Military Technology 5/2019

8 · MT 5/2019 Although the pursuit of or, more correctly, return to multi-domain operations is welcome and long overdue, many of the ‘revolutionary’ changes being attributed to ‘multi-domain’ may actually have little to do with the concept. Cooperation between land, sea, air and other defence and security forces has occurred before. The Allied campaigns of World War II, particularly in the Pacific, demonstrated a refined orchestration of air, ground and naval assets. This was a period when armies had coastal artillery, navies regularly conducted shore bombardment and bombers laid sea mines to blockade Japan’s ports. Air, land and sea forces did not simply cooperate, but regularly integrated their respective capa­ bilities. This was demonstrated by the use of medium bombers against German ground forces in Caen during the Normandy campaign. Such ‘joint’ multi-domain operations were common by the war’s end. The post war years, unfortunately, saw a return to service parochialism that often suited advocates of single arm or technology dominance. The separation of air, land and sea forces, justifiable from an ad- ministrative and logistical standpoint, ignores the actual dynamics of warfare and hinders the key tenet of war – unity of effort – i.e. close integration of activities in pursuit of a common objective. The new discussion on integration, which now includes the cyber domain, is encouraging. It is, however, a misnomer. Restoring the capability for forces to exchange information, affect targets and coordinate will not in itself provide a solution to dynamic, rapidly changing, fluid nature of contemporary warfare. Multi-domain warfare recognises the truism that human conflict is not neatly compartmentalised. Its interactions are inevitable. Current inabilities by land, sea or air forces to impact on activities in the others is the result of a lack of specific means to do so. Viewed through a multi-domain perspective, it seems incredible that the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS), one of the longest-range rocket artillery systems, has never had a ship attack capability. Similarly, air forces, with the exception of naval air, have largely ignored their potentially critical contribution, not only to the maritime environment but also at times to the front line battle. These limitations were self-imposed, an assertion borne out by some current initiatives to provide multi-domain tools. Many of these solutions already exist or are easily adapted. The Raytheon-Kongsberg Naval Strike Missile (NSM) has now been integrated to the US High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) truck-mounted version of the MLRS, providing a long-neglected coastal defence capability. The QUICKSTRIKE-ER air-delivered precision naval mine (a 10-year arfare has rarely been confined to land, sea, or air alone. Applying military force to and across each of these has often been key to success. History offers countless instances of warships destroying fortresses or aircraft sinking ships. The unified application of military power across domains has resulted in decisive tactical, operational and strategic advantage. Today, the conduct of cross- or multi-domain operations is a major topic of dis- cussion. It is viewed as a response to peer-to-peer conflict and to accelerated changes in technology. Speaking at the Brooking Institution in early 2018, Gen James Holmes, Commander of US Air Force Air Combat Command , suggested the move to multi-domain warfare is driven by the need to re- spond to the speed at which adver- saries, including Russia, China and non-state actors, are adjusting to counter new technology and tactics. A similar rationale has been made by US Army leadership. Gen Stephen Townsend, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Commander, stated that multi-domain operations “employ capabilities across domains to pose multiple and compounding dilemmas for an adversary.” old technology) has been deployed by naval aircraft and air force bombers, replicating the effective offensive use of naval mines against Japan. Applying power across physical domains is definitely a good thing, but it alone will not address the dynamics faced in warfare. This requires a shift in mind-set at the tactical, operational and even strategic level. Multi-domain by its very nature focuses on the physical, while the change that needs to occur is a mental one. This mental approach to conflict is known as Manoeuvre Warfare, recognising current and future dilemmas and offering a solution. The concept rests on generating a rapidly-changing environment in which fast tempo, fast transit and quick kill disorient and confuse an opponent, making his response self-destructive or at least irrelevant. The US Marines reflect this concept in their Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication MCDP-1 ‘Warfighting’. Manoeuvre warfare is a core process that by its nature is multi- domain. Of critical importance is that it is applicable not only to land, sea, air and the electromagnetic spectrum but that it also provides an all-encompassing non-hardware system specific framework for operations at all levels. It also more clearly reflects the capabilities needed to successfully respond to the challenges of asymmetric conflicts of any nature. W Stephen W Miller Cross/Multi-Domain Operations and Manoeuvre Warfare Opinion Stephen Miller is a former US Marine and defence industry executive with experience in 24 countries that provides a unique perspective.