Early on the morning of 24 February, Russia conducted airstrikes, then followed up with a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, involving all branches of Russia’s military potential. This aggression was preceded by large-scale military exercises near the Ukrainian borders, where Moscow had been massing its troops for months. Before the invasion, many Western leaders tried to communicate with Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, aiming to reinvigorate the Minsk agreements, and ensure that military escalation did not become an option. The key efforts were led by French President Emmanuel Macron. French diplomacy, however, proved to be insufficient. Numerous Western analysts – including this one! – considered that a full-scale invasion would not be a suitable option for Moscow, given the high military and economic costs involved. Thierry Burkhard, Chief of the French Defence Staff, has also recently acknowledged that the French intelligence services’ assessment differed from the so-called Anglo-Saxon conclusion, saying that they believed that the “conquest of Ukraine would have a monstrous cost, and that the Russians had other options” to make President Zelensky and the Ukrainian government fall. He also noted that the invasion “was not a surprise” per se. This raises two questions. The first concerns the difference in assessments, which lies partially in a certain degree of caution vis-à-vis US intelligence, inherited since the 2003 war in Iraq. In other words, the lack of trust between Paris and Washington plays hand in hand with revisionist and rogue states like Russia. The second question is – if we knew that Russia would invade Ukraine, why haven’t we significantly boosted Ukraine’s air defence capabilities – and why have we waited so long to deliver anti-tank missiles, the deliveries of which began just weeks before the invasion? Why didn’t we help Ukraine to avert this war, by significantly improving the country’s military capabilities? The answer is rather obvious. The collective West opted for dialogue. However, history, including the most recent, teaches us that diplomacy alone – diplomacy unsupported by overt strength – does not work with Russia. Moscow has been planning this invasion for some time already and has been thoroughly deceitful – even just a few days before attacking Ukraine, openly misleading President Macron during his visit to Moscow. Since 2008, we have been pursuing the logic of diminishing the risks. But by pursuing this, and by trying to reset relations with Russia on numerous occasions, we nourished a sense of impunity and permissiveness in Moscow. As a result, we have achieved a major war in Europe started with no legitimate reason by Russia – a UN Security Council member and arguably the second nuclear power in the world. Throughout this recent period, and even over the preceding months, we have been trying to analyse Russia through our own prism and logic. Fundamentally, however – we have misread Russia. We were trying to appease but ended up in helping engineer a war. Russia’s anti-West stance is nothing new – it manifested itself for the first time in relatively recent history in 1999, when Russian troops captured the Slatina Air Base in Kosovo. We have miserably misread Russia – and simultaneously over- estimated its conventional military capabilities. But we also under- estimated the Ukrainian armed forces, which are fighting a defensive war rather successfully. As of today, Russia has failed to establish air superiority in Ukrainian skies, and has not managed to capture the Hostomel airfield north of Kyiv with the use of its special forces to establish an air bridge to quickly transport its troops. The Russian army appears to lack morale and seems unable to provide the efficient logistics needed to support prosecution of the initial plan – to quickly capture Ukraine. Moscow envisioned a ‘blitzkrieg,’ but 10 days into its invasion, no strategic city has been captured, and the Russian army has suffered heavy losses. So it’s time to address the major question – what we can do for Ukraine? First, we have to destroy the Russian economy – make every Russian citizen feel the consequences of Putin’s decision. Second, we have to fully understand that Ukraine will continue to fight, and that Russian troops are not welcome there. We have to start being serious and supply aircraft, air defence systems and all possible modern weapons – if we are not willing to ‘close the sky’. We also have to start asking questions. Will the European Union become a tangible geopolitical unit, able to defend itself and project power in a world where treaties and agreements are no more? How will the West address Russia’s growing appetite – and potentially defend Finland and Sweden? Will Article 5 of the Washington Treaty work? We are rather left with unanswered questions and uncertainty, while trembling every time Moscow raises the spectre of nuclear arms. As for Russia, it seems set to continue its drift into isolation and decline on the margins of Europe and Asia with no tangible prospects. The world we grew up in is no more. The world order has been destroyed – welcome to the brave new world. Denys Kolesnyk Brave New World 6 · MT 2/2022 Comment A specialist in information warfare and in all matters Ukrainian, Denys Kolesnyk reflects on the most recent events absorbing world attention. Not all Putin‘s vaunted equipment has necessarily worked as advertised. (Photo: Atlantic Council)
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