Vol.XLVII · Issue 5 · 2023 ISSN 0722-3226 E 16,50 US $ 28,00 United with THEME: Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) NATIONS IN FOCUS: Great Britain – Poland THEME: Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) NATIONS IN FOCUS: Great Britain – Poland INTERVIEW: Embraer and Military Airlift in Europe EMERGING TECHNOLOGY: Loitering Munitions Airlift in Europe Loitering Munitions SPECIAL FOCUSES: DSEI AND MSPO
Emerging Technologies – DSEI Special Final Frontier – Fortress Europe. ........................................................................................ 55 Tim Mahon Counter-UAS – How to Mitigate Drone Threats?............................................................... 56 Stefan Nitschke Beyond Audio, a More Connected Soldier............................................... 61 Invisio Communications Team Doctrinal Developments and Market Perspective in Loitering Munitions................................................................................ 62 Massimo Annati Impressum.................................................................................................. 65 The 3-2-1 Interview Safe, Reliable, and Energy-efficient Lighting Solutions – Donato Sasso, Director of International Business Development, Streamlight® Inc......................................................................................... 66 Peli-Hardigg Custom Case Solutions for Aerospace & Defence............ 67 Open your eyes to... Air Defender-2023 – A simulation of NATO’s Air War with Russia............................................ 68 Babak Taghvaee From the Bridge The renaissance of ASW frigates – Comparative Analysis of European, U.S., And Asian Projects............... 71 Massimo Annati Cover The L15 High Explosive (HE) 155mm Shell is designed for use with a range of 155mm guns. It comprises of a high tensile steel body, filled with RDX/TNT and fitted with a user selected fuze (typically L106). The shell body is of thin-walled type with high fragmentation and blast effect. (Photo: BAE Systems) 5/2023 · 1 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY Contents Editorial What Is Weakness? ..................................................................................... 3 Marco Giulio Barone, Editor-in-Chief Observations from Europe Brussels Vilnius: many words, some milestones, a degree of uncertainty ............. 4 Caterina Tani Berlin The Time Factor........................................................................................... 5 Stefan Nitschke Paris Late Steps Forward...................................................................................... 6 Marco Giulio Barone Rome An Italian Hub for Underwater Technologies?........................................... 7 Marco Giulio Barone London Pivot or Consequences?............................................................................. 8 Tim Mahon Theme: Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance A Welcome Enhancement – The British Army’s Cyber and Electromagnetic Doctrine....................... 11 Thomas Withington ISR Suites For Special Mission Aircraft – Trends and Evolutions............................................................................... 15 Babak Taghvaee Nations in Focus – Great Britain – Special DSEI Work in Progress – Survey of Main British Procurement Programmes.................................. 21 Tomáš Chlebecek Key Technology developments for the GCAP programme..................... 26 Andrew White New Roles and Equipment for the Royal Marines................................... 30 Stephen W. Miller Developing Australia’s Amphibious Capabilities.................................... 39 Stephen W. Miller Nations in Focus – Poland – Special MSPO The Development of Polish National Defence Industry........................... 42 Robert Czulda The Development Plans of the Polish Air Force....................................... 48 Robert Czulda Interview Rediscovering the Key Role of Tactical Airlift in Europe – Interview with José Gustavo, Embraer..................................................... 50 Observations from Overseas North America The U.S. Navy Moves Out to Create a ‘Hybrid Fleet’................................ 52 George Galdorisi South America Peru Looks for an Early Warning Aircraft................................................. 53 Francesco Tucci Index of Advertisers Aaronia AG................................................................................................... 59 ADEX............................................................................................................ 46 Aimpoint AB................................................................................................. 37 ASELSAN Inc..................................................................................... 4th cover AUTOFLUG GmbH. ..................................................................................... 21 Chelton Ltd. ................................................................................................. 25 C.I.O. - Iveco – Oto Melara SCRL................................................................. 23 Diehl Defence GmbH & Co. KG......................................................... 2nd cover Defense & Security....................................................................................... 20 DSA.............................................................................................................. 10 EDEX............................................................................................................ 14 EUROSATORY............................................................................................. 54 Future Forces Forum.................................................................................... 43 Invisio A/S.................................................................................................... 33 I/ITSEC......................................................................................................... 38 KNDS – Krauss-Maffei Wegmann GmbH & Co. KG..................................... 45 Peli Products S.L.U...................................................................................... 31 Streamlight, Inc............................................................................................ 41 Systematic Software Engineering Ltd.......................................................... 13 Weibel Scientific A/S.................................................................................... 17 ˇ
