Military Technology 06/2021

Alternative Options? The prospect of leasing an SSN in advance has been touted by the Australian Defence Minister Peter Dutton, but Hellyer is sceptical, stating that “ There‘s nobody out there who has extra nuclear submarines in good condition,” and that the US Navy is building its VIRGINIA-class SSNs at a rate of two per year, just to keep fleet numbers level as its LOS ANGELES- class boats retire. He added that leasing a LOS ANGELES-class boat could be an option, but “they have been loved long and hard by the USN and are at the end of what the USN regards as their useful life. I am not sure we want to start our journey with nuclear propulsion with a 35-year old boat.” However, from a practical standpoint, the RAN may not have any choice in the matter. According to briefings from the Australian Defence Department, there are three options moving ahead. The first is to remain tightly in lockstep with the USN’s VIRGINIA-class programe; the second is to follow the UK’s ASTUTE-class programme; or, third, to buy or develop a different design. However, the tight production timeline to try and get the first SSN into service in the 2038-2040 timeframe means there is little scope for a new design, even by modifying any of the existing off-the-shelf designs. Moreover, following either the US or UK programmes also has its issues. Hellyer explained that both nuclear powers are in a transition themsel- ves, moving from one SSN class to another, which is expected to start from the beginning of the 2030s. The US is going to move from producing its VIRGINIA-class Block IV to the Block V variant, while the UK is going to start its SSN(R) programme to replace the ASTUTES. Australia’s choice is whether to stick with the current SSN designs, or to switch to the new boats. It could conceivably mean that Australia might end up with two different classes of SSN. It also raises questions about the role of Australian industry. SEA 1000 was designed to develop a sovereign industrial SSK manufacturing ca- pability as part of its continuous shipbuilding policy for the future. The submarine shipyard at Osborne North will have to be re-purposed to build a significantly larger platform – instead of a 4,500t BARRACUDA SSK, an ASTUTE boat comes in at about 7,800t and a VIGINIA at in excess of 10,000t – which requires significant additional works and facilities – but Australian component suppliers may be excluded from the project. “If you‘re taking a completely mature design off existing production lines in the US, every single component going into that is a US one […] The process for certifying a new piece and a new supplier is, like, three years long. So to what extent is there room for Australian industry to cont- ribute in any way other than just assembling a bunch of US components?” Hellyer asked. The choice to build SSNs is a massive decision, entailing huge ramifi- cations. Whilst it will provide Australia with a first-rate submarine capa- bility, it will come at a very significant cost, and at considerable risk to the RAN’s submarine capability in the interim. At the very least, industrial cooperation and programme management will have to be exemplary if the programme is to stand even a remote chance of success. Furthermore, one of the anxieties surrounding the ATTACK-class pro- gramme was whether the boats would be delivered in time to replace the COLLINS-class when they left service from 2038. The first ATTACK-class was due to enter service in 2034, if it had remained on schedule. While this was a risky oprion and left no room for any further delays, the SSN decision makes the situation significantly worse. “Australia is now even further away from having submarines than it was before,” Hellyer stated, highlighting that it has been 16 years since a Future Submarine project was announced in the 2009 Defence White Paper, and that this would have taken at least another 13-14 years before the first ATTACK-class boat was in service. Delivering a first SSN by 2038 to take over from COLLINS is unlikely’ and therefore the RAN will see a drop in submarine numbers and experience a capability gap. The government anticipates that moving to an SSN programme will add from two to four years to the original ATTACK-class delivery schedule, which means a first boat in 2038 or 2040 – in a best case scenario, in which the project runs on time. Unfortunately, this is unrealistic, as most defence projects – even those much less complex or problematic than building SSNs – suffer from cost overruns and delays. “I do have concerns about implementation and just staying on track,” Hellyer observed. Canberra has stated that it wants to start construction in the late-2020s to meet this schedule, but “there is no risk margin in that transition […] unless we can get access to nuclear submarines sooner,” added Hellyer. An ASTUTE-class submarine operating with UK Carrier Strike Group in 2021 (CSG21). This is one of the least risky design options available to Australia but, although cheaper per unit than the VIRGINIA-class, likely entails a significant departure from alignment with the US Navy. (Photo: UK MoD) From the Bridge MT 6/2021 · 65