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Space Forum                                                                              MT 12/2018 · 53


              The committee was worried that without significant reorganisation, the   and holding the Deputy Secretary of Defense responsible for their “full and
            US would lose its edge in space as a war-fighting domain, citing the head   faithful execution.”
            of US Strategic Command, who said that the space enterprise was not
            resilient enough to prosecute or survive high-end conflict which extends   A Single Accountable Command
            to space.
              With its existing structure the ‘national security space enterprise’ does   That  single  accountable  organisation  is  the  USAF  Space  Command,
            not  enable  US  space  forces  to  evolve  into  an  organisation  capable  of   which is now solely responsible for organising, training and equipping all
              operating in space as a war-fighting domain, the HASC said. Furthermore,   USAF space forces. These responsibilities include acquisition, resources
            its management structure jeopardises US space dominance.  and requirements, cadre development and war-fighting.
                                                                    On the red tape reduction front, the NDAA eliminated the position of the
            Fragmented Leadership                                 Principal Defense Space Advisor, a position that had no decision-making
                                                                  authority, and the Defence Space Council, which the summary described
              The HASC pointed to numerous studies and reports that have highlight-  as a bureaucratic forum that was not integrated into the DoD’s real deci-
            ed fragmented leadership and authority and the resulting lack of focus and   sion-making bodies.
            priority on military space, as well as ineffective decision-making.   It also nixed the position of the USAF Deputy Chief of Staff for Space
              As far back as 2000, the Rumsfeld Commission, also known as   Operations, as per the HASC’s recommendation, which the summary de-
            the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space   scribed as a “hastily-developed half-measure instituted by the Air Force,
            Management, called out the need for management and organisational   which at best only added a box on the organisational chart,” and finally the
            changes. It concluded that several disparate space activities should be   NDAA said that the Deputy Secretary of Defense must make one person
            promptly merged, chains of command adjusted, lines of communication   responsible for space budget prioritisation, but that person cannot be the
            opened and policies modified, in order to achieve greater responsibility   Secretary of the Air Force.
            and accountability, the NDAA summary noted.             To keep DoD honest, according to the summary, the NDAA also requires
              Subsequent reports years later, from the Institute for Defense Analyses   the Deputy Secretary of Defense to contract with a federally funded R&D
            in 2008 and the Government Accountability Office in 2016, said much the   corporation that is independent of the USAF, to guide Congress in the es-
            same. GAO’s 2016 report, entitled ‘DoD Space Acquisition Management   tablishment of a separate military department that will take responsibility
            and Oversight’ identified more than 60 stakeholder organisations involved   for the Department’s space activities.
            in space acquisitions and observed that: “…in general, the DoD has not   Whether the elevation of USAF Space Command to the status of the
            made any significant changes to space leadership over the last two dec-  single accountable organisation will fit the bill remains to be seen. Space
            ades.” National security space leaders echoed these conclusions in a   Corps supporters clearly think not and continue to push for it, but report-
            number of other hearings, such as the 2016 ‘National Security Space: 21st   edly believe forming such a corps could take between three and five years.
            Century Challenges, 20th Century Organization,’in which three senior re-
            tired space experts, “unequivocally,” answered no, when asked whether   Reusable Launch Vehicles
            they believed that the US was adequately postured to address the serious
            challenges faced in space.                              Whether or not the US eventually institutes such a corps with the kind of
              In a March 2017 joint hearing between several congressional subcom-  semi-independent identity, command structure and procurement bureau-
            mittees, former Commander of USAF Space Command, Gen. William   cracy as, for example, the US Marine Corps, its lawmakers clearly believe
            Shelton summed up the lack of progress since 2007 – when China tested   that it should have potent and coherent capabilities that enable it to retain
            an anti-satellite weapon – by saying that, “ten years of innumerable studies   the use of space for its own purposes, while preventing hostile powers
            and policy debates have not produced tangible improvements in our space   from using space against it.
