Military Technology 06/2021

THEME: Armoured Warfare MT 6/2021 · 11 Green Fingers Ascribing particular importance to any of the developments shown during Zapad is likely an impossible task. However, if there is one tac- tical element worth considering above all others, it is the Russian use of mines. Multiple TTPs were demonstrated, such as fire traps, where- by the imagined enemy forces were drawn into pre-deployed minefields that were also rigged with additional trenches full of high explosives. The minefields were flanked by MBTs and artillery, waiting to destroy the un- fortunate opponent with massed fires from prepared positions. A new sys- tem to be involved in this process was the aptly named AGRICULTURE, an 8x8 truck carrying 50 rocket tubes, designed specifically to deploy a field of anti-personnel and anti-armour mines in a short space of time. Other concepts that the RuAF are known to have examined, at least at an academic level, include the deployment of mines by UAV, enabling them to respond to the movement of reinforcements by mining and channeling said forces into fire traps or other unsavoury situations. Like many of the RuAF’s TTPs and weapon systems, the use of mines and rapid mine-laying systems, such as AGRICULTURE, are designed to negate NATO’s technological advantages. On the one hand, they are intended to constrain and limit freedom of manoeuvre. On the other, they enable Russian armoured formations to fight from a position of relative advantage. A meeting engagement between NATO and Russian MBTs in a wide open field would not favour Russian tank designs, despite ex- pansive modernisation efforts. However, by forcing NATO to manoeu- vre through minefields and engage emplaced, heavy armour with close and immediate fire support, the RuAF is attempting to tilt the balance of means and forces in its favour. In sum, the four systems and attendant TTPs discussed above pro- vide a window into Russia’s operational concepts at the tactical level. They reveal elements of how the RuAF might seek to negate NATO’s technological advantage and prevent a rapid defeat in the field. However, it is important to note that operational success is considered to be the primary means of winning a conflict by the Russian general staff. The means used to achieve this include the massed use of precision guided missiles against critical military and economic infrastructure within NATO countries. The goal is to limit escalation of the conflict horizontally (its geographic reach), and manage that escalation vertically (the weapon systems involved) to prevent a conflict being ended on NATO’s terms, or to achieve victory if possible. So, while the tactical elements discussed above are important, they must be considered against the background of Russia’s operational outlook, and the way in which it would fight to control escalation of any conflict and shape it to suit its own forces. country to move from pairs of aircraft conducting strikes against a single target, to individual aircraft conducting multiple strikes in a single sortie. If a similar system is, indeed, in use with Russia’s growing fleet of armed UAVs, it follows that the Ground Forces are building some form of imme- diate strike capability that would provide a wider range of assets capable of reaching into an opponent’s operational depth. A New Epoch According to Michael Kofman, Research Director for the Russia Studies Program at the CNA , there is an assumption within the RuAF that conflict with NATO will mean a fight against a technologically superior opponent. The answer to this has many aspects, including doctrinal and techno- logical adjustments. One technological solution that the Ground Forces appear to be grappling with is the introduction of a new turret for their infantry fighting vehicles (IFV). The system that appears to have gained favour is EPOKHA (Epoch). This is armed with a 57mm LShO-57 automatic cannon, which is under­ stood to be influenced or based on the AGS-57 automatic grenade launcher, as well as four KORNET ATGMs and a munition referred to as BULAT (thought to mean steel). BULAT is a guided munition, about which little is known; eight are carried in a retractable launcher on the roof of the turret, and Russian news outlets have indicated that they are designed to engage structures and lightly armoured vehicles. The turret is also provided with an automated fire control system that supports target detection and tracking, according to the Russian MoD. A BMP-3 featuring the EPOKHA participated in Zapad, and was given the designation B-19, which has previously been associated with the KURGANETS IFV. A platoon of the vehicles was put into use to provide critical support at key points of the exercise, the Russian MoD stated. The intent behind the B-19 is not yet clear. However, it is possible that, in line with the supposition of technical inferiority, the RuAF are looking for po- tential force multipliers. Fielding EPOKHA may create a technical problem for NATO forces that requires greater focus than would be the case for a standard BMP-3M or BMP-2, the primary IFVs in Russian service. If this is the case, it follows that a small quantity might be procured, to exert a disproportionate influence upon the battlefield. SamCranny-Evans is a Research Associate at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in London, and a frequent contributor to Mönch publications. The BMP-3 armed with EPOKHA ,shown here, participated in Zapad-21 under the designation B-19. The combination may be a sign of the RuAF attempting to introduce force multipliers into service that can influence a battlefield to a greater extent than a standard IFV. AGRICULTURE was used to rapidly deploy minefields during Zapad, demonstrating a preference for slowing and funneling NATO forces into prepared positions. g e