MT 2/2022 · 1 With all eyes focused on events in Ukraine for the last month, levels of uncertainty have changed not one iota. We still have little idea of how we really got to where we are now, and even less clue as to where we are heading – except, according to much of the media, to Hell in a handcart. Or, incidentally, why. We suggest that how we got here is not that difficult to determine. Vladimir Putin fundamentally – catastrophically – miscalculated almost every aspect of the situation in Ukraine, and in Russia. Driven by what appears to be his principal motivation – a feverish, obsessive desire for respect – he under-estimated the Ukrainian people, their resolve and their passion for the freedoms they have enjoyed since the break-up of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. He also badly under- estimated how much they have learned since his illegal occupation of Crimea. Coupled to an implacable will to resist and a native propensity to innovation (one senior NATO officer referred to the Ukrainian armed forces recently as “downright sneaky,”) the training that various NATO nations have provided in recent years has given rise to a defiant, capable force that seems destined to continue to inflict disproportionate losses on Russia’s legions. Legions that appear, as far as can be gathered from open sources, to be astonishingly inept, no matter their numbers, their strength or the shiny new nature of their equipment. In a war that is characterized by unprecedented volumes of disinformation, propaganda and ‘fake news,’ the exact nature of the losses inflicted are – and will continue to be – the subject of claim, counterclaim and heated debate. It does seem relatively safe to assume, from Ukrainian, European and US sources, however, that Russian losses in personnel amount to somewhere between 7,000 and 14,000. Moscow acknowledges just 500 casualties to date, leaving unanswered the question as to how it will conceal the actual numbers from a sceptical Russian populace, once the body bags come home. Putin also miscalculated the extent and depth of fracture lines in Europe, and the resolve of the United States. He depended on German reliance on Russian energy supplies; Quo Vadis, Humanus? Editorial With a theme for this issue of training, as we head into the latest iteration of Europe’s largest dedicated military training conference and exhibition (IT2EC in London, 26-28 April), it is worth reflecting on one salient fact emerging from the current conflict. It seems evident that the Russian forces engaged (and there is some debate as to their quality and readiness) lack what the retiring US CENTCOM commander recently described as “middle management:” the NCOs and staff officers who, in other armies, ensure things actually get done. We predict, with a degree of certainty, a lot more discussion in coming months and years regarding the benefits of training junior leaders well, and empowering them with the competence and confidence to execute independently. The outcome of this attempted cannibalization of a sovereign nation is uncertain – except that, eventually, there will be some form of peace. Whether that turns out to be a peace that Ukraine can live with – or that Putin can ‘spin’ as a victory – remains to be seen. But one result seems inevitable. With the moves that NATO has made in force dispositions being described as “permanent – not temporary” by Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, it seems likely we are now embarked on a Second Cold War. Tim Mahon Editor-in-Chief he assumed NATO would indulge in endless fence- sitting long enough for him to engineer a lightning strike to decapitate the government in Kyiv and present the world with a fait accompli; he believed that a deeply divided America, tired of foreign entanglements, would flatly refuse to support Ukraine except rhetorically. More seriously, he also miscalculated the veracity and even the foundation of the intelligence he was receiving. The arrest of senior leadership in the foreign intelligence directorate of the FSB, Russia’s security service, shows two things: one, that his underlings lack the moral courage to tell him the truth, spinning their reports, instead, to reflect ‘what the boss wants to hear’; and, two, that he is already seeking scapegoats to shoulder the blame for the probable defeat he is now seeing gallop over the horizon – accompanied by several other horsemen – recession, fiscal disaster, economic hardship and vastly increased political dissent. Too many analysts and commentators (including this writer) were caught flat-footed by Putin’s literally breathtaking decision to invade – despite what now appear to have been frequent and increasingly vociferous warnings from both American and British intelligence sources that a border incursion “at scale” was a very real probability. Another miscalculation centres on the effectiveness of Russian forces. The money the Kremlin has spent on high-tech equipment (at least some of which appears not to have lived up to expectations, and rather more of it seems not to have appeared at all in theatre) seems not to have delivered the anticipated results. Or, perhaps, the western equipment that has made its way into Ukrainian hands has been rather more effective than advertised.
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