For the first time since he rose to power, Vladimir Putin appeared weak during the controversial affair of Evgenij Prigozhin’s rebellion against Moscow. Putin’s image has been heavily harmed by the upraising of Wagner mercenaries, who were previously considered as part of Moscow’s capability to proficiently steer turf wars in favour of Russian interest. In these years, Putin has been able to exploit rivalries among Russian public and private stakeholders, to prevail and consolidate his power. Undoubtedly, the economic and social impact of the unsuccessful Ukrainian campaign pushed all factions in the same direction, instead, namely the containment of the President’s personal power. Albeit shadows are more than lights in the curious Wagner’s rebellion, we can suppose that Prigozhin wanted to leverage on this opportunity to gain more power or, if lucky, to effectively replace Putin with someone else. Initially, he always demanded the resignation of Defence Minister Sergeij Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valerij Gerasimov. Only when Putin officially labelled him as a traitor, he started criticizing the Kremlin directly. These nuances leave room for multiple interpretations about the true objectives of the rebellion. And many questions are left open about the surprisingly limited response of the Russian military when Wagner’s columns got close to Moscow. Nevertheless, from what we can observe today, the impact of the uprising on Putin’s power remains limited. Putin’s decree subordinating private contractors to the authority of Russian armed forces and Prigozhin’s exile in Belarus mark the victory of the Kremlin and the likely decline of Wagner in favour of other contractors. In Ukraine, Russian lines resist to Ukrainian offensive, despite growing pressure from the Ukrainian army. Putin will need to rebuild his image and to eliminate those who plot against him. On the external front, he will also need some positive results in Ukraine, and it would be realistic to expect some glamourous operations at some point, something that restores his image as war chief – regardless of its real impact on the conflict. However, Putin demonstrated once more his resilience and the lack of credible alternatives to him. In Europe, plenty of commentators and observers enthusiastically celebrated the proof that Putin is weaker than before and that there is hope for a different leadership in Russia or for the end of the war in Ukraine as a consequence of Russian troubles in internal politics. Leaving aside the possibility that Putin might be replaced by someone even more hawkish, violent, and merciless than him, should the ability to successfully conduct a military campaign depend exclusively on a linear calculus about “how strong leadership is”, no European country could be considered stable nor strong. The first reason is that – luckily – democracy does not allow for concentrating power as much as in Russia. The second is that in our democracies we are living in the opposite excess: no leader is strong enough, nor internally, nor in foreign politics. Editorial Even in France, a country whose Constitution is built to provide the President with large autonomy, especially in foreign politics, President Emmanuel Macron cannot dedicate too many resources too quickly to foreign politics and defence, despite he – like Rutte and Sánchez – has not inflicted any painful war to its people nor demanded for extreme sacrifices. Macron relaxed French labour laws, which had been among the strictest in the world, obtaining the fall of the unemployment rate. He eased auditing requirements, streamlined bankruptcy procedures, and lowered social charges and taxes for entrepreneurs. Business creation rose by 60% and France has overtaken the United Kingdom and Germany as the top destinations of foreign investment in Europe. He also enrolled freelancers in public unemployment insurance, extended welfare to one million more households, and made dental services, eyeglasses, and hearing aids free. His focus on economics pushed most of the French to label Macron as ‘dictator’ and ‘president of the rich’ and did not accept his reform of the pension system addressing disfunctions such as the lowest retirement age in Europe, the most expensive wealth system (16% of GDP), and early retirement for privileged categories. Despite the highly symbolic value of NATO summit in Vilnius, the discussion about the war in Ukraine was partly downsized in favour of an emphasis on the shift to the Asia-Pacific area, thus underlining who leads discussions and steers decisions withing the Alliance. Sometimes, considerations on strengths and weakness are just a matter of perspectives. And, recalling exultance about ‘Putin’s weakened position’, it should be clear to Europeans that – in the current situation – Athens cries but even Sparta can’t laugh. Marco Giulio Barone Editor-in-Chief Hence, the paradox is that, despite the disastrous Ukrainian campaign, declining economy, and lack of freedom, Putin remains solidly to power while in Europe leaders delivering on wealth and social advancement are sacked by their populations. For example, in recent elections in Spain, Basque and Catalan parties won enough seats to decide who becomes the next prime minister, who will later deal with their demands – for more autonomy or to reduce Madrid’s grip on regional politics. This despite Pedro Sánchez’s government’s impressive record. Spain’s economy is projected to grow 2% this year and in 2024, faster than the EU average, with beneficial effects on employment (at its lowest since 2008) and inflation (projected to fall from 8% to 3%). The government’s price cap on energy made Spaniards pay almost the lowest energy bills in Europe, and income tax, sales tax and taxes on food and fuel were reduced while taxes on banks and millionaires raised. The Sánchez government also increased the minimum wage, capped rent hikes at 3%, and gave contractors the same collective bargaining rights as employees. But Sánchez is far from enjoying stability and popular supports, and his position in foreign politics will be limited by internal constraints. In the Netherlands, the Dutch parliamentary elections in November are shaping up to become a three-way race involving outgoing prime minister Mark Rutte’s People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD), the conservative FarmerCitizen Movement (BBB) and a joint list of the Labor Party and Greens, all having between 15% and 18% percent support at the polls. The government will likely be formed by at least two of the three largest parties, and they would require a third and maybe a fourth party for majority. Consequently, extenuating negotiations on the governmental programme and, likely, on priorities in foreign politics will limit the Dutch government’s freedom of action. What Is Weakness? MT 5/2023 · 3