            protection posture.”                                    One of the key pillars of developing such a capability, naturally, is relia-
              In May the same year the Director of the National Reconnaissance   ble access to orbit at a reasonable cost in real terms. Unsurprisingly, reus-
            Office, Betty J Sapp, argued that the US is failing to keep pace with ad-  able launch vehicles, particularly those built and operated by Elon Musk’s
            versaries who are making space a priority. “I believe we have not made the   SpaceX organisation, have attracted the interest of the HASC. Noting the
            investment that would indicate space is a priority or fundamental to the US.   successful relaunch on 30 March 2017 of a FALCON 9 rocket – in the
            Our requirements, budget, and acquisition processes are disconnected,   same class as the USAF’s Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV)
            and none of them moves quickly,” she said.            system – that had previously orbited a payload, it recommended that the
                                                                  government rapidly evaluate their use for military missions. EELVs include
            Guiding Principles                                    the Boeing/United Launch Alliance DELTA IV and the Lockheed Martin/
                                                                  ULA ATLAS V.
              To resolve the problem, the HASC put forward four guiding principles.   Arguably, the US military has a reusable vehicle capable of placing pay-
            The first is to reduce bureaucracy, clarify roles and responsibilities and give   loads (admittedly small ones) in orbit and even retrieving them. This is the
            one individual the power to lead the national security space enterprise.   Boeing-built X-37B Orbital Test Vehicle (OTV), a miniature analogue of the
            The second is to treat space as an equal to the other domains. The third   late lamented Space Shuttle. The OTV itself, however, is more of a payload
            principle is to identify a professional cadre of trained, promoted and sus-  than a launcher, as it needs a launch vehicle in the form of the ATLAS V and
            tained space experts, and the fourth is to establish an integrated national   has even been carried into space atop a FALCON 9.
            security space programme.                               That historic relaunch in March of last year took place from Launch
              The HASC’s first recommendation based on these principles was to   Complex 39A at NASA’s Kennedy Space Center in Florida, the FALCON
            create that Space Corps within the USAF. It would have been tasked with   9 orbiting a geosynchronous communications satellite. (The first stage of
            protecting US interests in space, deterring aggression in, from and through   this rocket had previously been used in a space station cargo resupply
            space and providing combat-ready forces to enable combatant com-  mission for NASA in April of 2016.) After separating from the second stage
            manders to fight and win wars. HASC’s second was to create a ‘sub-uni-  during the latest mission, the first stage returned to Earth for the second
            fied’ combatant command within STRATCOM, to strengthen operational   time, landing vertically on a drone ship stationed in the Atlantic, SpaceX
            leadership – a recommendation reportedly under consideration by the   reported. At the moment, it is only the launch vehicle’s first stage that is
            Pentagon. Elimination of the Principal Defense Space Advisor post was   reusable.
            the committee’s final recommendation.                   SpaceX points out that most of the cost of any space launch is incurred
              When the NDAA was enacted, besides denying formation of a Space   in building a rocket that is used only once, the price of which is compara-
            Corps but directing further study of the idea, it did mandate changes to   ble to that of a commercial airliner that will make tens of thousands of reve-
            USAF space programmes to  “begin fixing the broken national security   nue flights over its service life. The company argues that a rapidly reusable
            space enterprise,” according to the final congressional floor summary of   launch vehicle could reduce the cost of space flight a hundredfold. More
            the act.                                              importantly for a military capability, it could enable short notice launches
              These changes are to involve the streamlining of USAF acquisition   of usefully large payloads, essential to the effectiveness of any space force
              authorities, elimination of  “burdensome red tape” and empowering  “a   that aspires to war-fighting capabilities.
              single accountable organisation” for space forces (note the lower-case
            initials) within the USAF. These changes are intended to renew the em-  Peter Donaldson, with 25 years of experience as a journalist and writer covering
            phasis on the organisation and management of space within the US DoD   aerospace and defence technology and operations, is a regular contributor to MT.
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