laser homing rockets or missiles and electro-optics, including a targeting laser-designator. The attack mission requires preferably operating at higher altitudes up to around 5,000m, execution of the mission and a return to base. The Turkish Bayeaktar TB2, as successfully used by Ukraine, fits this category. A second is the loitering munition (LM), sometimes referred to as a kamikaze drone. Using a ground launcher positioned behind the front lines, the drone can circle using onboard cameras searching the ground below and sending video back to the operator. On identifying a target, he directs the LM to attack, destroying the target with the LM’s warhead. The AeroVironment Switchblade, as supplied by the US to Ukraine, and Russia’s ZALA Aero KUB-BLA, as recently identified in shoot-downs, are typical examples. Ukrainian forces have also attached bombs to small quadcopters, modified for carry and release over targets, in a local innovation. What is noteworthy about armed drones has been their ability to not only attack armoured vehicles in forward positions, but to attack and destroy supporting air defence systems with similar success. Tactical Implications Some observers have queried the apparent absence of Russia’s drones in the initial stages of the war – a concern that may be irrelevant, considering increasing reports by Ukrainian forces of sightings and shootdowns, and online video of Russian drones in the past few weeks. Yet, the experience of these drone fleets is worthy of attention. This is particularly true of the Ukrainians, considering they have been operating against the Russian air defence network, considered by most analysts as the most comprehensive of any army. It is also of interest since their fleet is of recent vintage – in 2014 they had not a single modern UAS – and remains small. Lt Col Yuri Ignat, a Ukrainian Air Force spokesperson, suggested in January that “All in all, Ukraine has approximately 20 Bayraktar drones”. Additional TB-2s have certainly been delivered since the war began, The conflict between Russia and Ukraine offers a new perspective on the use of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and loitering munitions (LM) on the battlefield. Previous experiences, such as their use in Syria, against an ARAMCO refinery, in the war in NagornoKarabakh in 2020, and even in Zelenopillia during the 2014 combat in eastern Ukraine, may have led to a number of misleading conclusions. These took place in specific, limited scenarios, amid circumstances such as a lack of effective air defence, as well as the initial benefit accruing to any new weapon when a defence against it is not yet well understood. Yet, it appeared clear that these systems present a new, serious threat for currently configured ground forces and, possibly, near-ground aviation also. As a result, there were many attempts to draw ’lessons learned’ and project conclusions from these actions. It also stimulated the development and pursuit of countless counter-UAS (C-UAS) ‘solutions’. Use of UAS and LM by both parties in Ukraine offers a wider perspective: not only on their capabilities and effectiveness on the conventional battlefield but, equally importantly, this broader combat experience highlights their potential influence, and the validity of tactical countermeasures being considered or introduced. The Drones The current Russian-Ukraine conflict offers the best representation of the tactical employment of ‘drones’ on future battlefields. In this case the expression ‘drones’ encompasses both those UAS used for observation and those intended to directly attack targets. The former, referred to as Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets, are intended to observe the battlefield, passing their information and images to ground stations. They range from airfield-launched fixed-wing designs to smaller, often VTOL quadcopters. Equipped with optical cameras, ranging devices, and navigation or positioning systems, they can also direct artillery strikes. Artyem Vyunnik, founder of Athlon Avia, the developer of the Fury UAS designed for the Ukrainian Army, stated in a 2018 interview that for this role “You need specific software for artillery calculations…using our drones we make one shot, then a correction, and then six guns shoot, and the target [is] destroyed. We are more efficient”. The accurate targeting by ISR drones patrolling the skies, coupled with precise positioning of the guns, makes artillery more effective. Establishing a direct link between the ISR platform and the battery, as practiced by the Ukrainians, also places rounds on target quickly, eliminating the time for a target to move. ISR drones can be extended range and endurance versions, like the AAI Shadow or Russia’s Orlan-10, to simple quadcopters, including commercial models. The former can fly 16hrs at 1,000m, to either operate deep behind the front or to loiter while seeking targets. These are midsized, around 3m wingspan, with sufficient payload for cameras and a laser designator. The latter are forward assets, staying relatively near their operators in order to maintain line-of-site link, and flying low, using terrain and their small size to remain safe. Armed drones are intended to directly attack targets, and encompass several concepts. In one, a UAS is fitted with hard-points for (typically) Stephen W Miller Countering Tactical UAS and Loitering Munitions 26 · MT 3/2022 Feature Side by side Recognising the revived threat to ground forces by the introduction of cruise missiles and UAS, the US Army launched an accelerated programme to field an air defence capability to accompany its manoeuvre forces. The Stryker M-SHORAD was fielded in 2021 to fill this requirement. It integrates MHR AESA radar, day/night sight, Longbow Hellfire missiles, Stinger missiles, and the XM914 30mm cannon in a Moog Reconfigurable Integrated-weapons Platform (RIwP). It is the first US Army AD system incorporating dedicated CUAS. (US Army and General Dynamics)
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