Military Technology 04/2021

104 · MT 4/2021 Rear Echelon Natalia Pouzyreff is an engineer and a member of La République en Marche , the centrist/liberal political party created by Emmanuel Macron in 2016, which dramatically changed the shape of French politics in the 2017 election. As a députée in the Assemblée Nationale since June 2017, Mme Pouzyreff sits on the Defence Committee. She is a board member of the Franco-German Parliamentary Assembly, where she is the French coordinator for the ‘foreign and defence policies’ working group. Her background includes appointments with both Thales and Airbus, for the latter of which she served three years in Beijing as the representative of Eurocopter. MilTech is grateful for her agreement to contribute this column, of which a French language version has appeared in La Tribune. In 2020, global arms spending exceeded US1.8 trillion. This represents a sharp acceleration in rearmament processes, compared to previous years. Furthermore, beyond conventional weapons, the trend is also to- wards increasing expenditure on nuclear weapons. Indeed, the strategic context has deteriorated in recent years. Persistent proliferation, whether in Korea or Iran, and operational breakthroughs re- sulting from the advent of new technologies, mean more missiles, poten- tially equipped with dual warheads, such as those developed by Russia. Currently, the nature of the nuclear threat destabilises the global balance and degrades security, right up to Europe’s very borders. Such a situation demands the maintenance of deterrence and the rein- forcement of its credibility. The United States is in the process of renewing its nuclear deterrent budget and Great Britain is considering increasing the number of nuclear warheads in its inventory. For France, nuclear forces remain the ultimate guarantee of its sov- ereignty, intended to provide a response to aggression, not for use as a ‘first strike’ weapon. French deterrent credibility relies upon continuity of doctrine and permanence of posture. Hence, the nuclear weapon is a political weapon, in the hands of the Head of State, embedded in the political discourse on sovereignty since the end of the Second World War. This ‘political weapon’ also relies on steadfast institutions and on na- tional consent. The budget allocated to modernisation of the nuclear de- terrent is voted for on a yearly basis in Parliament. 1) The operational efficiency of the French deterrent system is affirmed during exercises that take place every eighteen months for the airborne nuclear component. The naval component, distinguished by its perma- nent nature, consists of four ballistic missile submarines that alternate on patrol. Nevertheless, France manages to reconcile the credibility of its nu- clear forces with a commitment to arms control, as stated in the Non- Proliferation Treaty’s (NPT) intentions regarding the reduction of arsenals. Indeed, France has already ceased production of fissile material and dis- mantled the relevant facilities, applying the principle of ‘strict sufficiency.’ In Europe, France assumes a sovereign, unilateral posture – in much the same manner as the United Kingdom. Both nations contribute to the defence of Europe. It is obvious that our national vital interests en- compass a European dimension: Greece is within range of Iranian bal- listic missiles, and we remain committed to the reassurance process on Europe’s eastern flank. Today, NATO remains the cornerstone of Europe’s collective defence – and the alliance is a nuclear one, with responsibility shared among its 21 European allies. These states are therefore stakeholders in European deterrence. Yet some question the extent to which some of them shoulder their responsibilities and contribution to the alliance. Which is precisely why EU Member States must jointly question the role of nuclear deter- rence in Europe. To achieve that, a real reflection among Europeans must be initiated and a common strategic culture must be developed. This is the essence of President Macron’s address of 7 February 2020, aimed at reinforcing the European dimension of deterrence. Similarly, a consensus between European countries regarding arms control is essential. Indeed, the NPT, in conjunction with the International Atomic Energy Authority’s verification systems, is the only way to guaran- tee a degree of balance in the strategic posture of the permanent mem- bers of the UN Security Council. This is in contrast to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which creates the risk of asymmetry and does not propose any kind of control process. Secondly, agreement between member states is all the more neces- sary in the current post-INF [Intermediate Nuclear Forces] treaty context, 2) as we witness a resurgence in the deployment of intermediate-range weapons on the EU’s own borders. In fact, it would be appropriate for EU member states to take an interest in this issue. Furthermore, a joint discussion between EU states and NATO should be launched: we woe this to our fellow members – it is, above all else, about the security of we Europeans. To this end, Members of Parliament can usefully contribute to the public debate. In conclusion, Europe, through its members states, should formalise a deterrent posture while strengthening the European pillar within NATO, as well as the transatlantic link. Only in so doing will our collective security regain credibility – and our respective nations assume their community of destiny. Natalia Pouzyreff, Member of the French National Assembly Why Europe Should Address Nuclear Deterrence Mme Natalia Pouzyreff is a député in France’s Assemblée Nationale and a member of the Defence Committee. (Photo: Assemblée Nationale) f 1) The current multi-year Military Planning Act calls for the allocation of € 25 billion to nuclear deterrent capabilities in the period 2019-2023. 2) The 1987 treaty foreswore conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 500-5,500km.