Military Technology 06/2021

Tomás Chlebecek The End of an Era: A Tale of a Warrior Diplomat It is a historic paradox that the year marking the 30 th anniversary of the Gulf War and the 20 th anni- versary of 9/11 and the Afghanistan campaign has seen the passing of two American legends and architects of “triumphs without victory,” , Donald Rumsfeld and Colin Powell. A Soldier’s Soldier General Powell was an embodiment of the American dream. A son of Jamaican immigrants from South Bronx, he pursued service in the US Army, leading him from a Reserve Officer Training Course through overseas postings in Germany and South Korea, then two combat tours in Vietnam. As a decorated infantry officer with excel- lent leadership abilities, immortalised in his 13 Rules , he went on to the prestigious White House Fellowship and became acquainted with a gener- ation of up-and-coming Republican icons. Four of them became Defence Secretaries – Donald Rumsfeld, Caspar Weinberger, Frank Carlucci, and Dick Cheney. Powell soon gained reputation as someone inevitably set to rise to the top. His unique bipartisan interagency experience started during the Carter administration as a military aide at the highest levels of DoD and Energy. He continued in the Reagan administration, under his ‘godfathers‘ Carlucci and Weinberger – a meteoric rise that created an extraordinary Washington career, with short interruptions to ensure field commands and fast promotions – V Corps (1986–1987) and Forces Command (FORSCOM, 1989). Powell moved to the White House National Security Council, first as Deputy National Security Adviser in 1987, then as Reagan’s last NSA (1987–1989). In the Bush 41 administration, he was initally offered either continuation at the NSC, Director of Central Intelligence, or Deputy Secretary of State. Instead, he became the youngest ever and first ROTC Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), after leapfrogging over 30 of his colleagues. Powell not only excelled in these top-level jobs, he made them bigger or redefined them once and for all, while being an effective gatekeeper and honest broker at the same time. As CJCS (1989–1993), he was assisted by the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, being the first serving his full two terms under the new legislation, and enjoyed an unusual level of autonomy. Reluctant Warrior Powell was present for the creation of the 1984 ‘Weinberger Doctrine‘ – now named after him – em- bracing the concept of using overwhelming military force to ensure vital national security interests. At DoD and NSC, he lived through the Beirut bombings (1983), interventions in Grenada (1983), Libya (1986) and Iran (1987–1989), then managed conflicts in Panama (1989), the Persian Gulf (1990–1991), Somalia (1992–1993) and two strikes on Iraq (1993). He was instrumental in the US-Soviet arms con- trol negotiations, leading to the landmark (now defunct) 1987 INF Treaty, 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) and never-implemented 1993 START II. He was largely responsible for the current size of the US nuclear arsenal and also for the 1991 Base Force blueprint, crafted to manage the post-Cold War defence drawdown. Instead, demands from the Clinton administration for a larger ‘peace dividend‘ led to the 1993 Bottom-Up Review, with a further re- duced force structure. Powell’s performance and stature warranted either a fifth star, a tour extension or further command (all done before). He even graciously offered to retire early. Sadly, the job he was uniquely suited for – NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe – eluded him. On balance, Powell contributed to serious failures in exercising US glob- al leadership, especially in Croatia and Bosnia (1991–1993). Paradoxically, he also inadvertently helped to create risk-averse military mentality, mani- fested during the Kosovo campaign (1999) and pre-9/11 counter-terrorism efforts. On the signature issue of Iraq, his track record remains mixed. Advocacy for an early end to Desert Storm, recognized at the time, helped to preserve key Iraqi military capabilities and the regime, leading to effec- tive partition of the country. Powell also failed to fully grasp his own “you break it, you own it” principle – that already happened in 1991. Unexpectedly, the Bush 43 administration gave him, Rumsfeld and Cheney a second career in a national security ‘dream team‘. What should have been a pinnacle turned out as a disappointment. He wanted to be Secretary of State (2001–2005) instead of pushing for the top Pentagon post. Had he done that, history could have been different; Rumsfeld was Bush’s second choice. Though still indispensable, Powell remained out- side the military chain of command for the campaigns in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003). Moreover, he and ‘Rummy‘ – both larger-than-life personalities and formidable bureaucratic players with large followings – engaged in similar State-Defence turf battles to those they witnessed during the Ford and Reagan years. As their outsize statures deterred and stymied dissenting or alternative voices, both men should have known better. However, General Powell’s place in history has long been all but assured. His lifetime of selfless public service has pawed the way for a generation of leaders above and beyond the military, and inspired many more. Always a trailblazing professional and humble gentleman, he made history. A national security, defence and naval analyst based in the Czech Republic, Tomás Chlebece k is a regular contributor to MilTech and Naval Forces . Comment MT 6/2021 · 9 Colin Powell 1937-2021. (Photo: US government)