Military Technology 05/2021

Special Feature MT 5/2021 · 69 airborne and maritime ISR assets. In theory, this information can be gath- ered and distributed using China’s communication satellites such as the TJS-6 geostationary spacecraft launched in February. Making an Impact It is unlikely that China’s space infrastructure quite matches that of the US at this point. However, it is clear that concerted efforts are being made to develop its space situational awareness and ISR capabilities – and obvious that doing so will contribute to the PLA’s key doctrinal concepts that shape its understanding of successful operations in modern warfare. While the YAOGAN constellations may not be accurate enough to pro- vide a target-grade track for the DF-26B anti-ship missile, for example, they will suffice to point it in the right direction, allowing an active seek- er to provide terminal guidance. Some Chinese sources have indicated that satellites could be used for mid-course correction of such missiles, provided that timely and accurate information could be supplied up to the point of re-entry. This element of China’s space programme most obviously lends itself to the concept of target-centric warfare. Chinese aspirations to information dominance are also clearly supported by the space programme. Communication satellites, com- bined with China’s extensive network of ground control stations, will enable a very high bandwidth of data transmission, theoretically providing the PLASSF with the information necessary to make decisions on a re- al-time basis. It is worth noting that the PLA appears to have a number of examples it seeks to emulate, one being the US combined force that assassinated Osama Bin Laden, consisting of ground, air, maritime and space assets. The other is the Israeli Defence Force’s Ghost Battalion, deployed during the recent conflict with Hamas. It integrated a similar array of disparate assets into a networked formation, supported by space and cyber assets. Both formations have received attention from official publications of the PLA, indicating they are considered important. It follows that the ability of these forces to control information flow and conduct targeted strikes against pivotal enemy nodes is something the PLA is looking to emulate, perhaps on an even grander scale. It will be essential for the PLA to harness and maximise the capabilities of its space assets if it is to achieve this goal, and effectively conduct information dominance and target-centric warfare. Ground-based radars serve to track objects in low earth orbit (LEO), such as missiles or other satellites. This data might have two potential uses to the PLA: to track the orbit of an opponent‘s surveillance satellites and warn potentially sensitive sites of its path, allowing time for deception or concealment; the second, clearly of greater concern for the US, would be the provision of data to an anti-satellite system, be that energy-based (lasers) or kinetic (missiles). The fixed sites in China are supported by a number of mobile sites, intended to provide continuous coverage when satellites have orbited beyond the line of sight of fixed sites. This is backed further by maritime tracking systems, such as the PLA Navy’s six Auxiliary General Intelligence ships, which can be used for space tracking and missile instrumentation. Sitting alongside this infrastructure are a great many foreign bases, all ensuring that the PLA and China’s commercial sector have access to the information gathered from space as and when needed. In Orbit Of the many assets that China has orbiting the Earth, a few warrant particular attention, such as the YAOGAN-9 and SHIJIAN-6 satellite con- stellations, launched from 2010 and 2004 respectively. Both are believed to gather electronic intelligence (ELINT). The majority of the 13 YAOGAN satellites seem to be used for electro-optical (EO) and synthetic aper- ture radar (SAR) missions, according to a 2018 paper from the Project 2049 Institute. However, the YAOGAN-9 launches have deployed triplets of satellites in a choreographed, triangular LEO, indicating use for ocean surveillance. If the YAOGAN-9 constellations are, indeed, ELINT assets, as is widely believed, a three-satellite constellation could enables the geolocation of large vessels – such as aircraft carries – using a technique known as time difference of arrival (TDOA) direction finding, which works by measuring RF emissions from the target and the varying arrival times of those sig- nals at the receivers on the satellite. This can produce geolocation data accurate to within 10m a level of accuracy dependent on synchronisation and timing data gathered from a position navigation and timing (PNT) as- set such as China’s BEIDOU navigation satellite constellations. Though multiple factors can limit the efficacy of TDOA, the long reconnaissance times that such satellites provide, combined with EO and SAR surveil- lance, provide fallback options. Further contributions to the maritime targeting picture are likely pro- vided by the PLA’s over-the-horizon backscatter radars, as well as its Used to analysing and commenting on issues of land warfare and the realities surrounding the evolution of conflict, Morgan Douro brings a fresh perspective to the pages of MilTech and provokes reflection. The BEIJIXING AGI vessel. China deploys a range of intelligence and satellite control assets in a bid to ensure that the information required by the PLA is always available. (Photo: Japanese government)