28 · MT 3/2022 Feature Tor M2 was designed by the Russian military specifically to destroy UAVs, as well as aircraft, helicopters, missiles, and other precision-guided weapons, flying at medium, low and very low altitudes in all-weathers. Although seen with Russian forces in Ukraine, its presence does not seem to have deterred employment of Ukraine’s drones. (Photo: Russian MoD) Counter-UAS Perspectives One critical question arising from observing the battlefield performance of drones in Ukraine is whether traditional air defence doctrine and organisation is effective against the type and scope of the threat that the UAS and LM present. The continued ability of both to operate and successfully execute missions, despite being faced by Russia’s tiered air defence, suggests it may well fall short in providing a C-UAS capability. The diversity of operating parameters, environments, potential numbers and even objectives of various drones self-evidently complicates appropriate countermeasures. Unlike aircraft or even missiles, defeating drones does not necessarily lend itself to a common solution nor to a centralised control approach. The ability of drones, as demonstrated in this war, to proliferate in the battlespace, appear unexpectedly, and observe or attack, has the potential to parallel the German ground force dilemma in Europe facing the constant threat of attack by Allied fighter-bombers. When even a single vehicle’s movement prompted air attack, Field Marshall Rommel confessed “air superiority made operations difficult or impractical”. Then, at least, darkness and poor weather might offer a respite from conditions that are not only not problems for today’s battlefield drones, but actually can enhance their ability to operate undetected. Facing this reliance on dedicated air defence systems holds the danger of have too few assets that, even if fully effective, will offer inadequate coverage. Each loss of one of these systems, as has occurred in Ukraine, would exacerbate these opening additional opportunities for ISR and attack drones. Current C-UAS The C-UAS inventory is a mix of disruptive and kinetic approaches. The former includes individual handheld and stationary systems that jam a drone’s control signals, spoof its navigation, or otherwise render it ineffective. A number of such systems are available, such as DroneShield, Russia’s Polve 21, or Sierra Nevada’s MODi RF jammer used in the US Marines’ Light Marine Air Defense Integrated System (LMADIS). Kinetic kill systems employ guns, missiles (Stinger, Coyote, 9M338), to physically destroy the UAS. Russia’s Tor (SA-15 Gauntlet) and the US Army’s IM-SHORAD both specifically included C-UAS as priorities in their target portfolio integrating capabilities, for detecting and neutralising these threats. Both Tor and Pantsir, another Russian air defence system intended to address small targets like the UAS, do not appear to have been able to provide adequate protection to its forces, although deployed in Ukraine. Osa, S-125 Neva, Pantsir-S1, and Tor, intended to provide anti-access area denial ‘bubbles’ over these forces, proved inadequate. It remains to be determined if this was due to limitations of the systems themselves, or deficiencies in the way they were operated. In any case, Ukrainian ISR and attack drones found ways to operate under, around, or despite these tiered defences. Forward combat elements, close artillery batteries, and logistics were particularly vulnerable without effective response, a condition compounded by the introduction of LM. Most did not have any indication of being targeted until rounds were impacting on them. Further complicating the defence, despite having not having to consider any real possibility of fixed-wing air attack and very limited concern over helicopter attack, the Russian air defences appeared over-stretched. Undoubtably this is in part due to the difficulties in covering mobile formations on the attack. Yet it also suggests the challenges presented by large numbers of widely dispersed UAS operating independently, with the flexibility to quickly capitalise on opportunities that may present themselves. Loitering Munitions or ‘kamikaze drones,’ like the ZALA Aero KUB-BLA, use ground launchers to get airborne and are often reserved for difficult high-value targets. KUB-BLA was first observed in Syria and is now being used against Ukraine. (Photo: ZALA Aero) f
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