Military Technology 06/2021

Caterina Tani The Duckbilled AUKUS The Aukus - the US, Australia and UK partnership, coupled with the US decision to share its nuclear- powered submarines with Australia, which entailed cancellation of French submarines from Naval Group – is a strange creature. It’s a mix of industrial and operational issues and a shared anti-Chinese strategy, all of them understandable. However, the move is also perplexing. From a strategic point of view, given that the entry into service of RAN nuclear submarines is expected for 2035, and also for the rudeness shown by the United States towards France. The decision, in fact, was seen as a deliberate act causing deep humiliation for the political and industrial prestige of Paris – a “stab in the back,” as French Foreign Minister, Jean Yves Le Drian, defined it. From a strategic perspective, there is no doubt that for the anti- Chinese coalition led by the United States, eight nuclear boats located relatively close to China’s operational theatre represents a formidable enhancement of capabilities – in ASW and in geopolitical threat. However, until 2035, Australia will have to rely only on its current six aging COLLINS-class boats. Fourteen years in geopolitics constitute a geological era: the period is so prolonged that it does not in any way change the strategic equation between China and its adversaries. It is therefore reasonable to believe that the announcement of the RAN’s procurement change is actually essentially a political move: aimed to show China a fierce coalition of maritime nations able to block the path to its growing oceanic and transcontinental ambitions, particularly in the South China Sea, and towards Africa and Latin America. The concurrence of the submarine announcement with the establish- ment of a close alliance between the three anglophone countries may suggest that submarines are mostly an expedient to emphasize the establishment of the alliance itself. What is not completely clear is the sense of such an alliance, considering that the Five Eyes and the Quad have similar purposes. As for France, the cancellation of the contract for 12 BARRACUDA- class conventionalized submarines - which experts do not consider of the highest quality – led to the de facto exclusion of France from Indo- Pacific strategies, notwithstanding its possessions in the two oceans and the two million French nationals living there . After President Biden’s almost-apologies to Macron for the “clumsy” move during the G20, it appears quite compelling that the United States did not seek to humiliate or punish France with AUKUS. As compensation for France, there are rumors the US might increase its support for Paris’ counter-terrorism operations in the Sahel, buy some French products for the Pentagon, or even sponsor a possible french candidacy for the post of NATO Secretary General. This is not a very likely hypothesis, given past French coolness towards NATO, but a Gallic Sec Gen would certainly favour the rapproche- ment already underway between the alliance and the EU. If the US is not guilty of ‘punishing’ France, it is possible the same does not apply to Britain, which not enjoying its best-ever relations with Paris, for several issues related to the consequences of Brexit. London might be willing to keep France out of the Indo-Pacific, but Paris sees the region as vital to French interests. Unlike France, the UK has no possessions in Asia-Pacific but, through Australia, New Zealand and also, perhaps, English speaking India and Singapore, maintains cultural, geopolitical, military and economic influence that give consistency to its claims in the area. In essence, Albion - perfidiously or not - succeeded in giving Indo- Pacific substance to Global Britain, driving out the eternal French rival. Washington has found itself embroiled in the game, voluntarily or not, and for this reason Paris has also been angered beyond measure. When it comes to AUKUS and the EU, France has tried to involve Brussels in the matter in various ways, receiving lukewarm reactions. Only the Commission ‘s President, Ursula von Der Leyen and European Council President, Charles Michel, shared – or seemed to share – some kind of frustration, in a statement after the announcement and in talks with his US counterpart, respectively. Indeed, in Europe, there are very qualified submarine builders who compete everywhere in the world with French industry. It is likely, there- fore, that the countries hosting these manufacturers were not particularly disappointed by the French setback, beyond the obvious Europhile statements of circumstance. Although the AUKUS affair was used as another example of the weakness of both the EU’s defence industry and geopolitical standing, it might, paradoxically, lead to a more meaningful EU strategy for the Indo-Pacific. The strategy, adopted in April 2021, calls for a stronger engagement “with partners in the Indo-Pacific, to respond to emerging dynamics that are affecting regional stability.” That means an adequate response to an increasingly assertive China, as the US is requesting. So far, however, the EU still maintains a two-faced approach, with member states exhibiting mixed feelings towards China. At the G20, Macron recognised “the importance of the Indo-Pacific Strategy” . Considering his possible desire for revenge, the first, shy steps the Union is taking with its defence, and the fact that France will hold the EU Presidency from January 2022, might lead to interesting scenarios. Based in Brussels, Caterina Tani brings extensive experience, contacts and expertise to her role as NATO and European Affairs Correspondent for Mönch Letter from Brussels MT 6/2021 · 41