Military Technology 05/2021

space scenarios in all its major drills, including communication, radar jam- ming and anti-jamming techniques, disruption of space-based navigation systems and launch of anti-satellite weapons. Some exercises incorpo- rate teams of hackers attempting to infiltrate enemy satellites, to spy on them and/or to disrupt their capabilities. Russia’s Aerospace Forces may appear less threatening in terms of space weapons, yet their space assets are known for the ability to search for, locate, track and characterise space assets operated by potential enemies, with the US (naturally) at the top of that list. Russia also plans to develop laser weapons able to damage enemy satellites in low Earth orbit (LEO), with preferred targets including satellites supporting the Prompt Global Strike system – the Pentagon’s asset for attacking virtually any target in the world within 30 minutes. The rapid expansion of space economic activities, and the perception being directly threatened, drove the US to re-establish a space command (USSPACECOM) under Strategic Air Command in 2018. In addition to the main countries perceived as a threat, the commu- nity of space users is broad enough that it is unlikely all of them will be politically aligned in the future. As of today, six countries possess navi- gation satellites, 38 have ISR and remote sensing or scientific satellites, and as many as 45 already operate communication satellites. The good news is that anti-satellite weapons and launchers belong to a small club of space powers only. The Curious Case of France’s Space Command Although the French government (and people) will never admit it, France is a medium-sized power that cannot afford direct autonomous confron- tation with present and future geopolitical superpowers. The country lacks size and resources. With its € 2 billion annual investment in military and civil space, France is still far behind the leading trio in the sector: Washington invests S50 billion dollars annually in space, Beijing $10 billi- on and Russia $4 billion – according to French government figures. Paris’ decision to establish a space command may seem somewhat surprising, therefore. In fact, in 2009, seven years after the closure of USSPACECOM, France was the first country to feel the need to revive military understanding of space issues. The Commandement Interarmées de l’Espace (CIE) is a joint command, directly subordinated to the Defence Staff, and was officially constituted in July 2010. In 2016, then CIE com- mander, Gen Jean-Daniel Testé, estimated that each European or North American citizen would need 47 satellites per day simply to access GPS- powered apps or surf the internet. In April 2018, a study conducted by the Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales (CNES) revealed that, should GPS experience a temporary failure, up to 10% of French GDP might be lost in just a few hours. Subsequently, Defence Minister Florence Parly has repeatedly stressed that space should be considered a fourth operational domain, and that space warfare capabilities must expand. Words have Space is of increasing importance in state planning, due to fluid geo- politics and economic relevance. A growing community of nations feels the need to establish dedicated space commands, in an effort to master the security dynamics associated with so vast an opera- tional environment. Within the soi-disant ‘West,’ the US and France have decided to establish dedicated commands for space warfare and to develop specific warfare techniques, with Britain being the latest to join this exclusive club. Space and Power Politics The latest lap of the space race is just beginning, a fundamental rea- son being the value of related markets; the space sector has a current market valuation of $350 billion ( € 295 billion), with growth projected to reach an astounding $3 trillion by 2050. In the long run, therefore, states will naturally want to have a say in such a market, possibly influencing its governance and rule sets. The US is the first space superpower, deploying the largest number of satellites, possessing proprietary technologies, and cultivating significant ambitions in terms of space exploration. As a consequence, if the US military seeks to maintain an edge over adversaries, it cannot lag behind competitors. So, when China and Russia established space commands – suggesting they would serve well to counter American supremacy in space – Washington realised it could not sit on the fence. Military concentration on space has risen since 2015. China created the People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force (PLASSF), a dedicated command that groups space assets, cyber weapons, and EW capabili- ties. This combination of capabilities under a single commands suggests that China envisions the integrated use of kinetic, informatic, and elec- tronic weapons. US intelligence sources deem China’s space command to be far more than a cosmetic approach. The PLA already incorporates Minister of the Armed Forces Florence Parly delivers a speech ahead of the launch of a military satellite. (All photos Ministere des Armées) Marco Giulio Barone Space Warfare ‘à la française’ France’s Space Command in the making 38 · MT 5/2021 · Special Supplement