Military Technology 06/2021

procrastination. Key capabilities, such as cloud computing, are relevant to entire national strategies, and thus initially encourage state intervention – the central actor, main financier and principal user. This is where things get complicated. Today’s technologies require huge upfront investment, which dwindles as the desired technology reaches maturity, while applications such as predictive maintenance promise considerable cost reductions over pro­ duct life cycles. A bummer for governments, whose inclination to spend in research in general - and especially in defence - is exactly the opposite manner. Governments in office tend to allocate small tranches of funds, possibly spread over several years, promising that the main tranche will come later, usually after the end of their mandate, so as to leave the ‘hot potato’ to their successors, should re-election fail. All major European countries behaved in this manner when allocating funds for air combat systems. This behaviour is not compatible with current technology evo- lutionary pathways. Moreover, the triad of key technologies we are dis- cussing does not have - in its initial phase - the production of striking ob- jects that politicians can show to the public to justify investment. Abstract capabilities with high technical content are difficult to promote, and of little utility in winning votes, not to mention the kind of jobs they create – strategists, planners, highly-qualified workers, engineers, researchers, and technicians – certainly not politicians’ favourite target electorate. To summarise, in addition to the technical advantages of the ‘quick win’ ap- proach, the selection of small objectives to be achieved in the short term may make it possible to show concrete goals that are easier to sponsor and communicate and, consequently, to finance. In addition, visibility can potentially be used to convince private investors to lend a hand, especial- ly in the difficult early stages of drip-feed funding, when robust solutions are needed. In short, from this point of view, new enabling technologies also revolutionise the way innovation is financed and managed, effectively creating a new understanding of technological progress for decades to come. Companies have been waging a technology battle over national/sover- eign knowledge powerhouses. When unaffordable at national level, blocks of countries created multi-national consortia, such as the TEMPEST and SCAF/FCAS programmes. This is a kind of market pre-positioning phase that goes beyond single projects. In fact, the revolution brought about by the triad of key technologies will affect the entire technological innovation cycle based on infrastructures and research centres. For instance, Tesla has stated it intends to build one of the most powerful supercomputers in the world, to be used to create entire virtual cities within which AI soft- ware intended for ground vehicles will be able to simulate traffic rules, accidents, contingencies, etc. to learn how to respond to all possible scenarios. Similarly, in the military field, supercomputers could be used in training autonomous aircraft by simulating threat situations and worst- case scenarios. This simulation effort would in turn be used for further expanding AI algorithms, tasking them with growingly complex missions, while consuming less energy and in smaller physical spaces for memory and processing. Capacity-building for future air combat systems is thus about spiral development, involving the design capacity of engineers, the calculation capacity of supercomputers and the learning capacity of AI applications. Money and Politics To conclude the analysis, it is also worth understanding how the rela- tionship between technological advances and financing works. New tech- nologies present new challenges in these respects as well. From a pro- grammatic point of view, the years 2035-2040 are not a fixed deadline, and have been decided upon almost arbitrarily, betting on the fast maturation of enabling technologies. Dates serve to give an idea of the time horizon, but in fact it is unclear when some key results will be achieved. There could be a long gestation phase followed by a rapid acceleration of tech- nological evolution or, to the contrary, an initial encouraging phase fol- lowed by an intermediate period of slow progress. In some sub-sectors, the desired outcome and feasibility are known, but in fact the intermediate pathway is not entirely predictable. Therefore, the approach taken today to nurture technological progress is the so-called ‘quick-win’ approach, which allows for results over time even if the deadline is arbitrary or im- precise. A ‘quick win’ is an improvement that is visible, has an immedi- ate benefit and can be delivered quickly after project commencement. A ‘quick win’ consists of achieving one or more short-term objectives that do not have to be deep or have an impact, but must be a concrete result that most stakeholders can agree is A Good Thing. The best ‘quick win’ objectives are those that are easy to implement, inexpensive and, of course, that can be implemented quickly. This artifice makes it possible to extol every small progress within the broader development path, even if the time horizon is distant or indefinite. From a technical point of view, such an approach allows reference points to be set for subsequent evolutionary steps. From a financial point of view, it is a way of compensating for the political tendency to Feature MT 6/2021 · 39 The EXCALIBUR flying test bench announced at DSEI by Leonardo for the TEMPEST programme. The choice fell on a Boeing 757, a generously- sized aircraft with a lot of available power. To squeeze all new findings into a fighter jet will be a monumaental challenge. (Photo: Leonardo) The TARGUS experimental aircraft used by Indra to develop fully autonomous pilot modes. Despite claims to the contrary, fully automating aircraft through a machine learning mechanism is one of the most difficult tasks. (Photo: Indra) f h