Military Technology 05/2021

In terms of infrastructure, the future operational C2 centre is expected to be built, by 2025, as near to the CNES Space Centre in Toulouse as possible, bringing together teams from the Military Satellite Observation Centre (CMOS) and the Operational Centre for the Military Surveillance of Space Objects (COSMOS). These units are currently based in Creil and Lyon and were attached to the Command in summer 2019. Further military assets will have their capabilities enhanced, such as the GRAVES satellite detection radar system, on the cusp of modernisation. The CNRS TAROT scientific telescopes, one of whose missions is to monitor space debris, will also be used within this new force, and the number of operati- onal telescopes expanded. According to French Air Force figures, 67% of guided munitions launched operationally worldwide have been supported by satellite-based images (for localisation) and GPS (for guidance). Such dependence on spaceborne assets reiterates the importance of space to France, but also explains the country’s deep commitment to programmes such as the GALILEO navigation system, which allow for greater auto- nomy when it comes to supporting military operations. The Future In addition to monitoring, the French government does not exclude the possible augmentation of its force with kinetic effectors, under Action and Resilience in Space (ARES) programme, launched in 2019. This incorpo- rates research to enable France to improve its response capabilities in space by 2030. According to official statements by the defence minister and high-ranking officials, kinetic solutions to counter malicious activi- ties will be evaluated, including satellite-deployed high-powered lasers or machine guns capable of destroying the solar panels of an approa- ching satellite. Paris is admittedly lagging behind the other space powers in anti-satellite weapons, but the government earnestly seeks to fill the gap. France might be smaller than the so-called ‘space superpowers,’ but the nation’s pertinent bodies have a sound understanding of the situ- ation, and well-founded ideas about solutions to enhance the security of French military and civil assets. Other European countries, such as Great Britain, Germany, and Italy, have valuable space assets that could provide a foundation for (or contribute to) national or Europe-wide space forces. Yet only Paris has so far stepped up and committed to the creation of a proper space force in line with today’s trends – with UK Space Command now running a close second as the British government steps up its own commitment to space. been followed by facts, as the Loi de Programmation Militaire 2019-2025 assigns € 4.3 billion for military space activities. Some French members of the European Parliament Members have also brought the issue to the attention of the EU, trying to obtain greater EU commitment for a conti- nent-based approach to space capabilities. At the military level, The CIE groups all national defence-related space capabilities, and is responsible for France’s military space policy. To meet this responsibility, it consists of six main offices – an operations centre; a joint space operation centre (EMIE); spatial politics and cooperation (BPOL); forecasting and planning (BPAV); employment and coordination (BEC); and space situational awareness (BME) – manned by a few do- zen servicemen. Some 60% of the work is in forecasting and strategic planning, with 20% dedicated to current space operations, and the rest split amongst the other functions. Although the share of space operations might look low, intelligence and analysis functions are actually performed by the Direction du Reinsegnement Militaire (DRM), which receives rough data from CIE through liaison officers. In practice, French military capabilities in space are based on twelve satellites, including four earth observation satellites (two military-owned HELIOS and two PLEIADES in cooperation with CNES), four electronic intelligence satellites (ELISA), and four communication satellites (two nati- onally-operated SYRACUSE III, and ATHENA-FIDUS and SICRAL-2, joint- ly with Italy). In addition, France has agreements with Germany and Italy for exploiting the radar-imaging capabilities of the German SAR-LUPE constellation (five satellites) and the four satellites of Italy’s COSMO- SKYMED. The total military workforce involved in space activities reaches 1,000 personnel. France is already committed to replacing aging satellites and to ex- panding its space capabilities. SYRACUSE III will be replaced by two SYRACUSE IV satellites by 2023, and the four observation satellites will be replaced by the MUSIS programme. The first MUSIS satellite was launched in December 2018, the second in December 2020 and the third is scheduled for October 2021. The ELISA constellation will be replaced by CERES, starting in October 2021, consisting of three small satellites tasked to intercept radar emitters, flying in formation, to triangulate the position of targeted radars. Industrial capabilities are provided by companies such as Arianespace (launchers ARIANE-6 and VEGA/VEGA-C), Airbus Defence and Space France, Thales, Thales Alenia Space France, CapGemini, CS-SI, and a breeding ground of more than 180 small and medium enterprises (SME/ PME). Satellites support French operations worldwide. For instance, earth ob- servation satellites provide France with roughly 42,000 images per year, (120/day). When MUSIS becomes operational, the country will be able to expand its capabilities up to 650 images/day. In the communication sec- tor, France deploys 51 satellite communication terminals in its overseas operations. Marco Giulio Barone is a political-military analyst based in Paris, and a regular contributor to Mönch publications. Exercise ASTER-X is the first French drill simulating space warfare scenarios, led by the CIE. Military Space MT 5/2021 · Special Supplement · 39 Rendering of CSO optical reconnaissance satellites, intended to replace the ageing HELIOS spacecraft.

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