Military Technology 06/2021

10 · MT 6/2021 THEME: Armoured Warfare The URAN-9 UGV, shown here with its 9M120 ATAKA ATGMs and SHMEL thermobaric rockets, was one of many unmanned systems tested during Zapad-21. (All photos: Russian MoD) a much more meaningful extent than was the case four years ago. This was to be expect- ed, given the foreign and domestic resistance faced by the Lukashenko regime since the contested election in 2020. Zapad-21 was also used to display some new technologies for the RuAF, as well as selected tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) and the context in which they were used. Unmanned Ambitions In the lead-up to Zapad-21, a number of Russian outlets reported on the anticipated use of the URAN-9 combat unmanned ground vehicle (UGV). It was apparent that Russian ef- forts towards the fielding of UGVs for combat purposes had taken a step forward, beyond the use of other types, such as the URAN-6 for demining missions. During Zapad, the Russian MoD reported that the URAN-9s had been used to provide screening for a motorised rifle brigade, allowing it to reposition. The UGV was also used to engage armoured vehicles at ranges exceeding 3km, using its 9M120 ATAKA anti-tank guided mis- siles (ATGM) and a sensor designed to detect the electro-optical sights of the target vehicles. The vehicles appear to have been controlled from a distance of 1.5km using a line of sight command link. The experience was presumably successful, as the Russian Commander-in-Chief told Red Star on 2 October that further URAN-9s would be delivered to the RuAF in 2022, allowing further trials to be conducted and the scale of procurement decided thereafter. However, it is still unclear whether the major issues that face all UGVs have been resolved – the range at which they were operated from is unlikely to be sufficient to ensure the survival of the crew, for example. Separately, the Russian forces appear to be experimenting with armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), such as a version of the medium-alti- tude long-endurance (MALE) ORION, which the Russian MoD calls INOKHODETS. According to TASS, it was used alongside FORPOST to deliver strikes against ground targets using guided missiles and on- board targeting systems in support of attacking forces. Other reports in- dicate that UAVs were used to deliver unguided munitions, which was likely achieved using a system similar to the SVP-24 GEFEST navigation and targeting sight that Russian Tu-22M3 strategic bomber and Su-24M ground attack aircraft are equipped with, enabling them to deploy dumb bombs with a level of accuracy that the Russian MoD has claimed to be equal to that of a smart munition. The SVP-24 has been used in Syria and, according to research published by the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) in 2018, it enabled the limited Russian air assets in the From 10-16 September, the Russian armed forces (RuAF) conducted the Zapad (West) 2021 strategic command staff exercise, simulating an imaginary regional conflict between the Western Military District and a coalition of NATO states. Its ultimate goal was to test the capabilities of the strategic command staff in the region, including their ability to form a unified C2 network integrating separate forma- tions, such as airborne units (VDV), assets from the Northern Fleet, the Aerospace Defence Forces (VKS) and second-echelon forces from the Central Military District. As such, Zapad’s focus was on challenging the upper aspects of C2, with the result that much of the tactical training is scripted and rehearsed. Zapad is also intended to signal Russia’s willingness to defend its partner, Belarus, and its ability to counter NATO forces more generally. To that end, it demonstrates force readiness and the extent to which Russian forces have been modernised. The exercise also serves to showcase new technologies; the previous iteration of Zapad in 2017 saw the widely broadcast display of the T-90M and T-80BVM main battle tanks (MBT) and the BMPT TERMINATOR tank support vehicle. This is also part of a signalling process, demonstrating that, while Russia may be behind NATO in some areas technologically, it is working to address those deficiencies in its own way. Zapad-21 was not much different from the previous iterations. Cooperation between Russian and Belarusian forces was portrayed as a significant aspect of the exercise. And, in comparison to the available reports from 2017, it does appear that the two forces worked together to Samuel Cranny-Evans Russia Showcases Capability at Zapad-21 Efforts Negate Technological Inferiority f