Military Technology 06/2021

the technological and industrial support required to provide Australia with SSNs. Chinese expansionism, and the proliferation of SSKs throughout the Indo-Pacific region, were the main reasons SEA 1000 was initially concei- ved, with plans for 12 new boats to replace the RAN’s six COLLINS-class SSKs. However, the problem with SSKs is that they have reached the end of the road in terms of the technology that can be integrated and the levels of endurance they can achieve. The options are limited to adding more batteries, and increasing the fuel capacity to gain more operational time at sea – but this, in turn, increases the size and displacement of the vessel in order to accommodate the changes. In (Partial) Defence of ATTACK Naval Group’s BARRACUDA SHORTFIN 1A design, as selected for the ATTACK-class, is ironically an adaptation of its BARRACUDA SSN design, which forms the basis of the SUFFREN-class SSNs it is building for the French Navy. Displacing some 4,500t, the ATTACK-class was set to be the largest SSK yet built on the international market, and markedly larger than the 3,400t COLLINS-class, which is already a large vessel in SSK terms. Indeed, ATTACK would have been a very capable vessel and would have gone a considerable way towards alleviating the burden of the extreme distances that the SSKs would have to travel before reaching their Indo-Pacific area of operations (AOO). The ATTACK-class was ex- pected to be fitted with a pump-jet system, to allow a more fuel-efficient transit to the AOO. However, the capabilities that the boats were set to deliver by the time they were delivered from the mid-2030s through to the mid-2050s, were not set to offer anything particularly revolutionary. Professor Marcus Hellyer from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) told MilTech that there did not seem to be much of an impro- vement from the COLLINS-class. “It’s an incremental evolution […] The The decision by the Australian government on 15 September 2021 to cancel its existing SEA 1000 ATTACK-class diesel-electric submarine (SSK) programme, opting instead for a nuclear-powered submarine (SSN) solution, came as a shock to the international community. This was largely because the SSN option has been consistently ru- led out by successive Australian administrations, despite being seen by defence commentators as the most obvious solution to meet the Royal Australian Navy’s (RAN’s) submarine requirements, and to overcome the ‘tyranny of distance’ the service suffers from a geographical standpoint. Australia has an aversion to the development of any civilian or military nuclear industry, despite hosting huge deposits of uranium. There have been many advocates for the technology over the last several decades, but the opposition to it has been consistently vocal, and nuclear power was banned outright in 1998. Diesel to Nukes – a Rational Reversal? The submarine procurement decision also came as a surprise announ- cement because, although the SEA 1000 programme entailed a large de- gree of risk, and had experienced serious problems, despite being in its early stages, it was felt that the government was committed to the project – its largest procurement initiative ever. Canberra, the MoD and the RAN regularly referred to it as a “whole of government” effort. As a national endeavour, SEA 1000 was set to suck up huge amounts of funding. Further, it required the development of an industrial capacity – not just in Adelaide, but nationwide – and the training of a large skilled workforce over severaldecades. However, since the project was first initi- ated in 2009, and Naval Group selected as the prime contractor in 2016, the government has been fully committed to the programme. Until now. The dramatic reversal has been the consequence of three main factors. Firstly, the rise of China and, more specifically, the increase in the size and capability of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) as a cause of concern; secondly, the stuttering progress of the SEA 1000 project was a constant worry, with permanent concerns whether it would deliver to cost and on schedule; and, thirdly, the US and UK were both open to providing Resident in Auckland, New Zealand, Tim Fish regularly reports for MilTech on regional and wider defence issues. Tim Fish Australia’s SSN Programme From the Bridge MT 6/2021 · 63 An artist’s impression of the ATTACK-class submarine. Despite the risks of the programme, it at least offered a timeframe for replacement of the COLLINS-class. Abandoning that project has created a new level of uncertainty for the RAN. (Image: Naval Group)