Caterina Tani Vilnius: many words, some milestones, a degree of uncertainty Many words, some facts - some obvious, others not - and unexpected implications. Thus, perhaps, July’s Vilnius NATO Summit can be summarised. Indeed, it had highly symbolic value and saw the Alliance ‘transfigure’ itself into something different, backed by a solid and unanimous consensus. The final declaration – a 90-point – Communiqué smacking of Strategic Concept update – shows a determination to change the Alliance’s strategic posture to face what is already a de facto Cold War 2.0. In Vilnius, NATO partly downsized the discussion about the war in Ukraine and the country’s accession to NATO, while emphasising the shift to the AsiaPacific area – the most critical geopolitical priority. At the same time, it formalised some other ‘internal’ business – such as the famous 2% spending as a ‘floor’, and the focus on technology. Vilnius’ NATO differs from its correspondent during the Cold War. Still, the Alliance seems to have regained its place in history and a leading role in a new contraposition between blocs based on different views and values that go far beyond the purely military aspect, embracing the institutional, economic, technological, social and ideological ones. NATO, self-described as an “indispensable transatlantic forum to consult, coordinate and act on all matters related to […] individual and collective security,” shifts from its traditional defensive role to become more ‘political’ by including various are aspects collected over time. Among them, new domains, such as space and cyberspace, and other ‘unorthodox’ issues, technology first and foremost (with the DIANA incubator moving its first steps and money), climate, pandemics, and migrations. This is a real, increasingly ‘global’ NATO, not only given Finnish accession (and Swedish-one-to-be) but mainly because of its increasingly Indo-Pacific characterisation. Suffice it to look at a world map to understand the extension of Evere’s new interests. Despite the high symbolism of Vilnius and the key position on the agenda for Ukraine - about war and accession -, the perception is that, despite all the transfer of war know-how and weapons, sanctions, and everything done so far, including the Communiqué’s statements, NATO’s support for Kyiv comes out somehow downgraded. In assessing the issue, it has to be taken into account the less successful than expected Ukrainian counteroffensive, the weakening of perception of Russia’s power due to the Wagner-related events, a certain decline in support to Zelensky’s requests caused by some degree of Western public opinions’ fatigue, and the perspective of an upcoming election season not only in the States and the EU but also in Russia. The result is a growing awareness that the war probably cannot that be ‘won’ by Kyiv in the way all Euro-American leaders hoped until a few months ago. In addition, there is the deliberate vagueness about the NATO accession of Ukraine, which enters into the limbo of the maybes and tomorrows, subject to unclear conditio-sine-qua-non. However, some results have been reached: the removal of the Alliance’s formal Membership Action Plan (MAP) a fast-track accession procedure for Kyiv and the creation of a NATO-Ukraine Council to discuss urgent and relevant issues (such as the wheat and Black Sea issue after Russia refused to renew Ukraine’s export agreement). Anyhow, behind NATO’s haziness is the longstanding fear of a Russian escalation in the event of Kyiv’s automatic accession and the risk of instability that Ukraine would bring to the Alliance once protected by Article 5. Although not directly mentioned, it seems clear that intentions, postures, reorganisation and enlargement are instrumental to a new global geostrategic confrontation, which sees democracy VS authoritarianism worldwide. Unlike during the Cold War, this confrontation might soon include actors who once belonged to the Non-Aligned group. The infiltrations in the various African countries and the turmoil in the Niger region show that major upheavals might happen quite soon, forcing NATO to focus on that area too. For now, the pro- NATO Pacific states are ‘full-fledged non-members’, while China is clearly the main geopolitical rival, while, the “developments in [the Pacific] region can directly affect Euro-Atlantic security” and vice versa as the communiqué says. The concept may seem a bit of a stretch given the geographic distance and the relative EU reluctance to go against China (especially in France and Germany). Still, it regains meaning as the US re-becomes (without ever really having ceased to be) the absolute centre of gravity of the Alliance. On the other hand, the EU has finally given up ‘free-riding’ – as Trump liked to say - and is finding its new geopolitical position as a complementary NATO pillar. The ‘bloc’ is expected to increasingly focus on the crises in its neighbourhood, from the Balkans to Africa. Meanwhile, it is pushing on the accelerator with its defence industry, so much that even the UK, recalcitrant after Brexit to share its defence with Europeans, is considering making a U-turn. Last but not least, Turkey. After its last-minute decision to lift its veto on Sweden’s inclusion in the Alliance, Ankara seems to be in the process of rapprochement with NATO after difficult years of relations with it due to the SAM S-400 issue and the 2016 failed coup against Erdogan. In return for the agreement on Sweden, Ankara is getting the US green light for the long-awaited license on new technologies related to U.S. F-16s, which is precious for local industry. Turkey is also an asset for the Alliance, given the diplomatic skills of Erdogan, who is currently trying to reactivate the Grain Deal. But while now the country seems to appear as a team player, there is always the possibility for the Sultan to go back to its zigzagging foreign policy (as already happened in the past). As for internal Alliance matters, in Vilnius, NATO increased its Rapid Reaction Force to 300.000 troops and made clear that the 2% GDP to be devoted to the military is barely the minimum. It also made clear that technological cooperation is a must, that the Alliance is alive and well, and constitutes the geopolitical, strategic and political-military centre of gravity of what was once called the ‘free world’. The future will show if and how this NATO centrality is correct. Based in Brussels, Caterina Tani is MilTech’s NATO and EU Affairs Correspondent. 4 · MT 5/2023 Observations from Brussels
Observations from Berlin MT 5/2023 · 5 Stefan Nitschke The Time Factor In July, the world looked forward to the NATO Summit in Vilnius. As expected, Ukraine determined the coordinates of the two-day summit. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has repeatedly reiterated his call for his country to become a full member of the Western Alliance. Zelenskyy, who surprisingly found support from Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on the question of membership in the Atlantic Alliance in the near future, nevertheless expressed disappointment. Apart from the first meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Council (there was a NATO-Russia Council before), the many discussions in Vilnius were not followed by any hope for rapid decision-making on Ukraine’s accession. At best, there were further, albeit substantial, commitments for arms deliveries to Kiev. What else happened? As to the admission of Sweden as the 32nd member state of NATO, Erdogan had given up his blockade. It was expected that he will submit the accession protocol to the Turkish parliament for ratification. It is unclear to what extent Washington’s intended delivery of F-16 fighter jets to Turkey played a role. Shortly before, the Turkish President had made Sweden’s membership conditional on the resumption of Turkey’s accession negotiations to the EU. Participants at the NATO summit saw this as a blackmail. The NATO summit meeting in Vilnius was in fact not the forum for decisions on arms deliveries to Ukraine. This lies in the responsibility