12 · MT 2/2022 Theme: Training and Simulation In a sense, every global challenge of our time – from climate change to Covid, from political polarisation to mass migration – is now a security issue or, more accurately, can be used as a means of achieving a nation’s goals. What’s more, they’re more closely interconnected than ever. In some conflicts, the distinctions between war and what we used to call peace are also becoming more blurred. As a result, the operating environment becomes more ambiguous. The big changes include the increasing use of sub-threshold operations and the deployment of unattributable or non-state forces. Cyber attacks, increasingly sophisticated disinformation campaigns, developments in psychological warfare, the role of social media in driving public sentiment that influences policy decisions, the plethora of open-source intelligence material, the weaponisation of the civilian population to generate political unrest and refugee flows, and the availability of data on contributing factors like infrastructure and weather – all these things mean that we’re competing everywhere and all the time, even though open conflict may be less prevalent. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine is, in a very real sense, the end-stage of a much wider, longer lasting campaign that’s been being waged for years – politically, economically, technologically, psychologically and by proxy. But, just as technology and the general abundance of data is contributing to these challenges, they also offer an opportunity to help governments build their resilience and prepare for the next conflict, whatever form that might take. With more and more accessibility to data, the fidelity of Improbable’s models and synthetic environments increases, further unlocking their potential to reflect real-life scenarios accurately, and to drive operational readiness. MilTech: Where do the most glaring capability gaps lie? How easily or otherwise might they be plugged or bypassed? And to what extent does COTS – hardware and software – hold a viable answer? JR: Gaps lie in: • being able to make use of all our data (live data, historic data, covertly and overtly collected) more effectively and efficiently. To funnel this data into models, in order to calculate likely/possible outcomes. To fill in any gaps in data coverage, using data we already have; • being able to re-use models we already have; • being able to build new models, really quickly, that incorporate real- time data from inception. partners and allies. Government, industry and academia need to work together to bring out the best in one another to defend our way of life. At Improbable, this is why we get out of bed in the morning. Especially so since Ukraine. We feel we have something valuable to bring to the table. Ukraine reveals the multi-dimensional aspects of warfare, beyond the conventional considerations of military hardware and headcount: refugee flows, disinformation, cyber, weather, sanctions, infrastructure – all are playing a greater role than ever. Ukraine shows that even a well-drilled force, with modern equipment and a willingness to use indiscriminate force, can be slowed and stopped by terrain, by poor logistic planning, by under-estimating the population, by weather and by an adversary which doesn’t fight in a predictable manner - a failure to devote sufficient time to developing a true understanding of the operational environment. Ukraine also reveals – if anyone needed reminding – that things don’t play out exactly as you might imagine they would. Sometimes catastrophically so. You need to be able to challenge your plans and decisions before you act, and then be prepared to adapt rapidly as the situation changes. Collaboration between HQs and forces in the field, between government departments, between allies, and within alliances, is crucial. The more you can share access to a common operating picture with the same level of detail, to develop a shared/agreed understanding of the interdependencies, the better your decisions will be. The opposite leads to chaos, a breakdown in command and control and, ultimately, failure. MilTech: Hybrid, asymmetric, OOTW, low-intensity conflict, digitised warfare – are any of these accurate descriptions? Wherein lies the fundamental difference between warfare (as opposed to peacekeeping) in the 2020s and, say, 20 years earlier? JR: The essential nature of warfare hasn’t changed, but its character is constantly evolving, as each side seeks advantage. The world has become much more connected and interlinked – information flows almost instantaneously. This means that information war (Russians call it INFOWAR) has a greater place in operations, especially those in the sub-threshold space. The same information-age technologies that have transformed our societies, from private-sector satellites to smartphones, automation to autonomy, have had a similar effect on how we defend those societies. At the tactical level, an SSE easily lends itself to the development, rehearsal and perfection of small unit tactics.
RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy MTM5Mjg=