Force, US Navy and US Army have all launched Arctic defence policy documents in the last couple of years. Which is definitely a step forward, despite the fact there is no attempt at coordination and absolutely no sign of adequate funding or resources to enable the transformation of rhetoric into reality. The US Navy published a ‘Strategic Blueprint’ in January 2021, seeking to defend US territory and deter aggression in the Arctic, at the same time as specifically seeking to ensure continued ‘strategic access’ to the area – presumably for underlying mineral and other strategic resources – and to strengthen existing and potential alliances. This will be achieved, the document suggests, by focusing R&D and procurement efforts on both unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) and buoys in support of mobile sensing and mine countermeasure missions, and by building what it terms “a more capable Arctic force”. Frustratingly but, perhaps, unsurprisingly, the service does not take the opportunity to spell out what such a force might look like, how the force mix might evolve or, indeed, how it might be funded. Glaring omissions in explaining how the service’s laudable ambitions for the Arctic include a fundamental lack of any support infrastructure to maintain and sustain the ‘more capable force,’ any dedicated Arctic port resources adequate to the sustainment of extended operations and a serious lack of ice-capable surface vessels – including ice-breakers. In addition, there is no explicit explanation of the role that naval aviation might play in any Arctic scenarios. ‘Regaining Arctic Dominance’ is what the US Army wants to do, according to the January 2021 policy statement it published under the same name. In typically straightforward Army fashion, it outlines a clear, unambiguous and bold strategy that rests on three complementary foundations: the defence of national territory (Alaska); the provision of reliable and well-resourced assistance in search and rescue (SAR) operations in the notably harsh Arctic environment; and the development and strengthening of new and existing international partnerships. An ’Arctic Multi-Domain Task Force’ will be established, reforming two existing brigade combat teams already operational in Alaska and equipping, training and readying them for extended, self-sufficient operations in the Arctic winter. This is in keeping with the ambition to “generate Arctic-capable forces, ready to compete and win in extended operations, in extreme cold weather and high-altitude environments”. There are several relevant programmes already under way that will support this strategy. One, the development of the new Cold Weather AllTerrain Vehicle (CATV), has attracted competent contenders in the form of the BAE Systems BvS10 Beowulf and ST Engineering’s Bronco – in the latter case, the Singaporean company has teamed with Oshkosh Defense to offer an appropriately customized variant for the Army’s purposes. However (there is always a ‘but’) there is no explicit provision in the strategy for the creation of the logistical support and associated infrastructure that will be necessary to underpin and enable sustained operations. With a rather simpler ‘Arctic Strategy’ title, the US Air Force published its plans in mid-2020, seeking to extend “power projection and [to] cooperate with partners”. The service commits to an expansion of its Arctic capabilities, as part of which it has already begun rolling out new satellite communications and data link abilities – notably the SpaceX Spacelink constellation of satellites, 10 of which have so far been launched. “To compete in the Arctic, you have to be on the field,” Gen Glen VanHerck, head of US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) told the House Armed Services Committee in April 2021 testimony. Ten spacecraft have been launched to date, and the General is confident the number will grow to three figures. The rather ambitious vision, though, seems marred by two fundamental capability gaps. The existing early warning system, while adequate for ballistic missile defence (at least, until hypersonic missile systems become more widely deployed by potential adversaries), it is far less so for the increasing levels of threat posed by intermediate range and cruise missiles; and there is an almost total lack of any current unmanned (or, far This inaugural Strategy lays out Defence’s approach to the region, in support of the wider cross-government Arctic Policy Framework, and reflects the importance of the region for the years to come.” Words to live by, perhaps? Certainly, a clearer recent statement of British policy towards the region – and a not-as-subtle-as-usual response to increasingly assertive Russian behaviour in the area – would be difficult to come by. With key strategic interests in the area, Britain’s policy towards monitoring, policing and defending the Arctic, as circumstances dictate, is one benchmark to consider. Washington Looks North A year ago, three Russian submarines – with a combined ‘throw-weight’ capacity for 48 ballistic missiles, each the potential carrier for multiple thermonuclear warheads – surfaced in concert close to the North Pole. In addition, combat aircraft and ground troops joined the ubmarines in short order – as part of the Umka 2021 exercise. The event drew a pointed and barely diplomatic protest from the United States, with Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, stating baldly that “[Russia is trying] to exert control over new spaces […] modernizing its bases in the Arctic and building new ones”. The Russian response, issued through Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, was far less diplomatic. “Everybody knows that it’s our territory, our land”. Given previous actions over Ukraine and Crimea in 2014 and, more relevant, the February invasion of Ukraine, that sets minds a-worrying. Probably rightly so. It is axiomatic that, to a nation with interests as global as those of the United States, the Arctic is of vital importance: economically, strategically, politically and militarily. Yet there is no cohesive, national-level strategy in place. Trump ignored the region, largely because it presented no opportunity for radical or controversial, vote-getting action. The Biden administration has yet to articulate a new departure from established policy, which might best be described as laissez-faire. The narrative, therefore, continues to be set by the only existing operative documents that underpin a strategy for the region – and they have not been updated since 2013 – in other words, since before Russia upped the geopolitical ante by virtually annexing Crimea. So the world has changed dramatically – but American policy in the Arctic has not. But – that statement does the US armed forces something of a disservice. While there is no overarching policy framework, the US Air 20 · MT 2/2022 Feature The threat. A Russian K-300P Bastion (SS-C5 Stooge) 3K55 Oniks-Yakhont ant-ship missile being test fired. (Photo: TASS/ Sergei Fedyunin)
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