Military Technology 03/2022

The Ukraine conflict has highlighted the relevance and importance of artillery systems – both tube artillery and rocket launchers – not just as combat effectors, but as a tool for coercive diplomacy , even in the presence of sophisticated ballistic and cruise missiles. This is not necessarily a new phenomenon – but it is, perhaps, worth examining how both Russia and Ukraine are using their respective heavy artillery assets in pursuit of their military aims. In April, the Russian Defence Ministry claimed that its missile and artillery forces had hit four hundred targets in Ukraine overnight. In March, both Russia and Ukraine were using the 2S7 Pion 203mm howitzer – a 46t self-propelled system capable of reaching ranges in excess of 47,000 metres. In the case of Russian artillery, it appears they were used to engage civilian targets also. The heaviest and most powerful artillery system in use on either side, the Pion howitzers have wreaked havoc on Ukrainian cities and have reportedly been the systems causing the most casualties. Reports from Ukraine indicate that Russia is also using an improved variant, the MALKA, allegedly capable of mounting nuclear warheads. The use of such systems on high value Ukrainian targets – such as Kyiv or Kharkhiv – reinforces the argument that artillery is playing a distinctive role in the conflict, enabling Moscow to achieve its aims through coercive diplomacy. The use of systems such as Malka is helping the Russians achieve a conventional ‘assured destruction’ of critical targets. Leveraging lessons undoubtedly learned from its 1994 debacle in Chechnya, Russia appears to have recognised the benefits of widespread use of artillery in urban areas for gaining local control. In a recent article in the online journal The Conversation, Alexander Hill, Professor of Military History at the University of Calgary, suggests that “with Russian aircraft vulnerable to Western-supplied anti-aircraft weapons, this leaves Russian artillery […] in many ways, the principal Russian weapon in Ukraine”. Again, the Russian army appears to have learned from its successes, such as the 2015 battle of Zenopillya, in which Russian artillery completely destroyed two Ukrainian mechanised battalions in a notably short period of time. It also recalls the action at Debaltseve where, using Grad rocket launchers, Russia killed 6,000 Ukrainian soldiers. It appears that multiple rocket launch systems (MRLS) have become a critical component of the siege warfare situation now extant in Ukraine today, too. Both Grad and Uragan MLRS have been used in attacks on Kharkiv and other targeted cities, as has the Tornado-G MLRS, an upgraded version of the standard BM-21 122mm system. While sophisticated missile systems and aircraft have played a crucial role in Russia’s strategy in Ukraine, the role of artillery systems to force Ukraine to the negotiating table cannot be ignored. Current indications are that Putin’s fundamental strategy if based on a ‘land grab,’ and that he seeks to capture as much Ukrainian territory as possible prior to peace talks resulting in a favourable outcome – and is making significant use of artillery as a tool in that strategy. Moreover, Russian ground forces have suffered significant casualties and been forced to withdraw, leaving artillery to effectively hold ground – never a comfortable tactic. In fact, in March the British MoD was quoted as saying “Russia will likely continue to compensate for its reduced ground manoeuvre capability through mass artillery and missile strikes”. It would be overstating the case, however, to say that Russia is only using artillery for coercive diplomacy. While artillery is being used against high value targets to achieve a decisive victory, Ukraine also expects to create the same psychological effect with its own artillery – effectively, to coerce Russia into accepting a peace acceptable to Ukraine. That puts into context the recent Twitter appeal by President Volodymyr Zelensky for supplies of 155mm artillery systems and munitions. Canada has agreed to send four M777 ultra-light howitzers (used to great effect in Afghanistan by Canadian forces) to Ukraine, and Britain’s Prime Minster, Boris Johnson, identifying the struggle in Ukraine as an “artillery conflict” – at least right now – has also agreed to send artillery systems: unconfirmed reports suggest the AS-90 155mm system could be sent, along with 45,000 rounds of ammunition. The United States, too, has assisted Ukraine with heavy artillery systems and associated components. The delivery of such systems by Canada the UK and US, at a time when Ukraine was receiving only defensive weaponry from NATO member states, significantly increases the nation’s offensive capabilities. The Netherlands also plans to send German-made PzH2000 155mm self-propelled systems to Kyiv’s aid, while France is also transferring a number of 155mm Caesar systems. All these donated systems will enhance the Ukrainian ability to provide and sustain direct fire support in a conflict increasingly urban in nature. However the conflict in Ukraine turns out, it has already illustrated the intensified nature of urban warfare – the density of terrain, the inherent difficulties in discriminating between combatant and non-combatant personnel being just two of the multiple criteria of concern. Artillery has already played a major role in the confrontation, challenging traditional measurements of success and failure. Russian artillery, particularly, faces challenges as the conflict takes on a more asymmetric character, with more civilians becoming actively engaged in resisting the invasion. Ukraine, for its part, needs to consider how best to achieve effective coordination between artillery and manoeuvre units in an urban warfare context. Debalina Ghoshal Artillery as Coercive Diplomacy 6 · MT 3/2022 Comment Debalina Ghoshal is a Non Resident Fellow with the Council on International Policy, and author of over two hundred articles, papers and commentaries.

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