Third, where possible, deploy in concert with other drone types or flying decoy missions to distract air defence surveillance. A mix of slow, low-flying drones and TB2s offers a particular challenge to SHORAD operators. According to a Blighter Surveillance Systems Short Range Air Defence (SHORAD) white paper published in early 2022: “The most difficult threat for radar sensors currently is low, slow speed drones with a small radar cross-section. These tend to operate in regions where there is ground clutter and precipitation clutter. Aircraft and missiles that are travelling at high speeds are well separated from this clutter in Doppler space, but slow small radar cross section drones are difficult to detect and identify... Features on drones, especially rotary winged drones, can affect detection where for example the rotors create Doppler side bands that are well separated from the body echo, and these side bands may be used to detect targets rather than the body echo, even when the drone is hovering or flying tangentially to the radar”. These challenges are not new, and industry has been racing to develop new detection capabilities in SHORAD units to detect and classify simultaneously a growing range of threats, from small drones to hypersonic missiles. But as the detection and identification challenges multiply, there is a growing focus on developing more flexible counter-measures. There are now 26 C-UAS directed energy programmes under way globally to provide the next layer of SHORAD protection against the growing drone threat. Outside the USA, France and Germany, the Middle East has recently become a global centre for development and deployment of directed-energy C-UAS systems, with R&D under way in Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the UAE. It will probably be two to three years before these can be deployed in significant numbers to front line units, however – by which time the drone threat will have evolved further. In the battle for dominance between drones and counter-drones, the drones remain two steps ahead. Manufacturers and operators of Mobile Short Range Air Defence (M-SHORAD) systems across the world will be watching the Ukraine conflict with special interest, asking themselves one key question: why has Russia’s relatively capable Pantsyr-S1M M-SHORAD system proved so ineffective against the seemingly modest threat posed by Ukrainianoperated Turkish-built Bayraktar TB2 unmanned air combat vehicles (UCAV)? The drone has acquired almost cult status among the Ukrainian military, following a stream of Twitter videos showing the destruction of Russian tanks and other armoured vehicles by TB2s acting as artillery spotters or as platforms for highly accurate laser-guided anti-tank missiles. But, in 2019 and 2020, this same drone was an easy target for Libyan National Army (LNA) troops who, with modest air defence capabilities, reportedly shot down over 20 TB2s operated by the Government of National Accord (GNA), using a combination of Russian-supplied Panstyr-SIM and ZSU-23-4 Shilka air defence systems. So what has happened in the last two years? Has the TB2 acquired new EW capabilities, as some commentators have suggested? Or has Russia’s military suddenly lost its ability to defend itself from drone attacks? The Russian army which invaded Ukraine on February 24 had (and probably still has) some of the world’s most formidable battlefield counter-UAS (C-UAS) capabilities. Air defence battalions were integrated into every combat brigade and equipped with an array of recently upgraded C-UAS weapons. These included the Pantsyr-S1M and Tor-M2, Igla and Verba IR-guided man-portable air defence systems (MANPADs), plus Stilet and Stupor portable C-UAS rifles, all supported by Borisoglebsk and Zhitel EW systems and R-934BMV and Silok-01 jammers. Since 2015, Russia has also been able to optimise the use of many these systems on the battlefields of Syria and Libya. But there have been several weaknesses to Russia’s C-UAS tactics during the attack on Ukraine. Russian forward elements have advanced without integrated C-UAS support, EW systems have not operated to their optimal capacity and Russian vehicles have often kept to the main roads, proving easy targets for TB2s, which can loiter for up to 27 hours and have a range of around 4,000 kilometres. Many Russian air defence systems were destroyed early in the campaign and have not been replaced. None of these factors, however, quite explain the toll that Ukrainian drones are taking on Russia’s ground forces, nor the ease with which these drones, especially the TB2, are now operating in contested areas. From Syria to Libya, from Nagorno-Karabakh to Ukraine, each conflict has increased the TB2 operator’s experience in evading SHORAD defences, with new technologies and tactics, which offer some stark challenges for SHORAD operators the world over. Specifically, Ukrainian TB2 operators have taken three lessons to heart. First, avoid well-defended static targets (most of the TB2 losses in Libya were during attacks on airfields and military compounds). Second, deploy the drone in concert with EW units. TB2s were key to the success of Turkey’s Operation Spring Shield in 2020, when the drones, supported by Aselsan KORAL EW units, proved very effective against Syrian forces. Rear Echelon MT 3/2022 · 3rd cover Philip Butterworth-Hayes is editor of the Unmanned Airspace “Global Counter-UAS Directory and Buyer’s Guide” (www.unmannedairspace.info/counter-uas-industry-directory/) Philip Butterworth-Hayes Battlefield Drone Operators Stay Two Steps Ahead of Air Defences
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