capable LCS ship classes. In an adjacent mission set, since the end of the Vietnam conflict, the USN has taken steps to stay ahead of the evolving threats in the blue water, open-ocean domain, and migrate, to the maximum extent possible, its inshore and riverine capabilities to the Navy Reserve and Coast Guard. So much for good intentions, as the small boat, coastal defence mission remains enduring in naval operations. This issue finds the Navy scraping together 18 patrol boats as another component of expanding assistance to Ukraine. The initial, cryptic announcement by the DoD did not specify the type of craft to be sent, though Metal Shark recently announced the Pentagon is sending six of its maritime combat vessels to Ukraine. Regardless of the force mix, what is clear is the boats will support lower-end coastal defence missions, with Ukraine also relying on new anti-ship missile systems, like the Harpoons provided by Denmark, to counter the Russian Navy. The Bedeviling Force Structure Count Stakeholders in Washington are trumpeting 350, 400 and even 500 as the future recommended number of USN ships. While operators, the crafters of budget top lines and others in the decision-making process strive to justify their numbers, what is emerging are ever-increasing operational requirements for the future fleet – which promise to upend efforts to strategise and plan it. The US recently committed to forward deploy two more Arleigh Burke-class destroyers to Naval Station Rota in Spain – bringing to six the number of Forward Deployed Naval ForceEurope (FDNF-E) ships – at a time when it is concurrently strategising with allies in the Pacific on how to increase the number of ships that could deter China or match its expanding regional presence. At a Crossroads The Ukraine-Russia war and concurrent, fast-paced events in the Western Pacific should, indeed, be of concern to Biden administration officials and USN leadership. Far from a land fight, the war has provided numerous lessons for the Navy – including the three randomly selected above. These, and other early outcomes, highlight the conundrum of maritime nations gaining increasingly capable shore-based defences when, at the same time, the USN is responding to the clarion call for more capable ships for FDNF-E and other missions, as well as the need to concurrently support low-end operations, including river/coastal defence. At the end of the day, the Navy’s shipbuilding programme, in terms of numbers and ship-types, must also match its strategy to deter and compete with China in the Western Pacific and a resurgent Russia in Europe. The war in Ukraine is providing invaluable daily lessons for naval warfare. More significant, events there offer compelling justification to update tactics and strategy as nations eye strategic maritime threats reverberating well beyond this decade. Forget that the central strategic focus of the conflict remains the land domain. Dramatic events and less subtle, tactical and operational level activities gleaned from what has become a protracted conflict have attracted the attention of naval services in the US, Europe and beyond. The war has sharpened the focus on the challenges and rewards of conducting missions in the littoral regions. This comes at a time when the US is advancing military doctrines, including the USMC’s Force Design 2030 modernisation effort, that will conceptually allow operating with friends and allies against China, as a peer competitor, in the vast expanses of the Western Pacific. A dramatic moment in Ukraine came with the sinking of the Russian Black Sea Fleet flagship, the Slava-class cruiser Moskva, by multiple shore-launched Neptune anti-ship missiles. The weapon has only recently been fielded, state-owned Spets Techno Export having completed test and evaluation phases as recently as 2019. Beyond Ukraine, other nations are strengthening their coastal defence orders of battle. Indeed, US Vice Adm Jeffrey Trussler, Deputy CNO for Information Warfare (OPNAV N2/N6), has gone on record that recent monitoring activities included keeping China’s missile programmes – the DF-21D so-called ‘carrier killer’ in particular – on the watch list. After the Moskva’s sinking and the loss of several other Russian vessels, remaining naval units shifted their operating areas further out to sea, beyond the range of Ukrainian shorebased missiles. Warning alarms should be activated, from Washington, DC to Tokyo to Canberra – and beyond – that it is no longer ‘business as usual’ in future naval capability development, as the proliferation of land-based, anti-ship missile systems is at a point where a salvo is increasingly difficult to defend against. While it is too early to cancel carriers in the plan and design phase, perhaps the US Navy is getting it right as it moves to field the more agile and capable Light Amphibious Warship, designed to fill the capability gap between the Navy’s large, multipurpose amphibious warfare L-class ships and smaller short-range landing craft. Concurrently, the Navy is building more capable combatants, including new FFG-62-class frigates, with the first ten on contract for construction by the Fincantieri/ Marinette Marine-led team, all intended to replace the problematic, less From a New Orleans vantage point, former USN Captain Marty Kauchak covers a wide range of topics for MilTech, acting as North American Bureau Chief. Marty Kauchak Don’t Decommission Surface Ships – Yet A resurgent Russia has resulted in the US forward deploying two additional ships to Naval Station Rota, Spain to support the FDNF-E mission. (Photo: USN/Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Jacob Owen) 52 · MT 4/2022 Special Feature
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