the of the so-called Ramstein format. However, the conference participants were convinced that supporting Ukraine in the fight against the Russian aggressor requires a “concerted determination” from all NATO member states. Kiev itself wants to have a strong focus on longer-range weapons. An example, the French Government decided (on 16 March 2023) to provide the Ukraine with an undisclosed quantity SCALP-EG missiles (Système de Croisière Autonome à Longue Portée – Emploi Général), the French version of the British Storm Shadow air-launched (stand-off) cruise missile in operational use since May this year. Governmental circles in Kiev were prompting to argue that the Storm Shadow is “absolutely critical” to Ukraine’s counteroffensive. The question now arises as to whether Berlin may agree to the delivery of similar missiles. Voices are shown to increase in the Social Democratic Party (SPD) – part of the ‘Ampel’ coalition government – that no longer categorically rule out the delivery of Taurus cruise missiles to Ukraine. The German Air Force currently possesses roughly 600 missiles in its inventory. Now, after more than 500 days of war, the provision of the material demanded by Ukraine reflects the limits of what is feasible. Most of the European NATO partners are confronted with a depletion of their stockpiles – above all artillery ammunition. Even the United States speaks of a “worrisome thinning out” of their ammunition stocks but sees the Europeans as having an obligation to utilize their production capacities to full extent. And so it was that Washington considered providing cluster munitions to Ukraine. Berlin, on the other hand, was cautious. Like over 100 other countries, Germany has joined the agreement to ban cluster munitions – but not the USA, Russia, the People’s Republic of China and Ukraine. Meanwhile, the defence industry has long seen itself in an exceptional situation: it has to replenish the “melted down” ammunition reserves of the European allies and at the same time make enough ammunition available for Ukraine. The present production capacities are not sufficient to fill even the national shortages. Fifteen ammunition manufacturers in ten European countries want to remedy the situation. Twelve of these manufacturers produce the highly demanded 155mm artillery shells. It remains to be seen whether the ‘fast track’ initiative of the European Defence Agency (EDA), initially designed for two years, will have a likely effect and to what extent a procedure in close partnership, initially designed for seven years, will be able to fill-up the empty ammunition stocks. Not only because of the feared long production times. So, time is running out. Again, the time factor plays the biggest role, but not the money. Editor-in-Chief of companion journals Naval Forces and Wehrtechnik, Dr Stefan Nitschke is a frequent and welcome contributor to MilTech. ˘ ˘
Marco Giulio Barone Late Steps Forward After four years, the Paris Air Show, a symbol of France’s industrial influence in the strategic sector of civil and military aviation welcomed more than 2,450 exhibitors from 49 different countries and over 300,000 visitors. As many as 158 aircraft, drones and helicopters were showcases as well as a plethora of components, spare parts, sensors, and services. The visit of French President Emmanuel Macron, Prime Minister Elizabeth Borne, and several other key government figures underlined the importance of the event. Recently, the French government has announced a massive support for the aeronautics industry, including increasing public funding for research and development to €300 million per year starting in 2024, €50 million in public funding and €200 million in private investment for nine new hybrid, electric or hydrogen aircraft projects, and a €200 million budget to step-up the production of sustainable aviation fuels while supporting the country’s energy sovereignty. In the military sector, the impact of raising defence budgets and regrowing awareness about the need to rebuild a credible deterrent was visible thanks to a number of programmes being announced and/or showcased. As far as the SCAF/FCAS is concerned, the French, German, and Spain technical delegations gathered in Saint Cloud during the exhibition (June 20) to establish a common working method and to determine the digital tool sets that will enable the creation of model-based designs. A programme cloud accessible to all stakeholders, yet respecting everyone’s intellectual propriety will be also established, and Dassault Systèmes hopes that it will be selected as the main provider. In effect, the French company has a string track record, as it has a large portfolio of 350,000 clients in 140 countries and offers its Outscale cloud services and solution. In a dedicated press briefing, Dassault Aviation and Dassault Systemès envisaged a multi-layered cloud-based working environment that can become a nation-wide asset for France and, in perspective, for Europe, and can secure information of key programmes like SCAF – the combat cloud will be created in collaboration with Airbus, instead. SCAF’s future weapon systems were under the spotlight as well, with MBDA showcasing its Orchestrike swarming concept based on AI-driven software that allows to attack large areas through dozens of missiles and remote carriers, some of which providing escort jamming and the others acting as kinetic effectors. New weapons will be characterised by reduced radar and IR visibility as well as by long range of action to be launched from standoff positions. An example was provided thanks to a presentation on expendable remote carriers, which 4m long, 400kg, and 1h playtime demonstrator will contribute to the de-risking and maturation process. In a similar fashion, Diehl Defence showcased its own LARC (Ligh-Attack Remote Carrier) project for a 250kg munition with interchangeable nose and multiple possible applications, reportedly designed on the expected requirements of German MoD. Ground-based air defence systems were at the forefront as well, with multiple radars and launchers of the SAMP-T system showcased at the Eurosam and French MoD’s booths. The system is under the spotlight as the mixed Franco-Italian battery is now in service with the Ukrainian military. Meanwhile, Diehl’s IRIS-T SLM received the first feedback from the battleground, and its performance has been impressive, according to insights MilTech could gather at the exhibition. PAS was also the opportunity to launch the new MBDA’s Aquila interceptor, thought to counter hypersonic threats. Lastly, in the UAV sector the stage was taken by the new French drone Aarok, unveiled by the small company Turgis&Gaillard as national low-cost alternative to General Atomic’s MQ-9 currently in service with the French Air Force. The concept raised interest because it meets the French requirement of a single engine aircraft – which was discarded in the EUROMALE project – and is built exclusively by putting together existing French products from middle and small sized enterprises, thus demonstrating that “France possesses all the ingredients, already, it is sufficient to have the