power has delivered success, often in concert with ground or maritime forces. Equally, there are occasions when it has failed. Perhaps the first failure was one of expectation. According to air power proponents such as Douhet and Mitchell, air power would be able make armies and navies redundant, by striking at a nation’s means to make war and destroying civilian morale. History has shown that air power failed to live up to these early expectations. Superficially then, air power seems to be that ‘wonder weapon’ that can potentially solve all exigencies but, alas, for a number of reasons, it is no panacea. An examination of the Russian Aerospace Force’s (VKS) performance in Ukraine will testify to that. The rhetoric surrounding air power’s inability to deliver battle winning ‘shock and awe’ capabilities 24/7 can be grouped under a number of headings that include financial, political, logistical, technological and geographical. Investment Imperatives From the financial perspective, combat aircraft have been getting more expensive over time. This has occurred through general inflation, so-called defence inflation and the fact that, as aircraft have evolved, increasing amounts of technology, typically stealth materials, smart weapons, ISTAR and datalink systems, have been added. Using 2017 constant US dollars as a benchmark, in 1956 an F-4 Phantom cost $20 million. In the early eighties the F-16 Falcon cost $3540 million, while the unit cost of an F-18C Hornet was $65 million, the same as the F-15 Strike Eagle. Today, the F-35C Lightning II tops out at $138 million but even that is overshadowed by the F-22 that back in 1998 cost $250 million. The Numbers Game This does raise the question of nations potentially rowing back from procuring such expensive platforms. In the US, for example, that country’s stated acquisition of 1,763 F-35s is coming under scrutiny. Work on the F-15EX II as a successor to the F-16 is underway – and where does all this In comparison to land and sea power, air power has only been part of the military lexicon for a little over a century. During that short time, the technologies underpinning and supporting the air domain have grown exponentially, and accelerated the machinegun-firing, 80mph biplane of 1914 to the modern 5th-generation strike platform capable of Mach 3+ and firing BVR [beyond visual range] hypersonic missiles. Although platform and weapon technologies have improved to make the modern aircraft more lethal, the question often asked is, has air power’s utility intrinsically increased at the same rate as these generational improvement to performance? In answering this question, we must define what we mean by air power, consider its characteristics and look at what it can achieve. According to the US Air Force Air University at Maxwell AFB, “air power is the integrated employment of all air and space forces to control and exploit the air and space environments to achieve national security objectives”. This somewhat broad definition goes on to say that air power “exploits the properties of its operating medium to realize unique operational characteristics and thus employ unique capabilities to provide the nation [with] a broad range of military options” In “exploiting the properties of its operating medium,” the characteristics of air power come to the fore. These are numerous, but air forces widely agree that the main elements are height, speed, reach, agility, concentration and ubiquity. These characteristics are fine in theory, but “concentration and ubiquity” obviously require mass and numbers of platforms to achieve that mass. Finally then, what can air power achieve when employed at the strategic, operational and tactical levels? As far as strike aircraft are concerned, on which we focus here, air power can destroy, degrade or disable physical resources; isolate or channel military forces; influence or modify behaviours at the military or political level; and, finally, it can reassure, persuade, deter or generally coerce at the political, military or civilian level. Great Expectations It should also be appreciated that those that champion the doctrinal benefits and utility of air power are the air forces themselves. Objectivity in such discussions is often lacking. However, history has shown that air With a military, industrial and journalistic background encompassing air defence, air power and training and simulation, Trevor Nash dissects and reassembles issues for MilTech regularly. Trevor Nash Shrinking Horizons – Threats to Air Power 8 · MT 3/2022 Feature A VKS Su-35 air defence fighter was introduced into service in 2014. (Photo: Rosoboronexport)
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