technologies, battle management systems and the latest interceptors and effectors. The Air Force Assessment, Coordination and Engagement Branch at the Joint Air Power Competence Centre (JAPCC) noted in 2018 that the robustness of modern IADS goes even further. They can operate in either standalone or joint targeting modes, using network- centric warfare type tactics, while deriving the air situational picture (ASP) from existing, distributed sensors. “Systems of this kind can be integrated with airborne platforms for centralised C2, making it difficult to engage them,” JAPCC stated. This is why SEAD functions constitute a strategic imperative. The Way Ahead Anti-Radiation Homing (ARH) missiles – along with reconnaissance, stand-off jammers and other Electronic Warfare (EW) assets, will continue to form an integral part of modern air forces’ strategic capability to counter these threats. A key driver is Northrop Grumman’s Advanced AntiRadiation Guided Missile (AARGM), which will be capable of engaging traditional and advanced land- and sea-based air defence systems, as well as engaging non-radar time-sensitive targets. The AARGM is the result of observations made and experience gained during air operations in Kosovo, Iraq and, perhaps, Libya. During these conflicts, surface-toair radar tactics and capabilities shifted in such a way that the existing High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM) used by NATO air forces in a number of SEAD campaigns demonstrated deficiencies in the ability to hit radars. The AARGM now coming on stream with selected NATO air forces will be capable of engaging both traditional and advanced land- and seabased air defence systems, as well as engaging non-radar time-sensitive Air power today faces completely new species of surface threats – threats that will certainly influence doctrine over the next few years – or, perhaps, even decades. Emerging Risks The risk is real: the attack on Ukraine ordered by Russian President Vladimir Putin on 24 February illustrates for us the role of counter-air defence capabilities in a military conflict. In the very early phases of the attack, the Russian military was able to unroll quick and effective counter-air defence measures – in the West widely known as Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD) – that lead to a so-called “complete annihilation” of Ukraine’s ground-based air defence (GBAD) systems. The majority of the nation’s short- to long-range surface-to-air missile systems were operated as ‘standalone’ systems, often sparsely distributed along Ukraine’s northern border, rather than in the form of a densely-distributed, cohesive air defence system, as operated by the Russian military in large tracts of the Northern and Western Military Districts. Ukraine’s air defence systems consisted of Soviet-era systems, including S-300PS/PT (SA-10), 2K12 ‘KUB’ (SA-6), 9K37M ‘BUK M-1’ (SA-11) and 9K330 ‘TOR’ systems, some of which, like the SA-10, were faced with significant mobility problems. What made it an easy task for subsequent precision strike by specialised counter-air defence aircraft was the fact that the Ukrainian air defence radars are well known to Russian Air Force pilots, who routinely train to counter them. However, the threat of so-called integrated air defence systems (IADS) is real. IADS are typified by a highly modular design and open system architecture, allowing for the introduction of advanced multifunction radar Stefan Nitschke Counter-Air Defence Capabilities MatureCountering sophisticated ground-based air defence systems is taking on a more challenging complexion in the 2020s. (Photos: NGIS) 52 · MT 2/2022 From the Bridge
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