will to put them together”, Mrs. Gaillard explained to MilTech. Albeit this vivacious developments in the defence sector are gladly welcomed by armed forces and industry, a closer look at each programme shows that the glass is half empty. In effect, all programmes come horribly late. Negotiations of the SCAF/FCAS are taking so long that the demonstrator will fly only in 2029, while the first flight was initially expected in 2026. During the annual press conference, Eric Beranger, CEO of MBDA, acknowledged that the delivery of the first new SAMP-T battery will require 36-40 months, thus hampering the system’s impact on the current European security and creating a time gap that favours Israeli and US systems. While Aquila seemed a cutting-edge system for Europe, Rafael unveiled its SkySonic interceptor that looked in a much more advanced stage of development than Aquila, as the company unveiled that studies have been going on for three-four years now, and which development will speed up as Israel fears that Iran will field some hypersonic weapons relatively soon. In the UAV sector, Baykar proudly showcased its TB2, TB3, and Akinci UCAVs. While Europe plays with prototypes, Turkey has been selling 550 UAVs and according to Baykar’s figures the company manufactures as many as 30 per month. Big news also from Aeronautics, showcasing the new Orbiter 5 and unveiling numerous sales in Europe of the whole portfolio of its tactical UAVs. Meanwhile, while France preaches “Europeanism”, its prototype products (Patroller, Aarok, EUROMALE) keep overlapping with the Leonardo’s Falco family, which is ITAR-free, proven, and commercially successful outside of Europe – but never selected in Europe in favour of Israeli or US products. The take-home message is that, after working on awareness about the need of having a credible defence, the PAS demonstrates once more that European countries still have to learn that time matters and that pooling and sharing resources (and products!) is the only possible shortcut not to spend billions for late step forwards. Marco Giulio Barone is Editor-in-Chief of Military Technology. 6 · MT 5/2023 Observations from Paris (Photo: Marco Giulio Barone)
Marco Giulio Barone An Italian Hub for Underwater Technologies? During the 8° edition of SeaFuture exhibition in La Spezia, held on June 5-8, Italian Defence Minister Guido Crosetto announced officially that Marina Militare’s local dockyard will be modernised to become the centrepiece of an Italian hub for underwater technologies and, more in general, for maritime innovation. Already, SeaFuture is organized in the ageing buildings of the ‘Arsenale’, and brings together many industrial, academic, and institutional stakeholders in a truly unique event in the Mediterranean. For Italy, SeaFuture represents a meeting point for the national industry as well as a catalyst for technological innovation, scientific progress, commercial and economic development and, in the words of organisers, “a forum to raise awareness on the need to parsimoniously manage maritime resources”. More concretely, the so called ‘blue economy’ is an indispensable, enabling economic development factor for Italy. In Italy, the U-212NFS is seen as the renaissance of Italian autonomy in the underwater sector. The spelled-out ambition of Fincantieri and Marina Militare is to come back building submarines. In addition, as underwater technologies gain momentum, the Italian industry intends to leverage on the programme to trigger an upward spiral in the development of a technology powerhouse, with La Spezia at its core. In underwater technologies for submarines, Italy still relies on German technology and will need some transfer from TKMS to complete its knowledge base. However, the fact that Fincantieri now possesses the full design authority on U-212NFSs is seen as a great step forward. This allowed the integration of Leonardo’s Athena Mk.2U Combat Management System (CMS), Elettronica’s Electronic Warfare (EW) suite, and FIB’s lithium-ion batteries. It is possible than the second batch of U-212NFSs, on delivery in 2030 and 2031, will also feature a new AIP system with fuel cells jointly designed by Marina Militare and Fincantieri. At Sea Future, plenty of small and medium sized enterprises confirmed that these signs are seen as encouraging, and the exhibition itself represents the very first opportunity to gather enterprises and people together to make them start acting as a cohesive value chain. Most of them agree on the fact that – beyond optimistic proclaims – the pathway to achieve the goal of a fully functional Italian pole in underwater technology is long and challenging. But that everyone is appreciating the government’s, Marina Militare’s, and major Italian companies’ efforts to federate SMEs around key projects in a comprehensive supply chain. In effect, in the weeks after the exhibition, further concrete initiatives seemed to confirm that La Spezia is under the spotlight. For instance, Thales is to open a centre for the maintenance of naval sonars in the Arsenal. The new integrated support centre will occupy an area of 1,000 m2 and will double the number of engineers, technicians and managers currently employed. With the construction of the new integrated support centre in La Spezia, Thales Italia will be able to centralise all maintenance activities in one dedicated organisation: from training to simulation, from the integration and installation of electronic and mechanical hardware to assembly and testing. According to information MilTech could gather, such a move has been fed by Marina Militare’s wish to help concentrating industrial activities around the Arsenal and kick off its modernisation – today most of its large infrastructure is obsolete and underexploited. Naturally, creating a technology hub cannot underpin only national procurement, and some companies are already prepositioning and prearranging their ties in view of international market opportunities. For example, in August, Fincantieri and C.A.B.I. Cattaneo signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for the evaluation of commercial and industrial cooperation in the field of underwater vehicles and their integration with major vessels. C.A.B.I. Cattaneo is a leading company in the design, development, and supply of underwater vehicles for the Navy Special Forces. The MoU, which may be followed by a further cooperation agreement to be finalised by the end of the year, will allow the integration of underwater vehicles on Fincantieri’s surface and underwater products, thus improving, thanks to this new synergy, offers that can be formulated in relevant global markets. Both companies believe that cooperation can be extended to other specialised companies to strengthen the general positioning of Italian offers towards potential foreign customers. In fact, the offer could be strengthened through the marketing of a single capacitive package in which, in addition to Fincantieri’s platform, there will be CABI-manufactured underwater vehicles, functionally and physically integrated from the early design stages of the mother ship. And this can serve as a model for further similar synergies and arrangements. In brief, the Italian attempt of creating an underwater technology hub is in line with the current trend that sees the general expansion of underwater economic and military activities worldwide. Should the initiative succeed, Italy would demonstrate a return of its capability to establish and implement coherent and cohesive industry development policies, which have been missing for decades now. Marco Giulio Barone is Editor-in-Chief of Military Technology. Observations from Rome MT 5/2023 · 7 (Photo: Italian Ministry of Defence)
