivation is less important than results – for the paranoia surrounding Putin’s quest for respect will force the conviction in the Kremlin that the motivation is punitive rather than economic – and will inform the resulting response. The decision on 3 March by seven of the eight permanent members of the Arctic Council, effectively punishing Moscow in the Arctic region, by cutting cooperation and drastically reducing Moscow’s remaining avenues of engagement, could have counter-productive results for the West in the longer term. In the same manner as it appears we have now embarked on a Second Cold War, the fine strategic balance that has characterized the status quo in the Arctic might have disappeared – perhaps semi-permanently. Cut off from lucrative European markets, Russia must find markets elsewhere – and China looms large in Moscow’s thinking in this regard. But China is among those non-Arctic states – like India, the UAE and several ASEAN nations – that seek inroads into the region. And that, perhaps, is the single most destabilizing factor that effects the Arctic’s future. This is not simply energy-related: the ‘North-South Corridor’ project – a combined rail and sea transport initiative that has phenomenal potential to transform global shipping – would run from the Russian Arctic to the ports of the Indian Ocean – cutting transit times between Asia and Europe by up to 40% and fuelling Indian interest in supporting and investing in Russia. The Arctic Council’s raison d’être is to maintain the area as one of peace and tranquillity, leaving geopolitics outside the realm of consideration. The invasion of Ukraine changes all that, by disrupting the delicate balance of power. Increasingly aggressive behaviour by Russia – unless curbed – risks further and potentially radical change to that balance. Which can only be countered by paying greater attention to the defence of the Arctic – particularly by the United States and its allies – and by ensuring and assuring it through positive, well-founded and well-funded action. better, autonomous) airborne ISR capability that would provide a persistent power projection capability The Office of the Secretary of Defence published an ‘Arctic Strategy’ in 2019 which said, in part: “The US will acquire an agile, capable and expeditionary force with the ability to project power and operate within the region”. Lacking any itemized or allocated funding; with no commitment to any investment in infrastructure; absent any coordination of efforts, resources, aspirations or capabilities of the armed forces involved; failing to avoid duplication and make intelligent ‘best use’ of existing resources, there is little prospect of the strategy being any more successful than its eight year-old predecessor. What’s New? Nothing much, say some – particularly those who have no clue where the capability will come from to do something about whatever it is that might be new on closer examination. Evidence to the contrary, however, is rather plentiful. The ten commander of the Estonian Defence Force, now a Member of the European Parliament representing his nation, told an international audience at a Rotterdam conference in 2017 that “Russia is preparing for war – have no doubt”. Few argued with him then (although it was a diplomatic no-no to say so in public) – even fewer would do so now. More Russian aircraft threatened the Alaskan Air Identification Zone in 202 than at any time in the preceding 30 years NATO aircraft in the Baltic, over Iceland, in British airspace, are responding to increasingly frequent harassing flights by Russian aircraft. Russian submarine activity in the Barents and North Seas and the Atlantic is approaching the levels last seen at the height of the Cold War. The Arctic has long been held up in international fora as a bastion of cooperation – one of the last places in which the increasingly fraught relationship between Russia and the West has yet to spill over and start to exhibit more dangerous characteristics. Yet that is precisely what appears to be happening now, in the wake of Putin’s 24 February attempt at cannibalization of a sovereign, democratic state. The Russian invasion has already attracted enhanced sanctions from the rest of the world, led by the United States. And those will assuredly start to have a detrimental and rapidly escalating effect on the Russian economic, financial, political and societal domains. Russia’s huge Feature MT 2/2022 · 21 Constant exercises, training and rehearsing every aspect of winter warfare, are a sine qua non for NATO’s preparedness in defence of the Arctic. (Photo: NATO) A sight from a bygone era. A Nimrod MR2 overflying a British submarine in the Arctic. Now retired, their patrol, ISR and ASW functions are now being performed by P-8A Poseidons. (Photo: UK MoD/Crown copyright) f
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