Military Technology 05/2021

34 · MT 5/2021 Feature The highly-publicised use of UCAVs in Syria and Nagorno-Karabakh has led many to herald a new age in warfare. The truth is less clear-cut. (Photo: Azeri MoD) be borne in mind that the vehicle is part of a system – meant to be deployed as part of a networked battery, with networked C2 and re- connaissance assets form- ing an air defence system . A PANTSIR vehicle alone does not form a system, and is likely a relatively simple target for networked UCAVs and their supporting assets. The second reality is the permissive environment created by the en- gaged forces. Most footage released by the Azeri MoD clearly shows Armenian troops and vehicles out in the open – no attempt to conceal the vehicles or deceive the attacking force’s reconnaissance assets. The same could be said of the Syrian forces in Idlib, Kots, reporting at the time of the Turkish strikes, said “In all my trips to Syria, I have never met a local fighter with a shovel. He does not know what digging is in principle. No dugouts. No shelters for equipment. The UAVs shot them as if it was a shooting range.” The effective use of camouflage, concealment and de- ception have been proven to increase ground target survivability against aerial threats from 9-38% without, to 42-90% with it, according to one US Army study from the 1990s. The third reality is the totality of the battlefield. In neither of the above scenarios were UCAVs operating alone. It is most likely that many of the reported strikes were actually conducted by long-range artillery, rath- er than the munitions carried by the aircraft themselves. Whilst UCAVs played an important role in locating the targets and coordinating the fires, they were not responsible for achieving those effects alone. The totality of the Azeri or Turkish battlefields did that. What, then, of the UCAV? Two conclusions offer themselves. The UCAV is an economical way to provide poorer states with a functioning and relatively capable air force at low cost. It can be used by states such as Turkey to support a partner state at low risk, and to achieve geopolitical goals without risking expensive manned aircraft. This may be a pattern that Russia seeks to emulate, and China may well pursue it with alacrity. Secondly, UCAVS offer a cautionary tale for those NATO states that have typically delegated air defence to their air forces. Air force assets are in high demand, and limited in availability – the assets needed to engage UCAVs or their control stations might not always be on hand. It follows that some form of organic battlefield air defence with the range to engage UCAVs such as the TB2 should feature in the everyday table of equipment for expeditionary forces. Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs) have risen to promi- nence recently, largely due to the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and Turkey’s use of them against Syrian forces and their proxies in Idlib in February 2020. There impact on the modern battlefield should not be overstated, however. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict gave birth to an array of narratives on the changing character of warfare. One could, perhaps, be forgiven for thinking that a shift equivalent to the advent of air power had taken place. “Azerbaijan’s drones owned the battlefield in Nagorno-Karabakh – and showed future of warfare,” a November 2020 headline in the Washington Post read. “Armed Low-Cost Drones, Made by Turkey, Reshape Battlefields and Geopolitics,” stated the Wall Street Journal. The truth is far murkier: this portrayal of UCAVs dismisses or ignores a number of battlefield realities. In both theatres, attacked forces were notably lacking any coordinated or capable air defence. Yes, the Armenian and Karabakh forces had some 9K33 OSA-AKMs, a Soviet-era SHORAD system, which were quickly neu- tralised. Armenia could also deploy six TOR-M2KM SHORAD vehicles, able to engage the Azeri BAYRAKTAR TB2 UCAVs, among others, providing they could be detected and were in range. This is the first battlefield reality to be firmly grasped in assessing the true utility of UCAVs. The Armenian air defences were far from an effective and functioning network. Terrain contributed to this, as mountains and hills make accurate radar tracking of aerial targets difficult. The task is further complicated by UCAV designs, which typically minimises the use of radar-reflecting materials, leading to a reduced radar cross-section. Furthermore, poor Armenian organisation led to air defence units being poorly deployed and easily located and isolated for engagement. Syrian forces in Idlib faced a similar conundrum, and reportedly scrambled Su-24s to counter the TB2 and ANKA-S UCAVs approcahing their forces, only for Turkish F-16 to engage them with air-to-air missiles without leaving Turkish airspace. Alexander Kots reported for Zvezda Weekly that, on the arrival of BUK and PANTSIR-S1 air defence systems, Turkish UAV operators were forced to operate with more caution. Yes, a number of Syrian PANTSIR-S1 vehicles were defeated but, it should Used to analysing and commenting on issues of land warfare and the realities surrounding the evolution of conflict, Morgan Douro brings a fresh perspective to the pages of MilTech and provokes reflection. Morgan Douro Killing the Sacred Cow UCAVs and the Realities of the Battlefield f