The conundrum facing security planners and authorities in 2023 is more complex than it has been for decades – yet on the surface seems relatively simple. Faced with long-term geopolitical change in Asia, on the Indian sub-continent and in the Middle East, it is seductive to allow temporary struggles such as those taking place in Ukraine to fade into the background, while wrestling with the issues of marshalling resources and developing sustainable doctrine to confront emerging threats. Would that life were actually so simply defined! For several years, Britain has identified China as the principal threat to national security in all its forms. Economic and information warfare have raised their heads in subtle and not-so-subtle forms. The fate of Hong Kong has been used as a lever by Beijing to try cowing what it sees as the rump of British imperialism. The brandishing of swords, in the form of regular and increasingly blatant incursions into Taiwan’s Air Defence Identification Zone, continues to generate concern in London, in Washington and in Brussels, as well as in capitals somewhat closer to the region of potential conflict. Uncertainty over Chinese plans in the South and East China Seas does the same. Yet simply looking forward frequently misses the point. History should inform Western planners just as much as forecasting – for it is history that inspires much of China’s thinking, ranging from the perceived wisdom of luminaries such as Confucius and Sun Tzu to analysis of the century-spanning trends of the nation’s history of conflict with its neighbours. A hundred and twenty years ago, British geopolitical thinker Sir Halford Mackinder suggested that China could (and would) easily expand to the west and bring “an oceanic frontage to the resources of the great continent”. Although not following Mackinder’s forecast playbook, China does appear to be using its ‘Belt and Road’ initiative to make increasingly assertive use of its rapidly growing combination of land and maritime power. It is also studying the predictions made in the late nineteenth century by American naval scholar and thinker, Alfred Thayer Mahan, who feared that a monolithic and increasingly powerful China would “be able to assert an influence proportionate to their mass, and to demand their shares in the general advantage”. Sensible analysis of China’s growing assertiveness in recent years has led to the US ‘pivot to the Indo-Pacific,’ for instance – and has also resulted in fundamental changes to the regional balance of power and future capabilities such as the AUKUS agreement, under which Australia will abandon its policy of eschewing nuclear power and will procure a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines to overcome the strategic mobility constraints imposed by its vast area of operational interest. AUKUS, of course, also raises another issue – that of the complication of the Asian strategic picture by the complex interplay caused by the interests of non-regional powers. That Australia, Britain and the United States agreed to implement an AUKUS programme is all well and good. That it did so without even consulting Paris – which considers itself as much an Asian player as either Washington or London – has led to a diplomatic ‘moue’ that will have long-term consequences. How profound those consequences may be, and how long they may last, remains a subject for conjecture currently: but the fact that France now considers itself to have been severely slighted – losing a multi-billion dollar contract for conventional submarines simultaneously with being presented with a strategic ‘fait accompli’ – comes at the same time as the nation has overtaken Russia to become the world’s second largest international source of weapon systems. Which raises a further question. The seemingly modern and advanced nature of some (but by no means all) Russian military equipment has been shown to be somewhat overstated as tactical results in Ukraine have become clearer. Although much of the apparent failure of Russian operations can be attributed to structural, rather than technological, inadequacy, the reputation that Russian arms have enjoyed in the world’s bazaars has suffered. In consequence, many current operators of Soviet and Russian legacy equipment may now be more persuaded to seek alternative supply solutions, thus further damaging the Russian economy and leading to greater isolation – and, therefore, greater risk of a spark igniting the powder keg it represents. And so we return to the conundrum identified above. National security is a more complex and more multi-faceted animal than it has ever been. Not only are the warfare domains multiplying – into space, the cybersphere, economics and information, among others – but the traditional boundaries of strategic considerations are being eroded – in some cases at the speed of thought. Actions to secure Australian sovereignty damage the standing of France which, alongside Germany, is now one of the critical pillars upholding the hegemony of the European experiment. Conflict in Europe has an indirect effect on extra-regional arms races in the short and long terms. Britain’s interests are so diverse and far-flung that it seems no budget, however munificent, can be stretched to address all the concomitant security concerns. Cold, academic analysis of strategic vulnerabilities is one thing. Sensible, effects-oriented policy evolution to address them is quite another. Both, however, need to learn lessons from history, especially as regards ‘what not to do’. At a time when there is an opinion growing in London that Iran is supplanting China as the direst threat to be confronted, introspection has become an unaffordable luxury. Decisive action is called for, in order to inject uncertainty into a potential adversary’s thinking. To do anything else misses the current opportunity for what some call ‘constructive engagement’ and others might term ‘strategic non-intervention’. Tim Mahon Pivot or Consequences? Tim Mahon is Publisher of the Unmanned Publications C-UAS web channel and a former Editor-in-Chief of Military Technology. 8 · MT 5/2023 Observations from London
