they were over the Western Front in the First World War. Air superiority – the ability to conduct air operations without undue interference or air supremacy – the ability to conduct air operations without interference – do not have to be strategic to include the complete theatre of operations, but can be applied locally, along with associated fly lines to and from the target area. To succeed, they demand a composite force to address C2, aerial refuelling, suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD), EW, AD and strike to ensure success and, often, integration with ground force deep fires. Although the VKS is now under the spotlight in Ukraine, the question of western air forces’ capabilities and robustness should also be examined, especially given the permissive environments experienced in Afghanistan and operations against ISIS in Iraq. Mounting operations against forces without a serious AD capability can lead to false lessons being learned or, worse still, complacency. That lesson was hoisted aboard by the RAF’s Tornado GR1 force during the 1991 Gulf War, where they lost eight aircraft, and by the VKS in Ukraine today. The latter also highlights the air power imbalance where a multi-million dollar strike aircraft can be destroyed by a $40,000 FIM-92 Stinger. In theory, by operating at medium level, strike aircraft can put themselves above the range of MANPADS, but that pre-supposes that air superiority has been gained by the neutering of longer-range SAM systems and AD C2 systems. This ability to destroy the enemy’s aircraft does not have to be achieved in the air, of course. As defence expenditure has generally declined over the past few decades, and the unit price of air platforms has risen, air forces procure fewer aircraft. These assets therefore become more valuable, both to their respective air forces and their destruction to the enemy so, in theory, this should generate a requirement for greater force protection. The vulnerability of aircraft on the ground was highlighted in September 2012, when the Taliban attacked Camp Bastion and destroyed six US Marine Corps AV-8Bs and damaged two others. It was also seen in the Falklands (Malvinas) conflict in 1982, when an eight-man British Special Air Service team destroyed or disabled 11 Argentine aircraft on Pebble Island. Airpower in the Run-Up to War? Those events occurred in warzones with numerous troops protecting the airfields. What about the scenario in which an undeclared war is preceded with an attack by special forces on a handful of key airfields containing a nation’s strike aircraft? leave the Next Generation Air Dominance programme? The quality versus quantity argument is alive and kicking. The cost-cutting associated with major aircraft programmes was also evidenced with the F-22 Raptor. The original procurement of 750 aircraft from 1994, was cut to 648. This figure was reduced again to 442, 339 and 277 before the then US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates cut the number to 187 in 2009. According to the air power strategist Martin van Creveld, between 1996 and 2008, the number of combat aircraft used by the “world’s leading air forces” was cut by one-third. It’s not just the cost of the airframe that needs to be taken into account. Spares to sustain the aircraft have become correspondingly more expensive, especially when one considers the added complexity of modern sensors, datalinks and weapons. The other factor is the cost of training and retaining the technicians to maintain and support the aircraft. The third factor is the cost of the weapons that the platform has to deliver, an issue that has been magnified over the years as ordnance has become smarter and correspondingly more complex. Unlike iron bombs that are relatively easy to manufacturer, weapons such as the AIM-120, AGM-158 JASSM, JBU-32 JADM and AGM-154 JSOW are expensive and take time to produce. As the price of aircraft, support and weapons increase, air forces can no longer afford to procure as many platforms as they once did, even as recently as two decades ago. This has resulted in the steep rise in development of surrogate unmanned platforms, such as the Boeing Australia Ghost Bat, and European programmes such as Tempest and the Future Combat Air System (FCAS). Such systems have yet to be deployed in anger, and so their efficacy is yet to be proven. There Are Known Knowns… What is known, and this seems to be a lesson that the VKS has forgotten in Ukraine, is that to exploit air power requires air superiority or air supremacy. These much vaunted maxims are as valid today as Ukraine has shown how $40,000 FIM-92 Stinger MANPADS can destroy multi-million dollar aircraft if air superiority is not won. (Photo: DVIDS) f The US is looking to cut back the number of F-35s that it is buying as a cost saving measure. (Photo: Trevor Nash) 10 · MT 3/2022 Feature
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