Military Technology 06/2021

region, SSKs will struggle to maintain a constant supporting presence. “When you look at the way Australia operates submarines, it‘s different from the way other navies operate SSKs. The Singaporeans, for example, when they sail out of harbour, they‘re essentially right in their operating zone. So things like AIP, that allow you to just sit and wait for three weeks, make a lot of sense. For Australia, however, we operate in a very diffe- rent way: we cover huge transit [distances] before we get into the AOO,” Hellyer pointed out. Even with a pump kit, the amount of fuel used to get to and from the AOO would limit time on station, and the RAN would struggle to maintain more than 2-3 boats on station at any one time. This would have been a factor influencing the Australian government, even if the SEA 1000 pro- ject had been running smoothly, but the programme had already run into issues. In early 2020, the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) reported that the programme was experiencing overall delays of nine months, even fter a re-baselining had pushed back various milestone dates. The signing of a Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) in February 2019 was almost 18 months late, and the timetable to complete a series of design reviews was not met. A lack of communication between the Defence Department and Naval Group regarding expectations at each stage of the process meant that relations between the two had soured significantly. Fortunately for Australia, the political situation in both the US and UK was conducive to the Australian approach requesting SSNs – the US advocating a tougher line against Chinese expansionism in the region, and the UK seeking a centrepiece for its ‘Global Britain’ agenda, following its exit from the European Union. With these three factors combining at the right time, the idea of the Australia-UK-US – AUKUS – partnership was born, becoming the vehicle by which the countries will deliver an SSN programme for an expected eight boats. An 18-month scoping study is underway that will map out a path and decide the best way to conduct a procurement programme. It is not yet clear what that might recommend in terms of design options, specific capabilities or industrial requirements. What is relatively, clear, however, is that, because Australia has no ambition or desire to develop a domestic nuclear industry, the reactors for the new SSNs will built overseas, ready for installation. This is consistent with Australia’s Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations. The Nuclear Option and Consequences But choosing to build SSNs is an even more difficult prospect than the ATTACK-class was, and raises all kinds of issues that Australia will need to resolve. If the Commonwealth thought that SEA 1000 was expensive, for example, the bill for a new SSN project will be astronomical, requiring constant government support over decades. It is not just the price tag of each boat, but the supporting infrastructure, nuclear safety, regulations, training and skills for sailors, both onboard and shore-side. This is what makes a cost estimate so difficult. key challenge here is, Defence is spending a lot of time, money and re- sources to get incremental improvements and there is an opportunity cost, if you‘re not putting those resources into areas of technology that could potentially give you those kinds of revolutionary improvements in performance,” he explained. Much of the equipment destined for use in the ATTACK-class was also to be installed in the COLLINS-class during its Life-of-Type Extension (LoTE) upgrade programme. The LoTE will give the COLLINS-class SSKs an extra decade of life through to the late-2030s ,allowing the first one to remain in service until 2038. Both the COLLINS- and ATTACK-class boats were expected to have the same main motor, use the AN/BYG-1 combat management system (CMS) and the Mk48 torpedo. The ATTACK-class was not expected to have an Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) system, lithium-ion batteries for increased underwater endurance, vertical launch cells for a larger we- apons payload, or even a large-diameter tube for unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) systems. With the SEA 1000 programme’s spiralling through-life costs reaching from the original A$50 billion ( € 32.2 billion) to an estimated A$90 billion, there have been questions as to whether the RAN would gain enough capability for the money it was spending, and whether this was an appro- priate method through which to meet the expected threats of the 2050s and beyond. Australia’s Unique Operational Requirements The problem is, that SSKs are mainly defensive weapons for local sea control. For a navy that has its AOO close to home waters, they are ext- remely useful. But for long-range expeditionary operations and the naval power projection missions that the RAN expects to undertake across the g COLLINS-class submarine HMAS RANKINS in the waters north of Darwin during AUSINDEX 21. The class will likely need a second upgrade programme, beyond the LoTE, to keep it operational until a new SSN enters service. (Photo: Australian DoD) The VIRGINIA-class submarine USS MISSOURI departs Pearl Harbor-Hickam to deploy with the 7 th Fleet in September 2021. This SSN is the most likely option for Australia, but is significantly larger than the British ASTUTEs – and more expensive – but would offer some commonality with the US operating in the Indo-Pacific. (Photo: US Navy) e 64 · MT 6/2021 From the Bridge