SPECIAL ISSUE - Unmanned Aircraft Systems A Construct for Operations in the 21st Century Theme: Armoured Cavalry • The evolution of the armoured cavalry: comparative analysis • The role of medium calibre guns in recognition by force tactics • Large UGVs: the future of light cavalry unit? Nations in Focus: Egypt • Egyptian ambitions and the expansion of the military: geopolitical and industrial perspectives • The modernisation of the Egyptian Air Force – An opportunity to replace Russian products? • The role of armoured forces in the Egyptian Army and their evolutionary pathway Mönch Verlagsgesellschaft mbH Christine-Demmer-Str. 7 53474 Bad Neuenahr-Ahrweiler Tel.: +49-2641 / 3703-0 Fax: +49-2641 / 3703-199 E-Mail: marketing@moench-group.com www.monch.com Emerging Technologies To read in silence: overview of sonar suites for next generation submarines From the Bridge Naval intelligence: electronic reconnaissance ships, midgets, and unmanned assets PLUS….. Editorial, reports and commentaries from our correspondents from Europe and Australia, Interviews, Strategic pills from Russia and China, analysis Your established tri-service defence technology information service… because knowing is half the battle! MILITARY TECHNOLOGY Mechanized Brigade ‘Pinerolo’ Centauro II tank destroyer during exercise SIO 2021 at Torre Veneri, Apulia (Photo: Italian Army) The next issue of Military Technology will contain, among other things: Next Issue 6/2023 Reservation Deadline: 13 October 2023 Ad Material Deadline: 18 October 2023 Publication Date: 03 November 2023 Bonus Distribution: Dubai Airshow Dubai, UAE 12 – 16 November 2023 Milipol Paris, France 14 – 17 November 2023 EDEX Kairo, Egypt 4 – 7 December 2023
chiefly hostile radios, can indicate the position of red force units and personnel. Some CESMs may even be able to break into hostile radio traffic. The ensuing Communications Intelligence (COMINT) may provide valuable information on the enemy situation and their intentions. The radio spectrum can be used as a vector to transmit a cyberattack. Today’s military radio-dependent systems are digitised much like our cellphones, computers and a host of other electronic systems we depend on. Your cellphone and computer can be at risk of a cyberattack transmitted across WiFi, which also uses radio. A radar or radio can similarly be at risk from such nefarious activities. Rather than carry interference, radio signals can instead carry cyberattacks. Malicious code enclosed in these cyberattacks can infect the radio or radar they are targeting. Alternatively, the code may infect the communications networks and Command and Control (C2) systems these radios, radars, SATCOM or GNSS systems are connected to. The British Army is embracing the CEMA doctrine in two ways by reorganising its electronic warfare formations and adopting new equipment. The army is forming its CEMA Group, expected to be headquartered at Andover in southwest England. Army electronic warfare is the preserve of the Royal Corps of Signals which contains the 14th Signal Regiment (Electronic Warfare). ‘14 Sigs’ as it is known colloquially, is headquartered at Cawdor Barracks, southwest Wales. 14 Sigs has four Signal Squadrons; 223, 226, 237 and 245. An additional two regiments will join 14 Sigs in providing CEMA to the army. The Royal Corps of Signals’ existing 21st Signal Regiment, headquartered in Colerne, southwest The British Army is moving ahead forging its cyber and electromagnetic effects doctrine with the acquisition of new equipment. The project is known as ‘703117450 - JES/00146’, but this reference number helps explains why its ‘Project Poynting’ moniker is routinely used. The initiative seems to take its name from John Henry Poynting, an English physicist who lived between 1852 and 1914. Professor Poynting worked at the University of Birmingham in England’s West Midlands. One of Prof. Poynting’s great achievements was to devise a method for determining how much energy is transferred per unit area over a set time by an electromagnetic field. This process is known as determining a Poynting Vector. The standard measurement of the Poynting Vector is watts-persquare metre of magnetic field and Prof. Poynting derived these measurements in 1884. The Russian physicist and mathematician Nikolay Umov (1846 – 1915) is credited with a similar discovery. As a result of Prof. Umov’s similar endeavour the Poynting Vector is also referred to as the Poynting–Umov Vector. It is perhaps unsurprising that the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence (MOD) has given Prof. Poynting’s name to one of its most important electromagnetic initiatives. In the MOD’s own words, Project Poynting “will deliver a first-in-class tactical CEMA (Cyber and Electromagnetic Activities) capability to Land Forces.” Additional MOD details state that Project Poynting is to be delivered as part of the British Army’s overarching Land CEMA Programme. The Land CEMA Programme is the materiel manifestation of the goals established in the UK MOD’s Cyber and Electromagnetic Activities doctrine published in 2018. This CEMA doctrine covers all the UK’s armed forces. One part of the doctrine establishes a roadmap for synthesising the country’s land forces’ offensive and defensive cyberwarfare and Electronic Warfare (EW) capabilities. The convergence of cyber and EW can be controversial within both the cyber and electronic warfare communities. For example, cyberwarfare does not always depend on radio spectrum to achieve its effects. The radio spectrum is the part of the electromagnetic spectrum with a three kilohertz to three terahertz waveband. This bandwidth is where military radars, conventional radios, Satellite Communications (SATCOM) and Global Satellite Navigation Systems (GNSSs) all do their work. As a result, this part of the electromagnetic spectrum is also where EW practitioners ply their trade. These practitioners seek to protect their own radio- dependent systems, as listed above, from the EW capabilities of their adversaries. Likewise, EW cadres will use this part of the spectrum to attack their adversaries’ radio-dependent capabilities. These attacks can take the form of jamming; the deliberate transmission of electromagnetic interference into an adversaries’ radio-dependent systems with the intention of rendering them unable to do their work. EW systems, notably Communications Electronic Support Measures (CESM), can gather intelligence. CESMs can listen for hostile communications traffic and determine the location of hostile radios. Locating the source of these transmissions, Specialising in radar, communications systems, electronic warfare and all things of C4I, Dr. Thomas Withington is a defence journalist, writer and regular contributor to Mönch magazines. Theme: Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance MT 5/2023 · 11 Thomas Withington A Welcome Enhancement The British Army’s Cyber and Electromagnetic DoctrineEleven of the new Boxer wheeled armoured vehicles the British Army is receiving will be outfitted with the Cornerstone and Poynting architectures. The vehicles will collect COMINT and provide COMJAM and cyber effects. (Photo: UK MOD) An important change is ongoing in the British Army’s electronic warfare community which is seeing the incorporation of cyber effects as heralded in the MOD’s wider CEMA doctrine published in 2018. (Photo: UK MOD)
