Military Technology 05/2021

underpins defence’s renewed future operating concept, specifically in terms of our ambitious goal to achieve holistic and coherent multi-domain integration […] This is of utmost importance,” he continued, “if we are to best position ourselves as defence to respond to a world which is charac- terised by constant competition, most of which is being nefariously con- ducted in the grey zone, just below that threshold of what hitherto would have constituted conflict. And we are definitely seeing that happen on a daily basis in the space domain.” Some of the challenges posed by space-based systems were outlined in another keynote, from the UK military’s Director of National Intelligence, Lt Gen Sir Jim Hockenhull. When allied to the most recently developed domain of military operations - cyberspace - these challenges are amplified. “We look forward to supporting the development of the UK’s own sovereign space capabilities, whether those are in the public or in the pri- vate sector […] We are also more aware than most about the vulnerabilities that space presents. Our national resilience relies on satellites for global positioning communications and timing - making tracking these threats vital work. The cyber domain lacks the neat rules of the physical domains, and this means that our adversaries feel free to test our resolve on a daily basis, with large numbers of cyber attacks on our digital systems being recorded and responded to on a daily basis. Through the partnership between defence and the intelligence agencies, the national Cyber Force regularly disrupts the sources of these attacks, as well as dealing with serious organised crime and online child sexual exploitation. It is already making an important contribution to multi-domain integration.” Hockenhull’s merging of space and cyber when outlining his de- partment’s priorities was illuminating, and understandable. Data and command links to and from satellites rely on networked computer sys- tems, blurring any meaningful distinction between the space and cyber domains. If an adversary were to deploy a GPS jammer on the ground – transmitting a ‘loud’ RF signal which prevented other ground-based (or potentially also airborne) receivers from picking up the precision navigation and timing signal, traditional military thinking would deem that an act of electronic warfare, to be addressed by the appropriately trained and equipped unit. But the same effect could potentially be achieved by a cyber attack targeting receiver terminals, or potentially interfering with command signals sent to spacecraft. former deputy commander of the RAF’s TYPHOON Force, during a pan- el discussion on the UK’s next-generation air training systems. “If you take the example of a simulated enemy aircraft threat, it’s one thing to have a good 3D model of it with complex radar cross-section. It’s one thing to have a good model of the atmosphere that we’re transferring our simulated electrons across, and it’s one thing to have a good under­ standing of ‘own ship’ EW behaviours. But then being able to get those bits of information to talk to each other and do a complex EW counter- measure and counter-countermeasure exchange in real time between two companies, both with commercial separate contracts, is actually quite tricky […] Defence Intelligence own a big chunk of this […] Boeing [which operates the RAF’s new GLADIATOR training system] owns a big chunk of the infrastructure. BAE owns the information. And bringing all of them together with the right compatibility and the right interface standards is no small task. The more we do it, I think the more we’ll get better at it, and there are standards evolving daily as to exactly how we’re going to do this better going forward.” The RAF is not just looking at building a next-generation ISR capability in the air-breathing domain. The service has held the UK military’s brief in space for years, and with the creation in 2020 of the MoD’s Space Directorate - and, within that, a Space Command, headed by a two-star RAF officer - the domain is ever more central to the force’s thoughts and plans. From largely being confined to running the SKYNET defence communications network, the RAF now has far-reaching responsibilities in space, much of them concentrated on safeguarding society’s growing reliance on satellite-borne services, which underpin vast swathes of the UK’s critical national infrastructure. Air Vice Marshal Harv Smyth, Head of the Space Directorate, told DSEI during his opening-day keynote that space is front and centre in not just MoD but wider governmental thinking: and the ISR products derived from space – and their security, and the security of the systems that produce and disseminate them – are there- fore an area of intense focus. “From a defence perspective, we fully appreciate our intimate depen- dence on space, both as an operational domain in its own right but also as the key domain which integrates all others across the global stage […] There’s absolutely no doubt - certainly in my mind, and those at the top of defence - that space affords us the operational advantage we enjoy today against our potential adversaries. And its integrating role fundamentally 58 · MT 5/2021 C4ISR Forum When significant elements of an aircraft’s control system are delivered to the pilot through a helmet, integrating the helmet display into simulators adds another layer of technical complexity, and raises data-integrity and -ownership issuers. (Photo: BAE Systems/David Baird)