Military Technology 04/2021

Caterina Tani NATO 2030: a Marriage of Great Interest? It is now several weeks since NATO reshaped its nature in light of the ‘new world order’ and the changes in the strategic relationships between the US and Europe - anticipated at the Cornwall G7 a few days earlier. The fulcrum of this ‘new deal’ is the NATO Strategy 2030, which applies to the decade which has just begun. In 74 points, the comprehensive but complex document sets itself the ambitious goal of covering all aspects of the “global world of Atlantic interest.” This means the strategic, operational, geopolitical, military and civil issues that affect – or will affect – the Alliance and its members. Although there have been other documents dealing with these subjects, this can be said to be the first occasion on which NATO redefines its 21st-century priorities in such a manner. Beyond a plethora of good intentions, meticulously – but not always clearly - listed, a number of fundamental issues emerge: Russian assertiveness, the global explosion of Chinese power, new challenges in technology, climate and health, plus a new ‘Strategic Concept,’ to be presented next year. The new strategy postulates a different distribution of responsibilities and tasks between the two pillars of the Alliance – namely the United States and the EU – considered as a whole. The US acknowledges Europe as an equal and “adult partner” and guarantees it strategic protection – meaning the nuclear umbrella. In exchange - and as a consequence – Brussels must be able to take responsibility for its own strategic dilemmas, and to avoid fractures, especially regarding fresh initiatives aimed at the containment of China. The United States needs to concentrate most of its military potential on the Indo-Pacific region, in order to give substance to that contain- ment and to reassure the various Asian states that feel threatened by the Chinese giant, as they lack adequate military resources to deal effec- tively with it. To be able to do this, Americans must gradually disengage from the European theatre, transferring the majority of conventional military tasks to European nations – or even to the military structure of the European Union, if and when it might be ready. Washington will continue to maintain nuclear deterrence in Europe against the most imminent atomic threats – in immediate prospect, Russia, but with an eye to potential additional players in the future. Some conventional forces will remain, mainly in Germany, Italy and the UK – more as a symbolic move, to show US commitment to Article 5 – while other assets will be transferred to the Alliance. However, US forces will lose their residual status of ‘occupation forces,’ which they have subliminally retained since the end of the Second World War. Everything else will have to be managed by the Europeans, especially the friction with Russia and the chaos on and around the Mediterranean. If it is true that a credible EU defence does not yet exist outside NATO, it is also true that Europeans should become more autonomous - even with NATO support - and deploy missions as and when needed. The same goes for capabilities, which should be developed through the existing and future EU mechanisms, such as PESCO and EDF, without this posing a threat to the Alliance. In addition, the EU will have to take a more consistent and coherent stance on China. The ‘waltz rounds,’ will no longer be possible, with all due respect to German, French and Italian trade with Beijing. The same applies to the transfer of critical technologies, which has long been a matter of contention. The document also covers climate and health challenges in some depth. Regardless of good intentions, aimed at dealing with the ‘security’ aspects of these challenges, it is pretty clear that they are more legiti- mately the concern of other nations and political organisations or bodies. The intentions to fill the technology gap seem serious. The United States can not and does not want to lag behind the Chinese Dragon. The establishment of a Defence Innovation Accelerator (DIANA), a sort of modified version of the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), in two years’ time, and launch of the Innovation Fund, demonstrate commitment. Implementation might, however, be an entirely different kettle of fish. It goes without saying that this redistribution of responsibilities and concrete means to cope with challenges implies a virtually equal relation- ship between Washington and Brussels, coupled to a further rapproche- ment between the two. The two sides of the Atlantic will have to celebrate if not a marriage inspired by love – too many years have passed since the first date – then at least a marriage of interest: a union with equal rights and equal respon- sibilities, enunciated in a comprehensive, structured marriage contract. The NATO 2030 Strategy could represent a first draft of such a contract – but the road stretches far ahead! Should such a rapprochement, and EU acceptance of a global per- spective for NATO, ultimately fail – then a gap might once again open up between Brussels and Washington – with unpredictable consequences. Based in Brussels, Caterina Tani brings extensive experience, contacts and expertise to her role as NATO and European Affairs Correspondent for Mönch Letter from Brussels MT 4/2021 · 53