12 · MT 5/2023 Theme: Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Group’s three regiments to be used by these formations as and when required. The introduction of the Boxers likewise will probably see the eventual retirement of the Odette and FV-439 systems towards the end of this decade. Whether, and in what form, the Broadshield-equipped Jackal vehicles could be replaced remains to be seen. The MOD has not released a timeline regarding the introduction of Poynting. That said, the source close to the army’s EW community said they expect the selection of preferred contractor within two years. An initial operational capability for Poynting could follow in five. Arguably, it makes sense to introduce Cornerstone first. Of all the EW kit fielded by the British Army, Odette is the oldest and hence most in need of replacement. The source said that both the Cornerstone and Poynting requirements are funded. They added that industry has responded to MOD requests for bids. No information exists in the public domain on the companies that have submitted bids. The sensitivity of both initiatives makes it unlikely that their will be any bilateral or multilateral foreign participation in the programme. This is not surprising as the source said that countries typically do not like sharing their CEMA requirements. France, the Netherlands, Germany and Sweden all currently have existent tactical/ operational-level land forces EW requirements. Nonetheless, the highly classified nature of the mission makes it doubtful we will see any pan-European collaboration on land forces EW acquisitions any time soon. Bringing it Together The overhaul of the UK’s land forces EW capabilities has been on the cards for decades. In 2001, the MOD contracted Lockheed Martin to provide the army with new vehicular and backpack EW systems. These systems would be procured via the MOD’s Soothsayer programme. However, Soothsayer was cancelled in 2009 after costs overran by $60 million. A second attempt to procure land forces EW systems under Project Landseeker met a similar fate. Cynically, it could be argued that the army’s need for sophisticated EW systems to battle a near-peer adversary were less pressing when it was facing technologically backward adversaries in Afghanistan and Iraq. Russia’s first and second invasions of Ukraine in 2014 and 2022 respectively has changed priorities. Great power competition is back on the agenda in Europe. The UK, in conjunction with her North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) allies now face a foe which is investing in sophisticated communications technology. Since Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, the country’s military has been modernising apace. These efforts have seen the introduction of sophisticated, new digital communications like the R-187P Azart handheld, R-168 Akveduk vehicular/fixed-site and R-169 squad radios. These radios transmit across a 27MHz to 520MHz waveband and help carry data used by C2 systems like the Russian Airborne Force’s Andromeda-D. The British Army will need to hold these capabilities at risk using systems like Cornerstone and Poynting during any future conflict. The good news is that the MOD is taking army CEMA seriously. A new ‘Defence Command Paper’ will be published by the British Government imminently. The paper will “shape the way (UK Defence) thinks, operates, conducts business and fights,” according to the MOD. To this end, the MOD is seeking “solutions which are feasible, deliverable, cost-effective and accountable.” An article in late June published in The Economist said that EW is one of several areas prioritised by Ben Wallace, the UK’s Secretary of State for Defence. The other areas are air defence and longrange artillery. Europe’s volatile strategic environment, which shows no immediate signs of change, makes the delivery of advanced CEMA capabilities to the British Army paramount. Russian Army R-187P Handheld Radio. The Russian Army has invested heavily in military modernisation since 2008. These modernisation efforts have included the rollout of new communications and C2 systems to the Russian Army manoeuvre force. (Photo: Russian MOD) England, will re-role to support CEMA. 21 Sigs currently supports communications. Meanwhile 13th Signals Regiment, currently headquartered in Blandford, southwest England, will join the CEMA Group. 13 Sigs will support the cyber aspect of the CEMA group. The MOD has said in the past that it expects 21 Sigs to have rerolled to its new EW mission by 2024. 13 Sigs will be fully primed to perform its cyber role by 2028, the MOD has said. This should mean that the army’s new CEMA Group will be considered fully active by the end of this decade at the latest. Existing Capabilities Alongside organisational changes to the British Army to reflect the CEMA doctrine, the force is receiving new capabilities to assist these missions. From a materiel perspective, British Army EW capabilities currently include the Racal/Thales Odette CESM. Open sources state that Odette can detect, locate and identify radio signals across a three megahertz/MHz to three gigahertz waveband. The sources continued that deliveries of Odette commenced in 1999. Although mounted on Land Rover Defender four-wheel drive and Hägglunds/BAE Systems BV-206 all-terrain vehicles Odette is thought to only be used when static. Communications Jamming (COMJAM) is the preserve of the L3Harris Broadshield system. Broadshield is thought to outfit a selection of GKN FV-439 tracked vehicles used by 14 Sigs to engage signals across a 20MHz to six gigahertz waveband. The same COMJAM system is thought to equip SC Jackal wheeled reconnaissance vehicles also deployed by 14 Sigs. These Jackals provide COMJAM support to the army’s 16th Air Assault Brigade Combat Team, the force’s airborne rapid response formation. The FV-439s provide COMJAM support to the army’s wider manoeuvre force. Roke Resolve backpacks provide additional COMINT capabilities for dismounted troops, covering emissions across a waveband of three megahertz to three gigahertz. New Capabilities Two Ministry of Defence programmes are overhauling much of the British Army’s existing EW kit, notably projects Cornerstone and Poynting. Worth up to almost $500 million, Cornerstone will deliver a “networked land EW and signals intelligence capability,” according to a project tender released by the MOD in November 2022. Few details have been released regarding exactly what Cornerstone will entail, but this quotation infers that the Cornerstone replaces the Odette. No details appear to exist in the public domain regarding when Cornerstone may reach initial, and then full, operational capability. Conservatively, this could occur over the next five years, according to the author’s assessments. The Cornerstone architecture will join Poynting. Sources close to the British Army’s electronic warfare community told the author that Poynting will deliver offensive and defensive electronic and cyberattack. These capabilities will be used at the tactical and operational level by the army’s manoeuvre force. The Cornerstone and Poynting architectures will equip eleven of the army’s new ARTEC Boxer wheeled armoured fighting vehicles. It seems likely that the vehicles will be ‘pooled’ between the CEMA f
RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy MTM5Mjg=