Feature MT 3/2022 · 13 Operations Network (DMON), combined with an air force’s culture and doctrine, also allow aircrew the opportunity to show initiative, leadership, confidence and flexibility. These human factors are difficult to quantify, but are important in differentiating the good air force from the mediocre. Today then, air power is clearly required as an important part of the combined force, but it is not the panacea that many had predicted; reality has not truly met the rhetoric generated by its evangelical supporters. Its capabilities are often overblown and decried by the ‘boots on the ground’ brigade. The truth is, like any form of warfare, air power has an important role to play, but is undergoing a slow decline due to the high cost of ownership and membership dues associated with being a member of the ‘air power club’. The other issue, of course, concerns the fragility of runways and the airfield’s support infrastructure. This is not a new problem. Witness the RAF’s Harrier Force deployments away from RAF Gütersloh to woods and service stations in the 1970s but, with the rise of long-range air- and ground-launched missiles, fixed runways are fast becoming a major liability. Like the Harrier Force, will the near future see more emphasis placed on dispersed operations? Having considered financial, logistical and technological issues, what about the political framework dictating how air power can be used? The Political Dimension During the 1991 Gulf War, US-led coalition forces had the full support of participaing governments, and air power was used as the military demanded, and in concert with allied ground forces. This success helped to salve the wounds of Vietnam, where the US Air Force was constrained and directed by Washington as to how air power was employed. The Gulf War was seen by many as the first Effects Based Operation (EBO), resulting from the work of Colonels John Boyd and John Warden, USAF air power theorists, who developed a codified method of defeating the enemy from the air by targeting what became known as the Five Rings – leadership; key industries; supporting infrastructure; the population’s will and resistance; and finally, the enemy’s military forces. The problem with theories is that people who have to interpret them often adopt a tick box, rote approach. The result was that the success of Desert Storm could not be replicated in the Balkans, because national participants could not agree common aims and therefore political factors thwarted the utility of air power in this particular instance. Some commentators, including Dr Peter Gray from the University of Wolverhampton, stated that, “air power did make a major and significant contribution” to securing the Dayton Peace Accord. Usually associated with ground operations, geography can also offer challenges to air operations. At either end of the spectrum are the flat, featureless deserts of Iraq and the forested undulations and mountains as well as urbanised areas of the Balkans and Ukraine. The latter provides plenty of cover to hide personnel and equipment and conceal AD weapons. THE Effect of Homo sapiens In discussing the efficacy of air power, attention should also be directed to training. As highlighted above, successful composite air operations are a result of many different types of air assets working together in a complex environment. As RUSI’s Justin Bronk recently highlighted, the poor performance of the VKS in Ukraine has been largely down to a lack of sophisticated and networked training simulators, in contrast to those used by allied air forces such as the US, UK, France and Australia. High-fidelity networked training systems, such as the USAF’s Distributed Mission A tactical advantage or a cost-saving measure? A number of nations are considering the concept of loyal wingmen. (Photo: Boeing
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